Abstract
Deterrence lies at the heart of the criminal justice system and policy. There is a lack of information on citizen’s perceptions regarding a critical element of the deterrence process as it manifests through the communication of sanction threats. This study uses data from over 400 adults to examine their knowledge regarding the probability of detection and the average punishments for DUI, and also assesses the contribution of demographic and theoretical variables in predicting perceptions of detection probabilities and punishment estimates. Results show that persons over-estimate the likelihood of detection and provide higher estimates for average sentence lengths, but very few variables predict deterrence perceptions. An investigation of the resetting effect shows that persons tend to lower the estimated likelihood of punishment after experiencing a punishment. Deterrence may work better if researchers and policy officials understand what influences these perceptions and how they may be modified.
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Notes
The sampling frame for this research is all US households with working land-line phones. Also, households with land-line numbers ported to cellular phones would be included in the sampling frame. Only one member of each household was interviewed. If a juvenile answered the phone, the interviewers asked for a parent to continue the interview.
AAPOR response rate calculation RR6.
Of increasing concern to survey research is the use of call-screening devices (Tuckell & O’Neill, 2002). The Data-Tel predictive dialer used in this research anticipates call screening devices used to indicate that a household is ineligible, commercially known as a “Tele-Zapper.” This software also passes calls that it deems as screened through the use of privacy blockers and screening services to an operator to determine the appropriate disposition code or action. This operator then continues the call normally.
Although the data are collected on a population sample, less than one-third of the proposed sample actually participated. This may challenge the assumption of randomness, which is a problem when trying to provide estimates rather than testing hypotheses (Maxfield & Babbie, 2010).
These crimes were chosen because, as will be seen, we were interested in comparing a range of high-profile/common crimes that the public is likely to be exposed to and for which we had comparable and actual data from the United States Sentencing Commission. Collecting and analyzing comparable state-level data would be incredibly difficult not only because such data is not uniformly available, but also because of the distribution of respondents across each state.
Specifically, (a) antitrust had one probation, eight fine, and three life imprisonment; (b) embezzlement had one fine and four life imprisonment; (c) fraud had one fine and six life imprisonment; (d) drug possession had three probation, one rehabilitation, and two life imprisonment; (e) drug trafficking had nineteen life imprisonment and two death penalty; (f) burglary had three life imprisonment; (g) arson had ten life imprisonment and one death penalty; (h) robbery had five life imprisonment, and (i) murder had 78 life imprisonment and 12 death penalty.
We recognize that probation, rehabilitation, and fines may still be regarded as some form of punishment, but nevertheless follow the USSC coding criteria.
The decision to code life imprisonment responses as 470 months is consistent with how the United States Sentencing Commission deals with similar cases.
Death penalty responses were negligible, and included two cases for drug-trafficking, one case for arson, and 12 cases for murder.
There is no perfect method for comparing average sentence lengths obtained from our sample to average sentence lengths in the population. This is so because the respondents come from a variety of jurisdictions. The only comparison available is the nationally-based USSC data. As will be seen, the USSC data are driven by certain crimes (drug-trafficking, firearms, fraud, immigration) but still represent an adequate and acceptable comparison given the nature of our (general population) sample.
This is but one way to measure resetting. One could also ask respondents to indicate what the new likelihood of detection would be compared to an earlier time point, i.e., ‘yesterday’.
Research shows that persons who support/respect the police are more likely to perceive the law and the criminal justice system/authorities as legitimate, to perceive sanction certainty in a credible manner, and to engage in relatively little (if any) criminal offending (Tyler, 1990; Piquero, Paternoster, Pogarsky, & Loughran, 2011).
The’50–50’ response may also be due some bias associated with permitting respondents to generate their own probability responses (Fischhoff & Bruine de Bruin, 1999). Future research should consider providing respondents with an explicit response option scale to compare across methods.
It is important to note that our question does not ask respondents to indicate what convicted felons ‘should serve’, but instead they are asked their knowledge associated with how many months, on average, they think a convicted felon “would serve” for a variety of crimes. Our primary interest is to investigate respondent’s knowledge about what sentence lengths were perceived to be. Asking persons about the sentence length that criminals should serve may be more reflective of one’s punishment preferences in real life. For example, if an individual perceives that a punishment for a particular crime is unlikely but believes that it should be punished more harshly, then this may be more indicative of their retributive philosophy than their deterrence-oriented knowledge—which is the focus of our investigation. Future research should consider addressing this question as well.
According to the USSC (2007:Appendix A), “Using sentencing information obtained from the Judgment of Conviction order, Average Sentence Length is reported as the mean and median terms of imprisonment (including any months of alternative confinement as defined in§5C1.1) ordered for cases committed to the Bureau of Prisons. Cases that receive no term of imprisonment (i.e., probation) are included in the average. Cases for which a term of imprisonment is ordered, but the length is indeterminable, are excluded. In most cases for which the exact term is unknown, the Judgment of Conviction order merely specifies a sentence of time served. Prior to fiscal year 1993, the Commission defined life sentences as 360 months. However, to reflect life expectancy of federal criminal offenders more precisely and to provide more accurate length of imprisonment information, life sentences and all sentences above 470 months are now capped at 470 months.” http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/Table13.pdf (accessed April 12, 2010).
We note that police legitimacy is correlated with other variables as expected. For example, individuals who report more disrespect for the police also tend to have participated in previous criminal activity.
For instance, it is likely that individuals initially may have overinflated their perceptions of the true detection rate (i.e., individuals suspect the true rate is much higher than it actually is), yet through a rational updating process whereby they gain experience with repeated offending, they realize their perception is overinflated, and hence downwardly revise it. Because this process is highly dependent upon experience (Anwar & Loughran, 2011), these males who engage in the activity more may have better ‘settled in’ in their perceptions.
To be sure, Zimring and Hawkins’ hypothesis may have been geared to more serious offending groups (unlike our general population sample), such as the incarcerated offenders who were part of their more specific theoretical discussion.
Here, null findings are important because they tell us about what does not matter and provides direction for investigating other sources of deterrence perceptions.
This may be akin to the ‘Sword of Damocles’ finding from the Omaha Domestic Violence Experiment, in which the fear of detection and the threat of sanctions hangs over the offender’s head (Sherman, 1992).
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Piquero, A.R., Piquero, N.L., Gertz, M. et al. Sometimes Ignorance is Bliss: Investigating Citizen Perceptions of the Certainty and Severity of Punishment. Am J Crim Just 37, 630–646 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-011-9145-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-011-9145-z