Abstract
The paper focuses on Reinhardt Grossmann’s analysis of the Argument from Physics, as well as the analysis by the Spanish philosopher Antonio Millán-Puelles, in an attempt to assess the validity of the Argument on the basis of their respective critical views. Both authors agree in perceptual realism and in the need to distinguish between the scope and objects of Physics and the ordinary objects of natural perception. Their criticisms mainly concern the inappropriate use of the principle of reduction in the Argument and the distinction between secondary and primary qualities, which is, according to Grossmann, one of the sources of idealism and phenomenalism.
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Notes
I have also discussed the other two arguments in El problema de la irrealidad de las cualidades secundarias. El realismo perceptual según Antonio Millán-Puelles y Reinhardt Grossmann, Fundación Universitaria Española, Madrid, 2009, 351 pp.
Cf. FW, p. 58.
Cf. FW, p. 58 and ff.
For atomists, all the sensitive qualities of a body are dependent and reducible to figure, position, and location of atoms in the body (Cf. El problema…, Chapter III, Section 1).
This is the formulation used by Grossmann in “Reid, Meinong, and the Argument from Physics”, Metaphysica 1 (2000), p. 69: “Out there, in the non-mental world, only atoms (elementary particles) and their properties exist.”
The following quotations of Galileo’s work are taken from the text translated by Drake (1957). This volume includes three books by Galileo and some selected excerpts from The Assayer. Compare the Italian version: Il Saggiatore, in Le opere di Galileo Galilei, Firenze, Vol. VI, G. Barbera Editore. 1968, parag. 48, p. 346ff.
G. Galilei, The Assayer, in Discoveries…, p. 275. (Il Saggiatore, Section 48/p. 349: “[…] Quella sensazione che noi diciamo tatto, la quale, se bene occupa tutto il corpo, tuttavia pare che principalmente risegga nelle palme delle mani, e più ne i polpastrelli delle dita, co’ quali noi sentiamo piccolissime differenze d’ aspro, liscio, molle e duro, che non altre parti del corpo non così bene le distinguiamo; e di queste sensazioni altre ci sono più grate, altre meno, secondo la diversità delle figure de i corpi tangibili, lisce o scabrose, acute o ottuse, dure o cedenti: e questo senso, come più materiale de gli altri e ch’ è fatto dalla solidità della materia, par che abbia riguardo all’ elemento della terra”).
The human body has around 260,000 Krause’s corpuscles in the deeper level of the hypodermis, which are specialized as cold receptors. Ruffini’s corpuscles (35,000), located in the hypodermis too, are also heat receptors. But the selective or specialized character of these corpuscles is not absolute, i.e., their receptivity is not always exclusive.
Dealing with heat, he writes: “[…] first I must consider what it is that we call heat, as I suspect that people in general have a concept of this which is very remote from the truth. For they believe that heat is a real phenomenon, or property, or quality, which actually resides in the material by which we feel ourselves warmed”. G. Galilei, op. cit., p. 274. (Il Saggiatore, p. 347: “[…] questo che noi chiamiamo caldo, del qual dubito grandemente che in universal ne venga formato concetto assai lontano dal vero, mentre vien creduto essere un vero accidente affezione e qualità che realmente risegga nella materia dalla quale noi sentiamo riscaldarci”).
Ibid., p. 277–278. (Il Saggiatore, p. 351: “Ma che oltre alla figura, moltitudine, moto, penetrazione e toccamento, sia nel fuoco altra qualità, e che questa sia caldo, io non lo credo altrimenti; e stimo che questo sia talmente nostro, che rimosso il corpo animato e sensitivo, il calore non resti altro que un semplice vocabolo”).
Ibid., p. 275–276. (Il Saggiatore, p. 349: “E perché di questi corpori alcuni si vanno continuamente risolvendo in particelle minime, delle quali altre, come più gravi dell’ aria, scendono al basso, ed altre, più leggieri, salgono ad alto; di qui forse nascono due altri sensi, mentre quelle vanno a ferire due parti del corpo nostro assai più sensitive della nostra pelle, che non sente l’incursioni di materia tanto sottili tenui et cedenti: e quei minimi che scendono, ricevuti sopra la parte superiore della lingua, penetrando, mescolati colla sua umidità, la sua sostanza, arrecano i sapori, soavi o ingrati, secondo la diversità de’ toccamenti delle diverse figure d’ essi minimi, e secondo che sono pochi o molti, più o men veloci; gli altri, ch’ ascendono, entrando per le narici, vanno a ferire in alcune mammillule che sono lo strumento dell’ odorato, e quivi parimente son ricevuti i lor toccamenti e passaggi con nostro gusto o noia, secondo che le lor figure son queste o quelle, ed i lor movimenti, lenti o veloci, ed essi minimi, pochi o molti”).
