Abstract
Since the end of World War II the international community has been building, step by step and with many difficulties, the nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime. The purpose of this regime is the prevention of the proliferation of this type of weaponry and to achieve, as one of their final goal, the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons and the closure of all nuclear weapon production facilities or the conversion of these facilities for their exclusively use with peaceful purposes in the future. Despite all efforts made by the majority of the international community, the world still is far from achieving this important objective. This article offers to the international community a group of actions for the strengthening of the nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime and for the beginning of multilateral negotiations towards nuclear disarmament.
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Notes
The WMD non-proliferation regime includes the nuclear, chemical and biological weapon non-proliferation regimes.
The NPT was open to signature on July 1, 1968 and entered into force in March 5, 1970.
In Morales Pedraza (2009), a summary of the main outcomes of the NPT review conferences carried out in the period 1975–2005 can be found.
For more information see document NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)
Without the ratification of the USA and other 8 countries members of the CD, the CTBT cannot entry into force.
France also rejected the 13 steps and Russia agreed privately. However, in the VIII NPT Review Conference an agreement was reached on the importance that all State parties implement, without reservation, the 13 steps adopted in 2000. This agreement represented, without any doubt, an important change in the USA position that could facilitate the adoption of additional measures for strengthening the nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime in the coming years. However, until today the international community is waiting for concrete actions by the US Administration for the implementation of this new policy.
A new strategic arms control treaty was signed between the USA and Russia on April 8, 2010. The USA Congress approved the Treaty in December 2010 and the Russia Duma in January 2011. The Treaty entered into force on the 5th of February 2011. The Treaty will reduce further the number of strategic nuclear missiles in the military arsenals of both countries from the current level of 2,200 to 1,550 missiles for each side. The number of nuclear warheads in the military arsenals of both countries will be the following: 8,500 for the USA and 11,000 for Russia.
As alternative an implementation protocol to the NPT could be adopted.
Inexplicable, some NPT’s State parties are promoting nuclear trade in sensitive areas with some States not parties of the Treaty. What is regrettable is that this trade has been promoted without asking first to this group of States to become NPT’s non-nuclear-weapon State parties, according to the commitments and obligations assumed by all NPT’s State parties, but particularly by all nuclear-weapon State parties.
The NPT has no mechanism to force the implementation of Article VI by all NPT’s State parties in a realistic but defined period. This reality is impeding that the Treaty be used effectively to guide the nuclear disarmament process at multilateral level and under international supervision.
The new international instrument could adopt the form of a convention. For more information on a possible text of this international instrument see Morales Pedraza (2009).
The Conference recalls UNSC’s resolution 984 (1995) noting the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give conditional or unconditional security assurances against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the NPT and the relevant protocols established pursuant to nuclear-weapon-free zones, recognising that the Treaty-based security assurances are available to such zones. (NPT/CONF.2010/50, 2010)
The procedure to be used by the UNSC for the application of sanctions against a confirmed violator of the NPT’s provisions could be the following: After the IAEA’s Board of Governors confirm that a State party is in material breach of the NPT’s provisions and/or of their IAEA safeguards obligations and the violator has ignored all calls to change this situation within a specified time, the UNSC should be informed on this situation with the purpose of considering the matter immediately. The first decision to be adopted by the UNSC is to demand that the violator begin to reverse the created situation within no more than 4 weeks. If the violator does not initiate any action to change the created position, then the UNSC should adopt a decision suspending all international arms trade and any other trade on sensitive nuclear technologies and services from the proliferation point of view. If the violator does not change the created position in the following 8 weeks, then the UNSC should adopt a decision prohibiting all commercial air travel, international trade, with the exception of medicine and food, and all financial transitions on sensitive matters with the country concerned. If the violator does not change the created position within the next 2 months, then the UNSC should adopt a decision with the purpose of imposing a full commercial embargo, with the exception of medicine and food, until the violator reverse the created situation for which the sanctions were imposed. If the violator with his position put in danger international peace and security then the UNSC could adopt additional measures according to the United Nations Chapter. The adoption of this mechanism will put on notice to all NPT’s State parties that NPT’s provisions cannot be violated in the future without suffering serious consequences. During the consideration of any material breach of the NPT’s provisions and the IAEA safeguards system, the five permanent members of the UNSC should not exercise their veto’s right with the purpose of impeding any action of the UNSC. This mechanism should be put in practice when the plan for the destruction of all nuclear weapons is adopted by all nuclear-weapon States and the destruction process begins.
The composition of the Non-Proliferation Committee could be the same than the composition of the IAEA’s Board of Governors. Nevertheless, a different composition of the Non-Proliferation Committee could be considered, if necessary. In this last case, the composition to be adopted could be the same as propose as alternative in this paper.
These countries are: Germany (around 20 bombs), Belgium (around 20 bombs), Italy (around 100 bombs) and Turkey (around 100 bombs). All of them have requested the US government to withdraw all nuclear weapons from their territories. For additional information regarding the future of nuclear weapons in the USA see US Nuclear Weapon Enduring Stockpile.
For additional information regarding the future of nuclear weapons in the UK see document entitled “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent: The White Paper”; House of Commons Defence Committee; HC 225-I published on 7 March, 2007.
The IAEA’s policy-making organs are the Board of Governors and the General Conference.
Until May 2010, a total of 9 from the 44 CD’s members have not yet ratified the CTBT. The Treaty cannot entry into force until it is ratified by the USA, India, Israel, and Pakistan, among other five of States.
The installation of several missile batteries in Poland by NATO’s forces has forced Russia to install Iskander’s missiles in the western part of the country as a defensive countermeasure. With this type of actions carried out by NATO’s forces, the process of nuclear disarmament suffered a new and dangerous setback.
It is important to stress that nuclear-weapon States are generally non-committal regarding the establishment of a subsidiary body on disarmament in the CD. What is behind of this position is the delay in the adoption of any agreement that could force them to initiate the nuclear disarmament process at multilateral level under international supervision. On the other hand, many States, most notably those of the Nonaligned Movement, emphasise the need for specific articulations by nuclear-weapon States of the time-frame needed for the complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals, possibly in the form of a new nuclear weapon convention.
In 2004, the Nonaligned Movement called for the convening of a conference to conclude a timeline for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States, a call that was supported by many other States, but rejected by the nuclear-weapon States. (Applegarth and Tyson 2005)
Currently, 15 States have or it is suspected to have a complete nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and/or plutonium reprocessing facilities,. These facilities could enable these countries to produce fissionable material for nuclear weapons, if a political decision to produce such weapon is adopted by their respective governments. According to a statement made by the IAEA’s Director General in September 2004, some 40 States have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons and could do so, if they have fissile material or the capability to produce it and adopt a political decision to produce such weapons.
In Morales Pedraza (2009) a non-exhaustive list of principles can be found.
References
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Morales Pedraza, J. The IAEA, the NPT and the VIII NPT Review Conference. Public Organiz Rev 13, 305–322 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-012-0200-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-012-0200-0