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Against the Minimalistic Reading of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to Wolfgang Freitag

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A Reply to this article was published on 29 September 2012

Abstract

Several philosophers have argued that the factivity of knowledge poses a problem for epistemic contextualism (EC), which they have construed as a knowability problem. On a proposed minimalistic reading of EC’s commitments, Wolfgang Freitag argues that factivity yields no knowability problem for EC. I begin by explaining how factivity is thought to generate a contradiction out of paradigmatic contextualist cases on a certain reading of EC’s commitments. This reductio results in some kind of reflexivity problem for the contextualist when it comes to knowing her theory: either a knowability problem or a statability problem. Next, I set forth Freitag’s minimalistic reading of EC and explain how it avoids the reductio, the knowability problem and the statability problem. I argue that despite successfully evading these problems, Freitag’s minimalistic reading saddles EC with several other serious problems and should be rejected. I conclude by offering my own resolution to the problems.

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Notes

  1. Baumann 2008, p. 584. See Wright 2005, p. 242. Cf. Blamey 2008, Stjernberg 2009, and Hazlett 2010.

  2. Freitag takes “S knows in context x at time t that p” to be synonymous with and less cumbersome than “‘S knows that p’ is true in context x at time t.”

  3. Following standard notation, I use corner quotes (e.g., ┌ and ┐) to denote propositions and quotation marks to denote sentences.

  4. E.g., Cohen 1988, p. 105; DeRose 1995, footnote 33; Lewis 1996, p. 564.

  5. For ease of presentation, Freitag supposes that the contextualist accepts a stronger principle, which I will call, \( {\text{Closure}}_{{\text{F}}} :\forall x \in \Xi ,\forall S \in \sum ,\forall t \in T,\forall p \in \Pi _{e} :{\left( {{\left[ {{\text{K}}_{x} {\left( {S,t,p} \right)}\& {\left( {p \to q} \right)}} \right]} \to {\text{K}}_{x} {\left[ {S,t,q} \right]}} \right)}. \)

    ClosureF implausibly maintains that knowledge is closed under entailment simpliciter, and no contextualist would accept it. However, Freitag is in the clear, because given Factivityc, ClosureF implies Closurec:

    1. K x (S, t, p) & K x (S, t, [p → q]) (Assumption).

    2. K x (S, t, p) (from (1) by Simplification).

    3. K x (S, t, [p → q]) (from (1) by Simplification).

    4. p → q (from (3) by Factivityc).

    5. K x (S, t, q) (from (2) & (4) by ClosureF).

    6. Closurec: [K x (S, t, p) & K x (S, t, [p → q])] → K x (S, t, q) (from (5) by elimination of Assumption).

    So anything that can be derived using only Factivityc and ClosureF, can be derived using Factivityc and Closurec. See Freitag 2011, p. 278. My expanded presentation of the factivity-generated reductio simply avoids the implausible ClosureF principle altogether. My thanks to Wolfgang Freitag for explaining how this derivation is accomplished.

  6. Brueckner & Buford 2009, p. 434; 2010, p. 487. Although (3) says nothing about ascribing knowledge, I follow Brueckner & Buford in assuming that knowing an epistemic subject S knows p involves mentally ascribing knowledge of p to S. See also Mylan Engel’s discussion of unspeakable and unthinkable knowledge, where he assumes that the conversational and semantic features of EC apply to one’s mental life: Engel 2004, p. 212.

  7. See Baumann 2008 and 2010; Brendel 2005 and 2009; Wright 2005.

  8. Lewis 1996, pp. 559–561. See Cohen 2001, endnote 10.

  9. I benefitted from the presentation and discussion of Howard’s paper, “Wright’s Factivity Objection and DeRose’s Ordinary Language Basis for Epistemic Contextualism,” delivered at the Fifth Annual Midwest Regional Graduate Conference, DeKalb, IL, October 21, 2011. This “fluid view” is contrasted against a “static view” where epistemic contexts do not shift so easily.

  10. Engel 2004, p. 208; Brendel 2005, p. 41.

  11. Engel 2004, p. 208.

  12. Lewis 1996, p. 566.

  13. Freitag refers to (1) as the ‘truth commitment’ and (2) as the ‘no-knowledgeX commitment’ respectively. See Freitag 2011, p. 281–282.

  14. This assumes that the conversational and semantic features of EC apply to one’s mental life. See footnote 6.

  15. Brendel finds it unclear how a remote error-possibility contextually salient to (2), like the brain-in-vat hypothesis, could be an error-possibility for EC, but this objection makes sense of such a case. See Brendel 2005, p. 50.

