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A general model of a group search procedure, applied to epistemic democracy

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Abstract

The standard epistemic justification for inclusiveness in political decision making is the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which states that the probability of a correct decision using majority rule increases in group size (given certain assumptions). Informally, majority rule acts as a mechanism to pool the information contained in the judgements of individual agents. I aim to extend the explanation of how groups of political agents track the truth. Before agents can pool the information, they first need to find truth-conducive information. Increasing group size is also important in the initial search for truth-conducive information.

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Correspondence to Christopher Thompson.

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Thompson, C. A general model of a group search procedure, applied to epistemic democracy. Synthese 190, 1233–1252 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0108-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0108-9

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