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The Disclosure Panacea: A Comparative Perspective on Charity Financial Reporting

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Abstract

This article examines the charity financial reporting regimes of three common law jurisdictions: Ireland, the UK and the US. It assesses whether these respective disclosure models improve either nonprofit behaviour or enforcement odds. Three core aspects of the regimes are reviewed: the reliability of the disclosed information, the consistency of such information and its ability to facilitate comparison between charities, and the level of enforcement arising from disclosure. Particular attention is paid to oversight mechanisms, including audits, and their rates of effectiveness in the regulation of charities. The article examines ongoing efforts to reform broader international accounting standards and considers the impact such moves are likely to have at both regional and national level for charity accountability. It concludes that given the markedly different spheres in which for-profits and nonprofits operate, care should be taken in modelling charity disclosure regimes on those developed for for-profit entities.

Resume

Cet article examine les différents régimes de rapports financiers des organisations caritatives dans trois juridictions de droit coutumier (common law) : l’Irlande, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis. L’article cherche à établir si ces modèles respectifs de communication de rapports financiers permettent d’améliorer soit le comportement des organisations à but non lucratif, soit la mise en œuvre des règles. Trois aspects clés des différents régimes sont examinés : la fiabilité des informations communiquées, la cohérence de ces informations et leur valeur pour une comparaison des organisations caritatives, et le niveau de mise en œuvre qui découle de la communication des rapports financiers. L’analyse prête une attention particulière aux mécanismes de surveillance, dont les audits, et leur niveau d’efficacité dans la régulation des organisations caritatives. L’article examine les efforts en cours pour réformer plus largement les normes comptables internationales et considère l’impact que ces changements auront probablement au niveau régional et national sur la responsabilité des organisations caritatives. En conclusion, il est avancé que, étant données les différences significatives entre les sphères dans lesquelles les institutions à but lucratif et à but non lucratif opèrent, il convient d’être prudent dans la transposition à des organisations caritatives de régimes de communication de rapports financiers originellement conçus pour des entités à but lucratif.

Zusammenfassung

Dieser Beitrag untersucht das Regelwerk für die Finanzberichterstattung von Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen in drei Ländern, in denen das Common Law gilt: Irland, Großbritannien und die USA. Es wird beurteilt, ob die jeweiligen Offenlegungsmodelle entweder das gemeinnützige Verhalten fördern oder die Chancen zur Durchsetzung erhöhen. Hierbei werden drei Kernaspekte der Regelwerke geprüft: nämlich die Zuverlässigkeit der offengelegten Informationen, die Einheitlichkeit dieser Informationen und damit die Möglichkeit, verschiedene Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen miteinander zu vergleichen, und das sich aus der Offenlegung ergebende Durchsetzungsmaß. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird auf die Aufsichtsmechanismen, einschließlich von Wirtschaftsprüfungen, gelenkt sowie auf ihre Effektivität bei der Regulierung der Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen. Der Beitrag untersucht die anhaltenden Bemühungen für eine Reform umfassenderer internationaler Rechnungslegungsstandards und betrachtet die voraussichtlichen Auswirkungen einer solchen Reform auf die Rechenschaftspflicht der Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen sowohl auf regionaler als auch nationaler Ebene. Abschließend wird festgehalten, dass angesichts der ausgesprochen unterschiedlichen Bereiche, in denen gemeinnützige und gewinnorientierte Organisationen tätig sind, Vorsicht geboten werden sollte, wenn sich die Offenlegungsregelungen für Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen an die für gewinnorientierte Unternehmen formulierten Modelle lehnen.

Resumen

El presente artículo examina los regímenes de información financiera de las organizaciones benéficas de tres jurisdicciones del derecho consuetudinario: Irlanda, el Reino Unido y los Estados Unidos. Evalúa si estos modelos de divulgación respectivos mejoran las posibilidades de aplicación o de comportamiento de las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro. Se revisan tres aspectos fundamentales de los regímenes: a saber, la fiabilidad de la información divulgada; la coherencia de dicha información y su capacidad de facilitar la comparación entre organizaciones benéficas; y el nivel de aplicación que surge de la divulgación. Se presta una atención particular a los mecanismos de supervisión, incluidas las auditorías, y sus tasas de efectividad en la regulación de las organizaciones benéficas. El artículo examina los esfuerzos continuos por reformar las normas contables internacionales más amplias y considera el impacto que es probable que dichos movimientos tengan tanto a nivel regional como nacional en la obligación de rendir cuentas de las organizaciones benéficas. Concluye que dadas las esferas marcadamente diferentes en las que operan las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro y con ánimo de lucro, debe prestarse especial cuidado en no modelar los regímenes de divulgación de las organizaciones benéficas en base a aquellos desarrollados para las entidades con ánimo de lucro.

