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Incommensurability, slight pains and God

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Abstract

I will consider how the notion of incommensurability, as championed by Parfit (Reasons and persons, 1984), Griffin (Well-being: its meaning, measurement and importance, 1986), Chang (Ethics 112:659–688, 2002), and Hare (Philos Perspect 23:165–176, 2009), might affect both the argument from slight pain (which suggests God’s non-existence can be inferred from the merest stubbing of one’s toe) and Leibniz’s reply to this argument. I conclude that the notion of incommensurability may ultimately strengthen Leibniz’s general position.

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Notes

  1. For an interesting discussion of these issues see Daniel Cohen’s paper ‘Creating the Best Possible World: Some Problems From Parfit’.

  2. It should be noted that Leibniz’s overall aim is only to demonstrate that the existence of pain/evil is logical compatible with the existence of God, under these conditions.

  3. Note that others have argued that states of affairs are not incommensurable. One competing explanation for our indecision in such cases is that we can’t judge one option to be better than another (before and after mild sweeting) because the values involved (or our measure of them) are vague—see Broome (1997).

  4. My thanks to James Franklin, Daniel Cohen and Wylie Breckenridge for their help with this paper.

References

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  1. School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Charles Sturt University, Locked Bag 588, Wagga Wagga, NSW, 2678, Australia

    Morgan Luck

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Correspondence to Morgan Luck.

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Luck, M. Incommensurability, slight pains and God. Int J Philos Relig 75, 79–85 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-013-9416-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-013-9416-3

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