Abstract
The article responds to the objections M.D. Ashfield has raised to my recent attempt at saving epistemic contextualism from the knowability problem. First, it shows that Ashfield’s criticisms of my minimal conception of epistemic contextualism, even if correct, cannot reinstate the knowability problem. Second, it argues that these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of the commitments of my minimal conception. I conclude that there is still no reason to maintain that epistemic contextualism has the knowability problem.
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Notes
The problem is usually labeled the ‘factivity problem’. I think ‘knowability problem’ is a more adequate description.
For the sake of simplicity, I will omit insertion of a time parameter.
I hold that the strength of the subject’s epistemic position with regard to the proposition P depends on the truth of P. If P is false, the strength of the subject’s epistemic position is minimal. Others might wish to separate questions of truth from questions of the strength of the epistemic position; such an alternative view would have no bearing on my argument, though it would influence its exposition.
This claim needs modification. If context i defines a standard that is impossible to meet, then knowledgei ascriptions are necessarily false. I ignore this complication henceforth.
I simplify by assuming that knowledge claims are about complete propositions and ignore the possible involvement of other indexical terms.
Proposition (4) below contradicts (2), but follows, given the mentioned principles, from (3):
(4)Note that premise (1) is, strictly speaking, superfluous in this argument.
The proof assumes factivity and a certain form of closure.
Since there is no mention of knowledge of varying standards in Thesis, the issue of the knowability problem can be seen to be independent of questions of contextualism or variantism. I emphasise this point in Freitag 2012.
“Minimal epistemic contextualism” functions here more as a name rather than a description. I doubt that (MEC) really is, strictly speaking, minimal (see fn. 21 below), but we need not consider still weaker forms of contextualism here.
In my 2011 paper, I call the more general variant of (MEC) “(Compatibility)”. The move from (Compatibility) to the more specific (MEC) does not make for a substantial change here.
To be more exact, it seems that universally quantified versions of MEC better represent the original position of contextualists:
$$ \left( {{\text{MEC}}^*} \right)\;\forall s \in \mathfrak{S}\;\forall {\text{p}} \in \mathfrak{P}:\diamondsuit \left( {{{\text{K}}_1}\left( {s,p} \right) \wedge \neg {K_h}\left( {{\text{s,p}}} \right)} \right)\; .$$I think that (MEC*) is unnecessarily strong, but I shall not defend that view here. The decisive feature of minimal contextualism is not the type of quantifier used, but the involvement of the modal operator. Ashfield’s objections are meant to apply to MEC and MEC* indiscriminately. Because of that, I take the liberty to switch back and forth between MEC and MEC* as the right form of minimal contextualism.
Or MEC*.
MEC* does, and MEC does not, entail the possibility of (1) and (2).
Have I misunderstood Ashfield’s notion of a contextualist story? Perhaps “ECS” is meant to stand for MEC? – Then the argument may indeed be cogent, but won’t support Ashfield’s case: the conclusion of such a revised version of the argument is what I have endorsed anyway, namely that contextualism is committed to MEC.
Even S herself may knowh (1) and (2) without contradiction, if only she has this knowledge at other times than those when she does not knowh that hands is true.
It should be remarked that Ashfield here refers to my more general formulation of the contextualist thesis, (Compatibility). But (Compatibility) claims that knowledge according to some standards is possible; thus it, too, contradicts global scepticism.
Let me mention in this connection that some might think MEC to be still too strong as a formulation of EC. As Ashfield correctly points out, one might conceive of a contextualist position that accepts two different knowledge standards, both of which cannot be met. My original characterisation of contextualism allows for this possibility, while MEC does not so allow. So MEC is not really a minimal characterisation of epistemic contextualism.
References
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Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Christopher von Bülow for his last-minute corrections and Alexandra Zinke for many helpful discussions.
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Freitag, W. In Defence of a Minimal Conception of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. D. Ashfield’s Response. Acta Anal 28, 127–137 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0168-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0168-y