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Notes
Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness (Trans. J. Kosky. Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 2002), 221-225.
Marion, Being Given, 222.
Marion, Being Given, 225.
Marion, Being Given, 226.
I take this way of summarizing Marion’s position from Merold Westphal, ‘Transfiguration as Saturated Phenomenon’ (in Between Description and Interpretation:The Hermeneutic Turn in Phenomenology, ed. Andrzej Wiercinski, Toronto: the Hermeneutic Press,2005. 501-512).
Marion, Being Given, 228.
Marion, Being Given, 229.
Stephen Hardin, Texian Iliad: A Military History of the Texas Revolution (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996).
Marion, Being Given, 229
Marion, Being Given, 229.
Marion, Being Given, 229.
Marion, Being Given, 229.
Marion, Being Given, 230.
Marion, Being Given, 231.
Marion, Being Given, 231.
Marion, Being Given, 231.
I owe this objection to an anonymous reviewer
Titus Livy, Ab Urbe Conditia I-V. (Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis. Ed. R.M. Ogilvie. New York: Clarendon, 1974), II.13-14.
Cicero, Tusculanarum Disputationum. (2 vols. Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana. Eds. O. Heine & M. Pohlenz. . Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellshaft, 1957), II. 19-22.
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, II.33
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, II.35 and II.56; centuries later Plutarch tells the story as follows: Marius is praised for both temperance and endurance, of which latter he gave a decided instance in an operation of surgery. For having, as it seems, both his legs full of great tumors, and disliking the deformity, he determined to put himself into the hands of an operator; when, without being tied, he stretched out one of his legs, and silently, without changing countenance, endured most excessive torments in the cutting, never either flinching or complaining; but when the surgeon went to the other, he declined to have it done, saying, ‘I see the cure is not worth the pain’ (Plutarch, ‘Live of Caius Marius’ (in Plutarch’s Lives 2 vols. Trans, A.H. Clough. New York: Modern Library, 1992), I.552.
Marion, Being Given, 232.
Marion, Being Given, 232.
Marion, Being Given, 222; Marion is quoting from Descartes’ Regulae ad directionem ingenii, AT X, 365, 16 in the final part of this passage.
Marion, Being Given, 228.
Jean-Luc Marion, The Visible and the Revealed (Trans. C. Gschwandtner. Bronx: Fordham UP, 2008), 126.
Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena (Trans R. Horner and V. Berrand. Bronx: Fordham UP, 2002), 50-51; there is a good discussion in Tasmin Jones, A Genealogy of Marion’s Philosophy of Religion: Apparent Darkness (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2011), 109-120.
There are good discussions of this tendency in Shane Mackinlay’s Interpreting Excess: Jean-Luc Marion, Saturated Phenomena and Hermeneutics (Bronx, NY: Fordham UP, 2010) and ‘Phenomenality in the Middle: Marion, Romano and the Hermeneutics of the Event’ (in Givenness and God: Questions of Jean-Luc Marion, Eds. I.G. Leask and E.O. Cassidy. Bronx, NY: Fordham UP, 2005. 167-181).
Because Buber is concerned with describing two ways of experiencing the tree, it is incorrect to read the I-Thou relationship as an analogue to the Kantian noumenon and the I-It as the analogue to the phenomenon. What is at issue in Buber is how the tree is experienced, not whether or not it is experienced (as the Kantian analogy suggests). For a more detailed discussion of the Kantian reading of Buber, and a critique thereof, see Lawrence Perlman, ‘Buber’s Anti-Kantianism’ (AJS Review 151.1 (1990) 95-108). Perlman, however, perhaps overstates the case: it is not so much that Buber is anti-Kantian as much as he wants to assign limits to Kantianism. In other words, Kantianism applies to the I-It relationship, but doesn’t apply to the I-Thou relationship. This point will be developed later in the paper when the I-Thou relation is presented in terms of saturated phenomena.
Buber, I and Thou (Trans. W. Kaufmann. New York: Scribners, 1970), 57-58 [81-83]. The numbers in brackets refer to the pagination of the German text of Ich und Du given in Martin Buber, Werke: Erster Band: Schriften zur Philosophie (Munich: Kösel Verlag & Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1962). See Kaufmann’s corresponding footnote for a discussion of this unusual phrase.
Robert E. Wood, The Dialogical Principle and the Mystery of Being: The Enduring Relevance of Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 45.2 (1999) 83-97) 84.
Marion, Being Given, 199-212 and note 29.
Marion, Being Given, 206-7.
Buber, I and Thou, 56 [81].
Marion, Being Given, 209.
Marion, Being Given, 215-216.
