Abstract
In this article, we attempt to explain the fair outcome of ultimatum game experiments using the evolutionary dynamics. The players of the game, the proposers and the responders, are randomly matched to play the game. When the responders face low offers from the proposers, their decisions are influenced by not only the monetary payoff but also their feelings. To quantify the responders’ feelings, a degree of dissatisfaction is introduced into the game. Asymmetrical replicator dynamics is used to study the evolution of the proportion of players with different strategies. The solutions of the differential equations exhibit complex outcomes mainly depending on the degree of dissatisfaction. It could also be inferred from our results that people can maintain their rights and interests well when they have a strong sense of unfairness.
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Xie, W., Li, Y., Wang, Y. et al. Responders’ dissatisfaction may provoke fair offer. J Econ Interact Coord 7, 197–207 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-012-0092-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-012-0092-7