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Elinor Ostrom and the “just right” solution

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Abstract

Elinor Ostrom is justly valued for her contributions to understanding the nature of and solution to common pool resource problems (CPRs). Her solution is generally referred to as balancing the aim of reducing the high costs associated with political solutions with that of ameliorating the absence of incentives to create solutions at all in the market-based approach. In this short paper, I characterize her solution as a “ ‘just right’ solution,” in the sense that it is a governmental solution, but one that balances these objectives. I consider endogenous variables that help maintain the creation of the institution to solve CPRs as being the “just right” solution, because it is at just the correct scope.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA

    John H. Aldrich

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  1. John H. Aldrich
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Correspondence to John H. Aldrich.

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Aldrich, J.H. Elinor Ostrom and the “just right” solution. Public Choice 143, 269–273 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9630-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9630-9

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