摘要

本论文检查了三个普通法司法管辖区的慈善财务报告机制:爱尔兰、英国和美国,评估了各自披露模式是否改进了非营利性行为或执法几率。本论文审核了这一机制的三个核心方面:即,所披露信息的可靠性;此类信息的一致性及其方便在慈善组织之间进行比较的能力;以及披露导致的强制执行等级。本论文特别关注了监管机制,包括审计,及其在慈善监管中的有效性。本论文检查了改革更大范围国际会计标准的持续努力,并考虑了此类动作可能同时对地区和国家层面的慈善可说明性的影响。得出的结论是,由于盈利和非营利运营之间存在明显差别,因此为盈利实体制定建模慈善披露机制时必须小心。

ملخص

هذه المقالة تفحص أنظمة التقارير المالية للجمعيات الخيرية لثلاثة سلطات قضائية مشتركة: أيرلندا٬ الملكة المتحدة ٬ الولايات المتحدة. إنها تقوم بتقييم إذا كانت كل من هذه النماذج التي تم الكشف عن سرها تحسن أي من السلوك الغير ربحي أو تنفيذ الإحتمالات. تم مراجعة ثلاثة جوانب أساسية للأنظمة: هذا يعني٬ دقة المعلومات التي تم الكشف عن سرها ؛ تطابق هذه المعلومات و قدرتها على تسهيل المقارنة بين الجمعيات الخيرية؛ و مستوى التنفيذ الناشئ عن الكشف عن السر. يولى اهتمام خاص لآليات المراقبة، بما في ذلك عمليات المراجعة، ومعدلات فعاليتها في تنظيم الجمعيات الخيرية. يفحص هذا المقال الجهود الجارية لإصلاح أوسع لمعايير المحاسبة الدولية و يعتبر على الأرجح تأثير مثل هذه الخطوات على مساءلة الجمعيات الخيرية على المستوى الإقليمي والوطني على حد سواء. إنها تستنتج إنه نظرا˝ لأن المنظمات الربحية و الغير ربحية تعمل في مجالات مختلفة بشكل ملحوظ٬ ينبغي أن يؤخذ الحذر في وضع نماذج أنظمة الكشف عن سر الأعمال الخيرية التي أعدت للكيانات التي تسعى للربح.

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Notes

  1. The number of nonprofit organizations in Ireland is disputed. The 2012 INKEx Report identified 12,000 formal organizations, whereas a 1997 Trinity College report, using a broader definition, estimated in excess of 24,000.

  2. Author correspondence with Liam Keogh, Office of the Revenue Commissioners, Charity Division, 5 June, 2012, on file with author.

  3. Northern Ireland Government Funding Database at http://govfundingdbni.nics.gov.uk/gfdpublic/Home.aspx, last accessed 13 April, 2012.

  4. http://www.GuideStar.org (last accessed 20 April, 2012).

  5. Perversely, the IRS does not allow compliance with GAAP in several sections of the 990, particularly with respect to reporting on in-kind contributions. The form includes a cross reference table to reconcile ‘tax accounting’ with GAAP accounting. I am indebted to Putnam Barber for drawing this discrepancy to my attention.

  6. http://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/revokeSearch.do?ein1=&names=&city=&state=All...&zipCode=&country=US&exemptTypeCode=03&postDateFrom=01-Jun-2011&postDateTo=31-Dec-2011&dispatchMethod=searchRevocation&submitName=Search (last accessed 21 May, 2012).

  7. http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/About_us/About_charities/factfigures.aspx (accessed 25 April, 2012).

  8. Calculated by excluding the 96,155 charities with an income below £25,000 which are not required to file accounts from the 180,000 registered charities which must file annually and working out the percentage accounted for in the 277 charity accounts subjected to ‘targeted scrutiny’.

  9. FRS 102, [6] defines a PBE as one ‘whose primary objective is to provide goods or services for the general public, community or social benefit’.

  10. It should be noted, however, that the Szper research was limited to a sample of just one state, that of Washington State.

  11. http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=43 (accessed 8 June, 2012).

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Acknowledgements

This paper has benefited from a long gestation. The author is indebted to John G. Simon and Henry Hansmann for valuable feedback on earlier versions of this work and to Putnam Barber and Carolyn Cordery for comments on later iterations along with anonymous referees from Voluntas. The author would also like to thank Aileen Pierce, Evelyn Brody and Peter Kinsley for their assistance as well as participants at ISTR’s 10th International Conference in Siena, Italy, and more recently participants at ARNOVA’s 41st Annual Conference in Indianapolis for their engagement with the topic and the ensuing discussion, which has further helped me to refine my arguments. The support of a UCD Seed Funding research grant is gratefully acknowledged.

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Correspondence to Oonagh B. Breen.

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Breen, O.B. The Disclosure Panacea: A Comparative Perspective on Charity Financial Reporting. Voluntas 24, 852–880 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-013-9377-2

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