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Color Constancy Reconsidered

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Abstract

This article proposes an account of color constancy based on an examination of the relevant scientific literature. Differences in experimental settings and task instructions that lead to variation in subject performance are given particular attention. Based on the evidence discussed, the core of the proposal made is that there are two different forms of color constancy, one phenomenal and the other projective. This follows the hypothesis of Reeves et al. (Perception & Psychophysics 70:219–228, 2008). Unlike Reeves et al. (Perception & Psychophysics 70:219–228, 2008), it is argued that projective color constancy is crucially dependent upon phenomenal color constancy and certain aspects of scene perception. Additionally, it is hypothesized that capacities that support projective color constancy have an important role to play in facilitating our ability to quickly recognize scenes with diagnostic chromatic properties independently of assignments of colors to object surfaces.

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Notes

  1. To further elaborate, while some things of which I am consciously aware are phenomenally present (e.g., apparent color of the sort tapped in appearance matching tasks), there may be other things of which I am consciously aware that do not have a qualitative nature. As an example of the latter, some researchers hold that a conscious belief does not, in itself, have a phenomenal aspect. Of course, one may feel certain things as a result of entertaining that belief, but that is separate from the belief itself having a phenomenal character.

  2. To illustrate this using anti-realism about colors, it seems open to say that our color experiences represent objects as being objectively colored while nothing actually bears color properties. On such a view, colors exist only in the representational contents of our experiences. That is importantly different than saying colors are properties of experiences. After all, to take a property about which objectivism seems safe, whether or not my experience of something looking square is veridical, my experience itself does not have the property of being square; similarly, my thoughts about unicorns do not themselves possess the property of having a horn. The projectivist about color sensations denies this and contends that redness (greenness, etc.) is a property of my experience itself that an external object such as a ripe strawberry is systematically and mistakenly seen as having. See also the remarks about phenomenal transparency later in this section.

  3. David Foster, one of the co-authors of Reeves et al. (2008), has expressed skepticism about the existence of a constancy of perceived color (Foster 2003). I will argue later that Foster's (2003) concerns apply to the projectivist component proposed by Reeves et al. (2008).

  4. One prediction of this proposal is that, for any arbitrary scene, if it shares the same relevant cone ratio properties with a scene having diagnostic colors, it should be classified as the same sort of scene as the latter.

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Acknowledgments

I am deeply grateful to Adam Reeves for providing much helpful feedback that has sharpened my thinking on the matters addressed in this paper. A debt of thanks is also owed to Charlie Chubb, David Hilbert, Kimberly Jameson, Kent Johnson, Louis Narens, A. Kimball Romney, and Jack Yellott.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, California State University, Long Beach, MHB – 9th Floor, Long Beach, CA, 90840, USA

    Wayne Wright

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Wright, W. Color Constancy Reconsidered. Acta Anal 28, 435–455 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0187-3

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