As my present intention is just to show—not to discuss—Galileo’s ideas, I will merely point out that there is a lack of accuracy when expressing that particles have properties such as being subtle, delicate, and soft because softness would be in any case a property which can be perceived through the sense of touch, not through the senses of taste or smell. If Galileo’s argument is based on the fact that earth particles can be dissolved and become as soft and subtle as to become suitable for the taste and smell receptors, it is also true that the subsequent perception of those particles has nothing to do with softness or subtlety, but with odors and tastes.
Ibid., p. 276 (Il Saggiatore, p. 349–350: “Resta poi l’elemento dell’ aria per li suoni: i quali indifferentemente vengono a noi dalle parti basse e dall’ alte e dalle laterali, essendo noi constituiti nell’ aria, il cui movimento in sè stessa, cioè nella propria regione, è egualmente disposto per tuti i versi; e la situazion dell’ orecchio è accommodata, il più che sia possibile, a tutte le positure di luogo; ed i suoni allora son fatti, e sentiti in noi, quando (senz’ altre qualità sonore o transonore), un frequente tremor dell’ aria, in minutissime onde increspata, muove certa cartilagine di certo timpano ch’ è nel nostro orecchio. Le maniere poi esterne, potente a far questo increspamento nell’ aria, sono moltissime; le quali forse si riducono in gran parte al tremore di qualque corpo che urtando nell’ aria l’increspa, e per essa con gran velocità si distendono l’onde, dalla frequenza delle quali nasce l’ acutezza del suono, e la gravità dalla rarità”).
Ibid., p. 276–277. (Il Saggiatore, p. 351: «Ma che ne’ corpi esterni, per eccitare in noi i sapori, gli odori e i suoni, si richiegga altro che grandezze, figure, moltitudini e movimenti tardi o veloci, io non lo credo; e stimo che tolti via gli orecchi le lengue e i nasi, restino bene le figure i numeri e i moti, ma non già gli odori nè i sapori nè i suoni, li quali fuor dell’ animal vivente non credo che sieno altro che nomi, come a punto altro che nome non è il solletico e la titillazione, rimosse l’ ascelle e la pelle intorno al naso. E come a i quattro sensi considerati ànno relazione i quattro elemento, così credo che per la vista, senso sopra tutti gli altri eminentissimo, abbia relazione la luce, ma con quella proporzione d’ eccellenza qual è tra ´l finito e l’infinito, tra ´l temporaneo e l’ instantaneo, tra ´l quanto e l’ indivisibile, tra la luce e le tenebre. Di questa sensazione e delle cose attenenti a lei io non pretendo d’ entenderne se non pochissimo, e quel pochissimo per ispiegarlo, o per dir meglio per adombrarlo in carte, non mi basterebbe molto tempo, e però lo pongo in silenzio”).
Such an identification is akin to the one recurring among the secondary qualities, on the one hand, and pain, itching, etc., on the other. These properties (the tickle) correspond to the “emergent” properties (Sellars); in other words, these properties depend on sensations that occur in sensitive bodies and are different from the “physical” properties of inanimate nature (see Chapter 1 in Andrew Chrucky, Critique of Wilfrid Sellars' Materialism, 1990. Available at http://www.ditext.com/chrucky/chru-0.html).
Cf. FW, p. 6.