Robert E. Wood, Martin Buber’s Ontology: An Analysis of I and Thou (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1969), 49-50.
Martin Buber, I and Thou, 125 [129]; translation slightly modified.
Buber, I and Thou, 126 [130].
Marion, Being Given, 217.
Buber, I and Thou, 53 [79].
Martin Buber, The Eclipse of God (trans. M.S. Friedman. Harper & Row, 1952, 25-46), 39-40 [532]. The number in brackets refers to the German text of Gottesfinsternis published in Martin Buber, Werke: Erster Band: Schriften zur Philosophie (Munich: Kösel Verlag & Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1962).
Robert E, Wood, ‘The Dialogical Principle and the Mystery of Being,’ 86.
Buber, I and Thou 54 [79].
Buber, I and Thou, 84 [100-101]; Wood, Martin Buber’s Ontology, 37
Buber, I and Thou, 82 [99].
Buber, I and Thou, 83 [100].
Buber, I and Thou, 83 [100].
Buber, I and Thou, 111-112 [120]. I have slightly modified Kaufmann’s translation: he adds an indefinite article before ‘subject’ not found in the German, slightly changing the tone of the passage.
Buber, I and Thou, 112 [120].
Buber, I and Thou, 76 [94].
Buber, I and Thou, 78 [96]. This discussion of Buber’s account of fetal and early childhood development is necessarily brief; for a longer treatment see Francis Rofrano, ‘I/Thou- I/Spirit: Buber on the Spiritual Life of the Infant’ (Journal of Pastoral Counseling 42 (2007) 56-69).
Buber, I and Thou, 54 [79]
See Levinas, ‘Dialogue’ (trans. Bettina Bergo in Of God Who Comes to Mind. Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 1998. 137-151) 150, among other places. For a discussion of Levinas’ attitude towards Buber see Robert Bernasconi classic paper, ‘Failure of communication as a Surplus: Dialogue and Lack of Dialogue between Buber and Levinas,’ (in R. Bernasconi & D. Wood (eds.), The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other London: Routledge, 1988): 100–135).
Buber, I and Thou, 56-57 [81].
The catalogue of his examples is taken from Wood, ‘The Dialogical Principle and the Mystery of Being’ 84.
Levinas also complains that Buber’s account is too formalistic insofar as the I-Thou relationship may be obtained with both humans and non-humans. This criticism does not apply in the current discussion: Buber and Marion are in agreement that the saturation should not be limited to the human other. For a more thorough defense of Buber against Levinas’ critiques, see Andrew Kelly, ‘Reciprocity and the Height of God: A Defense of Buber against Levinas’ (Sophia 34.1 1995. 65-73) and Matt Edgar, Autonomy and Heteronomy: Buber, Levinas and Hegel on the Social Source of Obligation (PhD dissertation, Fordham University, 2002) 11-13; see too, by the same author, ‘The Other Speaking in My Voice: On the Suppression of Dialogue in Otherwise than Being’ (Philosophy Today 28 (2003) 23-27).
This formula could be abbreviated to read (x) [Gx → (Tx v Ix)] with the operator (v) representing the exclusive disjunction. I will not avail myself of this operator in what follows, since it is rather unusual in philosophical contexts and, as we shall see, I will want to use the longer version in my proof anyway.
For those interested, here is one version of the proof:
$$ \matrix{ {1.} \hfill &{(x)\left( {Gx} \right) \to \left( {Tx\;v\;Ix} \right)\;\& \; \sim \left( {Tx\;\& Ix} \right)} \hfill &{Premise} \hfill \\ {2.} \hfill &{(x)\left( {Tx \to Sx} \right)} \hfill &{Premise} \hfill \\ {3.} \hfill &{(x)\left( {Sx \to \sim Ix} \right)} \hfill &{Premise} \hfill \\ {4.} \hfill &{\left( Ga \to {Ta\;v\;Ia} \right)\;\& \; \sim \left( {Ta\;\& Ia} \right)} \hfill &{1,\;UI} \hfill \\ {5.} \hfill &{Ta \to Sa} \hfill &{2,\;UI} \hfill \\ {6.} \hfill &{Sa \to \; \sim Ia} \hfill &{3,\;UI} \hfill \\ {7.} \hfill &{Ga} \hfill &{Assumption} \hfill \\ {8.} \hfill &{\left( {Ta\;v\;Ia} \right)\;\& \; \sim \left( {Ta\;\& Ia} \right)} \hfill &{4,\;7\;MT} \hfill \\ {9.} \hfill &{Ta\;v\;Ia} \hfill &{8,\;Simplification} \hfill \\ {10.} \hfill &{ \sim Ta} \hfill &{Assumption} \hfill \\ {11.} \hfill &{Ia} \hfill &{9,10,\;DS} \hfill \\ {12.} \hfill &{ \sim Sa} \hfill &{6,\;11\;MT} \hfill \\ {13.} \hfill &{ \sim Ta \to \sim Sa} \hfill &{Discharging\;10} \hfill \\ {14.} \hfill &{Sa \to Ta} \hfill &{13,\;Contrapositive} \hfill \\ {15.} \hfill &{\left( {Ta \to Sa} \right)\& \left( {Sa \to Ta} \right)} \hfill &{5,14,\;Conjuction} \hfill \\ {16.} \hfill &{Ta \equiv Sa} \hfill &{15,\;Equivalence} \hfill \\ {17.} \hfill &{Ga \to \left( {Ta \equiv Sa} \right)} \hfill &{Discharging\;7} \hfill \\ {18.} \hfill &{(x)\left( {Gx \to } \right.\left( {Tx \equiv Sx} \right)} \hfill &{17,\;UG,\;Q.E.D.} \hfill \\ }<!end array> $$Marion, Being Given, 59.