  16. Brendel 2005, p. 50.

  17. Baumann 2008, p. 583.

  18. Engel 2004, p. 212.

  19. Brueckner & Buford 2009, p. 437.

  20. Freitag 2011, 4.

  21. For example, Keith DeRose asserts that, contrary to Invariantism, semantic standards vary context-to-context: “According to contextual analysis, when the sceptic presents her arguments, she manipulates various conversational mechanisms that raise the semantic standards for knowledge, and thereby creates a context in which she can truly say that we know nothing or very little. But the fact that the sceptic can thus install very high standards which we don’t live up to has no tendency to show that we don’t satisfy the more relaxed standards that are in place in ordinary conversations.” DeRose 1992, p. 917, my emphasis. See also DeRose 1995, pp. 4–5.

  22. Freitag 2011, p. 277.

  23. Freitag 2011, p. 278.

  24. Freitag 2011, p. 281, my emphasis.

  25. This analysis, which Freitag prosaically names “Condition,” is accompanied by an extensive exposition and defense, which I will not rehearse here. See Freitag 2011, pp. 279–281.

  26. See Williamson 2001, pp. 26–27; Wright 2005, footnote 8; Baumann 2008, pp. 587, 595–598.

  27. See Freitag 2011, p. 282.

  28. See Freitag 2011, p. 281.

  29. Freitag says that its falsehood can be intuitively demonstrated by noticing that Compatibility is consistent with

    Omniscience: ∀x ∈ Ξ, ∀S ∈ Σ, ∀t ∈ Τ, ∀p ∈ Πe: [p → K x (S, t, p)] (Freitag 2011, footnote 20).

    It’s worth noting that it would be no virtue of EC for it to be consistent with this insane-sounding thesis that all true propositions are known in all contexts by all epistemic subjects at all times. See Williamson 2002, p. 271. However, Freitag’s alternate formulation of EC is actually inconsistent with this Omniscience thesis:

    EC*: ∀S ∈ Σ, ∀t ∈ Τ, ∀p ∈ Πe: ◊[K l (S, t, p) & ¬K h (S, t, p)] (Freitag 2011, footnote 21).

    Assume the possibility that subject S knows in low-standards context l, but not in high-standards context h, at time t that r.

    1. 1.

      ◊[K l (S, t, r) & ¬K h (S, t, r)] (Assumption).

    2. 2.

      K l (S, t, r) & ¬K h (S, t, r) (Assumption).

    3. 3.

      K l (S, t, r) (from 3 by Simplification).

    4. 4.

      ¬K h (S, t, r) (from 3 by Simplification).

    5. 5.

      K l (S, t, r) → r (instance of FactivityC).

    6. 6.

      r (from 2,5 by modus ponens).

    7. 7.

      r & ¬K h (S, t, r) (from 4,6 by Adjunction and discharging Assumptions).

    So, in some possible world, there is some true proposition r that is not known in some high-standards context h, at some time t, by some subject S. In this possible world where the contextualist story is true, Omniscience is false.

  30. Freitag 2011, p. 282.

  31. Baumann 2008, p. 583.

  32. Freitag 2011, p. 281.

  33. This Compatibility* thesis is logically equivalent to Freitag’s Compatibility thesis.

  34. Freitag 2011, footnote 21.

  35. I owe this observation to Stephen Maitzen. Cf. DeRose 1991.

  36. Freitag 2011, p. 281.

  37. At best the minimalistic contextualist can know the contextualist story is true in some possible world. But, of course, to know it to be true in that possible world is to make it inconsistent and unknowable, or unstatable in that world.

  38. See Brendel 2009, pp. 407–408.

  39. See Freitag 2011, footnote 19.

  40. Freitag 2011, p. 281.

  41. Baumann 2008, p. 583.

  42. Wright 2005, pp. 240–241. See Freitag 2011, footnote 2.

  43. Freitag 2011, p. 278, my emphasis.

  44. E.g., Engel 2004, pp. 210–213.

  45. Cohen 2001, p. 93. See DeRose 2000 and 2004.

  46. One should treat Freitag’s minimalistic reading as a cautionary tale: in restricting EC’s commitments to avoid the problems of reflexivity, the contextualist must guard against sweeping away too much.

  47. My thanks to Brandon Williams for pointing this out.

  48. Engel 2004, p. 204.

  49. Lewis 1996, pp. 550, 566.

  50. Much of the substance and phrasing of this final paragraph is owed to comments from Geoff Pynn, delivered at the Central States Philosophical Conference, St. Louis, MO, September 16, 2011.

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Acknowledgements

I wish to express my appreciation to Mylan Engel Jr., Louis Gularte, Steve Maitzen, Geoff Pynn, Wes Skolits, Brandon Williams, and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier versions of this paper. I also want to thank Peter van Elswyk for encouraging me to look into the factivity problem.

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    Michael D. Ashfield

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Ashfield, M.D. Against the Minimalistic Reading of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to Wolfgang Freitag. Acta Anal 28, 111–125 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0153-5

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