G. Galilei, op. cit., p. 275. (Il Saggiatore, p. 348: “Io credo che con qualche essempio più chiaramente spiegherò il mio concetto. I vo movendo una mano ora sopra una statua di marmo, ora sopra un uomo vivo. Quanto all’ azzione che vien dalla mano, rispetto ad essa mano è la medesima sopra l’ uno e l’ altro soggeto, ch’ è di quei primi accidenti, cioè moto e toccamento, nè per altri nomi vien da noi chiamata: ma il corpo animato, che riceve tali operazioni, sente diverse affezzioni secondo che in diverse parti vien tocco; e venendo toccato, v. g., sotto le piante de’ piedi, sopra le ginocchia o sotto l’ ascelle, sente, oltre al commun toccamento, un’ altra affezzione, alla quale noi abbiamo imposto un nome particolare, chiamandola solletico: la quale affezzione è tutta nostra, e non punto della mano; e parmi che gravemente errerebbe chi volesse dire, la mano, oltre al moto ed al tocamento, avere in sè un altra facoltà diversa da queste, cioè il solleticare, sì che il solletico fusse un accidente che risedesse in lei. Un poco di carta o una penna, leggiermente fregata sopra qualsivoglia parte del corpo nostro, fa, quanto a sè, per tutto la medesima operazione, ch’ è muoversi e toccare; ma in noi, toccando tra gli occhi, il naso, e sotto le narici, eccita una titillazione quasi intollerabile, ed in altra parte a pena si fa sentire. Or quella titillazione è tutta di noi, e non della penna, e rimoso il corpo animato e sensitivo, ella non è più altro che un puro nome. Ora, di simile e non maggiore essistenza credo io che possano esser molte qualità che vengono attribuite a i corpi naturali, come sapori, odori, colori ed altri”).
As far as I know, what quantum Physics calls “color charge” of particles has nothing to do with the perceived colors. On the other hand, this science establishes that isolated atoms do not have color (or this cannot be observed) and subatomic particles do not have it either as color depends on valence electrons—the outermost electrons in atoms— which take part in chemical bonds between atoms. However, some experiments that show the color of large amounts of identical atoms in particular conditions can be found. See, for example, publications by the Fermilab web of the US Department of Energy: http://www.fnal.gov/pub/inquiring/questions/colorofatoms.html.
Sellars (1963). Quoted by R. Grossmann in FW, p. 59.
In this case, the property “to be a ladder” can be identified with the word “ladder” or its universal (concept).
See chapter 2 in Andrew Chrucky’s study on Sellars at http://www.ditext.com/chrucky/chru-0.html.
See R. Grossmann, “Perceptual Objects, Elementary Particles and Emergent Properties”, p. 141–142.
FW, p. 61. See also “Perceptual Objects, Elementary Particles…”, RG, p.129–132.
On this kind of reduction and on emergent properties, Grossmann quotes the work by Hempel and Oppenheim (1953): “The occurrence of a characteristic W in an object w is emergent relative to a theory T, a part relation Pt, and a class G of attributes, if that occurrence cannot be deduced by means of T from a characterization of the Pt-parts of w with respect to all the attributes in G.”
FW, p. 61.
FW, p. 62.
Grossmann illustrates this idea comparing the astronomer’s task—which in fact wants to know if the star or the planet that he once saw in space is the same as the one observed later—with the physicist’s investigation, which does not try to determine if the color he sees is the same as the state of the atoms of the colored surface (FW, 62).
In this case, Grossmann’s opinion is opposed to Armstrong’s who thinks that the connective law presupposes as “facts” both the identity and the equivalence of the two events (color vision and atomic states). The disagreement can be illustrated with their mutual disagreement dealing with the simplicity of universals, for Armstrong thinks that “physical theory gives us good reason for thinking that the phenomenologically simple qualities we perceive are in fact complex,” whereas Grossmann states that “phenomenal simplicity is for me the ultimate criterion for simplicity” and “in every case where P is phenomenologically simple, but claimed by someone else like you [Armstrong], to be really (scientifically) complex, I think of the properties of which P supposedly consists as being merely connected with it” (Cf. Phenomenological Realism versus Scientific Realism. Reinhardt Grossmann-David M. Armstrong Metaphysical Correspondence, by Javier Cumpa & Erwin Tegtmeier (Eds), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt, Paris, Lancaster, New Brunswick, 2009, 139 pp.
FW, pp. 63 and 64.
See J. J. Smart, Philosophy and scientific realism, London (etc.), Routledge and Kegan, 1966, 160 pp.; H. Feigl, Inquiries and provocations: selected writings 1929–1974 , ed. by Robert S. Cohen, Dordrecht (etc.), D. Reidel Publishing, 1981, 453 pp.; D. M. Armstrong, Bodily sensations , New York, The Humanities Press; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, 132 pp.
Cf. FW, p. 64.
Cf. FW, p. 58.