We can sketch the more sophisticated analysis in a set theoretical approach, assuming the usual set theoretical syntax and semantics and adding specific rules describing membership in two sets, G, the set of things that are given, and N, the set of things not given, treating giveness in terms of truth, i.e., that if x is true, it is given, and if it is not true, it is not given. Although ultimately we would want to distinguish between the giveness and truth, since Marion doesn’t identify them, this is enough for now. And if we understand truth as the product of an interpretation function into the domain, then saying that ϕ is true is relevantly like saying ϕ is given in the domain. Accordingly, we will say that
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1.
\( \phi \in \;G\;iff\;\phi = 1 \)
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2.
\( \phi \in \;N\;iff\;\phi = 0 \)
To see how this works in practice, let’s replace ϕ with the formula (a). And moreover, assume that (a = 0); line 2 tells us that (a∈N), i.e. (a) is not given. However, since Marion claims that even that which is not-given is given as a denial of giveness, we should allow the conclusion that, per line 1, [(a∈N)∈G]. The upshot of this is that while the formula (a) is not given, that (a∈N) is given: more generally, if ϕ is not given, (ϕ∈N) is given. On the other hand, replacing ϕ with (b), assuming (b = 1) gives us only (b ∈ G). However, insofar as [(b ∈ G) = 1], it follows that [b ∈ G) ∈ G]. And each resulting claim to that effect, insofar as it is true, is also a member of G. There is, it appears, an awful lot of stuff that is given – but that is Marion’s point, and in any case, this approach explains how it is that non-given things can be given, while not being given in the same way as things given simpliciter. However, this is and can only be a sketch; there are a number of technicalities that would have to be worked out before a definitive account could be offered; in fact, given the avowed Meinongianism of Marion’s thought, a more rigorous reconstruction would probably have be developed in terms of a free logic.
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1.
The proof for this claim is as follows:
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1.
\( (x)\left( {Gx \to } \right.\left( {Tx \equiv Sx} \right)\;\;\;\;\;\;\;Premise \)
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2.
\( (x) \sim Gx \to Gx\;\;\;\;\;\;\;Premise \)
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3.
\( Ga \to \left( {Ta \equiv Sa} \right)\;\;\;\;\;\;\;I,\;UI \)
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4.
\( \sim Ga \to Ga\;\;\;\;\;\;\;2,\;UI \)
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5.
\( \sim \sim Ga\;v\;Ga\;\;\;\;\;\;\;4,\;Implication \)
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6.
\( Ga\;v\;Ga\;\;\;\;\;\;\;5,\;DN \)
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7.
\( Ga\;\;\;\;\;\;\;6,\;tautology \)
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8.
\( Ta \equiv Sa\;\;\;\;\;\;\;1,\;7,\;MP \)
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9.
\( (x)\left( {Ta \equiv Sa} \right)\;\;\;\;\;\;\;8,\;UG,\;Q.E.D. \)
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1.
While I cannot develop the point here it is worth noting that Marion’s project, in Being Given, of rethinking phenomenology on the basis of saturated phenomena (as opposed to phenomenology’s traditional focus on common-law or impoverished phenomena) is parallel to Buber’s project, in I and Thou, of displacing the modern primacy of the it-world by rethinking life and the world in terms of the I-Thou relationship.
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for both a careful reading and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Harding, B. Saturating the Phenomenon: Marion and Buber. SOPHIA 52, 295–313 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-012-0321-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-012-0321-5