Abstract
This article clarifies the Buddhist position on freedom and responsibility, while arguing for three central claims. The first is that it is an open question whether Buddhists endorse causal determinism or causal indeterminism. The second claim is that the most promising contemporary interpretations of the Buddhist view fail in important respects. The final claim is that the best interpretation of the Buddhist position on freedom and responsibility is Buddhist Perspectivalism, the view that we should view ourselves as genuinely free and responsible, while viewing others as neither free nor responsible.
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Notes
This is Richard Hayes’ (2004) translation of the Pramāṇasiddhi Chapter of Dharmakirti’s Pramāṇavārttikam.
See Federman (2010: 11) for further citation.
Goodman considers two arguments from Buddhaghoṣa (366-367) and then he considers a series of arguments from Śāntideva, but he does so without distinguishing the different lines of argument (368). I am focusing on one argument, but I am doing so charitably, since I think this is the strongest argument that Goodman quotes.
Goodman does not use this name. As I say in note 5, Goodman does not even distinguish among Śāntideva’s various arguments, let alone name or reconstruct them.
Whenever I quote Śāntideva, I use The Padmakara Translation Group’s (2006) translation. These verses are on pages 80 and 82, respectively.
See the Padmakara Translation Group (2006: 84).
This is the translation by Narada Thera.
See Siderits (2007, Chap. 9), where Siderits endorses this reading of Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamaka school.
In this article, I have glossed over the nuances of the doctrine of two truths, focusing instead on Siderits’ characterization of it. Let me note here, however, that a statement like ‘others are never… morally responsible…’ is conventionally true, according to the Sarvāstivādin realist tradition, as long as we understand others as persons (i) who are ontologically and conceptually reducible to their constituent parts (the skandhas), (ii) who lack intrinsic reality (niḥsvabhāva), and (iii) who exist as mental constructions. So, more technically, we might say that objective attitude arguments alter what the concept ‘person’ means. For a helpful introduction to the two truths doctrine, see Thakchoe (2011).
Alternatively: some people are sufficiently free to view themselves as morally responsible.
The Yogācāra school might represent a relevant alternative to these views. I say ‘might,’ because it is unclear to me whether Yogācārins have the resources to develop an alternative account of freedom and responsibility. My sense is that they don’t, but I’m honestly not sure.
For a lucid discussion of the importance of ‘the opportunity to do otherwise,’ see Franklin (2010).
Of course, the Buddhist can view others as agents who do what they want without being forced to do so. As we have seen, however, such agency is too shallow to ground responsibility, according to the Buddhist.
I want to thank Mark Siderits for inspiring this article. I also want to thank an audience at Illinois State University for their thoughtful comments and questions on an earlier draft of this paper. Finally, I want to thank two anonymous referees for their very insightful and extremely helpful comments.
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Breyer, D. Freedom with a Buddhist Face. SOPHIA 52, 359–379 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-012-0308-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-012-0308-2