Millán-Puelles gives a nominal definition of the pure object as “the only validity of which consists in just being given as an object in an actually conscious subjectivity” (TPO, p. 269), and he also writes: “The pure object is irreal in terms both its matter and form. In turn, an irreality does not exceed its being-an-object pure and simple, either by virtue of its matter or by reason of its form” (TPO, p. 195). The notion of “pure object” and “irreality” are equipollent, and it also means “non-existent object” (TPO, p. 269–270), which is the preferred expression by Grossmann.
TPO, p. 169.
Cf. TPO, pp. 420–421.
Cf. TPO, pp. 421–422.
Fabro (1978) [Morcelliana, Brescia, 1962].
Cf. TPO, p. 421.
TPO, p. 422.
TPO, p. 423: “In physical science, one does not conceptualize what that expression designates in a manner that would be characteristic of physics, because that is not within the scope of what is possible in physics understood precisely as physics.”
TPO, p. 424.
TPO, p. 424.
Millán-Puelles illustrates that the inverse sentence is not necessarily true by the fact that the “shape” of a thing, which is a quality, is not subject to intense variation, but only to extensive increases or decreases. See also I. Gredt. Elementa…, vol I, Pars II, caput II, Section 189.
TPO, p. 424.
The physiologist’s name is Johannes Peter. In TPO original Spanish version had been mistakenly quoted as G. Müller.
Cf. TPO, p. 424–425.
Millán-Puelles refers to Appendix 5 and paragraphs 2 and 3 in Chapter V of the Zubiri’s work Inteligencia sentiente (Tecnos, Madrid, 2004, 456 pp.).
X. Zubiri, Inteligencia sentiente, pp. 172–173.
Besides, there is another divergent opinion concerning the way we perceive secondary qualities, for Millán-Puelles contends that not only heat but all qualities (proper sensibles) of touch, smell, and taste (then, he excludes colors and sounds) are perceived as effects produced by bodies, and this is completely compatible with perceiving the whole reality of a property. However, Zubiri’s expressions “in itself” and “of its own” exclude the possibility of perceiving in such a way (as effects) and being actually real (“of its own”), precisely because when one perceives something “in itself” or “of its own,” the object is presented “not as the effect of something that would lie beyond the apprehended” (Cf. supra and note 48).
TPO, p. 442. Millán-Puelles contends that wave is not the cause of color, but cofactor in causation of color perception which is not perceived in itself (as wave).
Ibid.
TPO, p. 443.
FW, p. 61. See also “Perceptual Objects, Elementary Particles...”, RG, pp. 129–132.
Cf. FW, p. 62.
Cf. FW. pp. 63 and 64. He follows two Leibniz’s laws on identity: two things cannot be identical if they have different attributes and relationships.
Cf. TPO, pp. 421–422.
See J. M. Garrido, El problema de la irrealidad… (Chapter V, Section 2).
In this regard, some texts by Artigas (1999) could be explanatory. There should not be confusion about the object of sensation and the scientifically elaborated object as the principle of reduction, which is compelled by the objectivity system of each science, does not occur in the sensory primary organization, but in the imaginative and conceptual levels. Artigas states that as the possibility of experimental testing of a scientific hypothesis depends on the proximity to the observation level, we need, in order to guarantee the suitable and real experimental control capacity, a single grounded observational level that is independent from any scientific method. This is certainly, on Artigas side, a clear defense of realism, but he does not mean that the experimental testing is a kind of verification of the theoretical hypothesis by the means of “pure empirical data” as the very design of the verifying experiment excludes the possibility of getting pure empirical data (op. cit., pp. 266–267). Besides, he also points out that in the case (for example) that we transcribe (or reduce) the secondary qualities to mathematical signs in order to make them suitable for scientific calculation and method, then the science is not using those sensory qualities but, instead, an already formalized object made up from the former qualities (and these formalized objects are “pure objects,” in Millán-Puelles’ terminology).
TPO, p. 423: “In physical science, one does not conceptualize what that expression [“subjective”] designates in a manner that would be characteristic of physics, because that is not within the scope of what is possible in physics understood precisely as physics.”
Millán-Puelles quotes from and agrees with Cornelio Fabro (Percepción y Pensamiento, p. 441).
TPO, p. 424.
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Garrido Bermúdez, J.M. Grossmann and Millán-Puelles on the Argument from Physics. Int Ontology Metaphysics 11, 163–180 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0066-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0066-y