Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

No bare particulars

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic—and, I shall argue, false—crowding consequence.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. ‘Constituent ontology’ originates in Wolterstorff (1970).

  2. x is a proper constituent of y just in the case that x is a constituent of y and y is not a constituent of x. Here and in the sequel I shall use ‘constituent’ as a catch-all for any member or non-mereological part.

  3. For one nice expression of this objection, see van Inwagen (2001, pp. 1–2). But note that some have stated the target view in explicitly mereological terms, such as Sider (2006, pp. 387–388); see also Paul’s (2002) mereological formulation of the bundle theory.

  4. Bare particularism is a minority view. But it has had its share of prominent defenders: Alston (1954), Armstrong (1989, 1997), Russell (1948), and recently, Sider (2006). Other defenses include: Allaire (1963, 1965), Baker (1967), Bergmann (1947, 1964, 1967), Casullo (1982), Davis and Brown (2008), Magelhaes (2007), Martin (1980), Moreland (1998, 2001), Moreland and Pickavance (2003), Oaklander and Rothstein (2000), and Pickavance (2009). For critical treatment, see citations in note 5 and Chappell (1964), Davis (2003), and Mertz (2001, 2003). For comparison of the bundle theory and bare particularism, see Benovsky (2008) and Morganti (2009).

  5. Most begin discussion of bare particularism and the Classic Objection by referencing Plato’s receptacles, Aristotle’s ‘prime matter’, and Locke’s substrata ‘I know not what’. The usual citations: Timaeus 48c–53c, Metaphysics 1029a20–33, Essay II, xxiii, Sect. 2. The Classic Objection shows up in many discussions of bare particularism; some of these include Anscombe (1964, p. 38), Armstrong (1989, pp. 94–96), Campbell (1990, p. 9), Davis (2004, pp. 267–268), Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1994, pp. 46–52), Loux (1978, pp. 149–152), Lowe (2003, p. 86), Mertz (2001, p. 48), Sellars (1952, 1963, p. 282), Quilter (1985), and Simons (1994, pp. 565–567).

  6. This is a hard bullet. But sometimes bare particularists seem willing to bite it. Thus Bergmann (1967, p. 24), ‘Bare particulars neither are nor have natures. Any two of them are not intrinsically but only numerically different. That is their bareness.’ Bergmann says in his (1964, p. 153) that bare particulars are ‘only numerically different’, a remark Magalhaes takes to imply that Bergmann’s bare particulars lack properties altogether (2007, p. 125).

  7. Objection. The claim that everything has properties is plausible only on an abundant theory of properties. And that’s bad. Reply. Fair enough. Luckily, my main complaint with the view (to be explicated below) does not assume any particular theory of properties. To the extent that the Classic Objection assumes an abundant theory of properties and that this assumption is problematic, my new objection to the theory is a superior one.

  8. Baker (1967, p. 211). See also Alston (1954, p. 257):

    A substratum might have underlain quite different properties from those which it in fact does and still be the same substratum; since it includes no properties, its identity does not depend on being associated with one set of universals rather than another. But a concrete individual could not possibly fail to include any of its properties and still be exactly the same individual which it is; its self-identity depends on its constituents.

  9. Armstrong (1989, p. 95).

  10. Moreland and Pickavance (2003, pp. 3–4). See also Moreland (1998, p. 257):

    A bare particular is called “bare”, not because it comes without properties, but in order to distinguish it from other particulars like substances and to distinguish the way it has a property (F is tied to x) from the way, say, a substance has a property (F is rooted within x).

    Alston makes a similar move in his (1954, pp. 257–258):

    We would certainly ordinarily say that the pencil exemplifies the color yellow, in addition to the ultimate substratum of the pencil, if any, exemplifying the color… we could now proceed to draw various distinctions between the two [exemplification] relations. For example the first relation is external, the second internal… In terms of this distinction we can characterize a “bare” particular as something which underlies universals but includes non; the latter feature constituting its “bareness” as constrated with a concrete individual.

  11. I assume here that if ‘instantiates’ is ambiguous between two ways of having a property, so also the ‘is’ of predication is ambiguous. If ‘is’ is not ambiguous, then I need not say more on this matter. For bare particularists like Moreland will simply accept that bare particulars are not red or round or juicy. They will, in other words, accept a negative answer to the Question and hence fall prey to the first horn of the New Objection.

  12. Alston (1954, p. 255). For similar remarks, see Allaire (1963, pp. 1–2), Benovsky (2008, pp. 175–176), Lowe (2003, pp. 85–86), Russell (1948, p. 97), Sider (2006, p. 389).

  13. Magalhaes (2007, p. 124), emphasis added.

  14. Sider (2006, p. 388), emphasis added. This statement of Sider’s is not obviously compatible with his suggestion that bare particulars are points of spacetime. For critical discussion, see Schmidt (2008).

  15. I here assume that if x is a proper constituent of y that x is distinct from y. The assumption is one the bare particularist should here grant: if bare particulars (each a proper constituent of some substance) are not distinct from their host substances, then the theory loses any interest.

    I have put the Crowding Argument in terms of tomatoes. But any kind of thing will do. Since writing his (2006), Sider has converted to mereological nihilism, according to which there are not any composite objects. So I suppose he now denies the existence of tomatoes. See Sider (2010). This does not harm my argument: simply replace ‘tomato’ in the Crowding Argument with a sortal Sider believes in (e.g., ‘electron’), while replacing ‘red’, ‘juicy’, and ‘round’ with predicates expressing properties that apply to, e.g., electrons.

  16. What else would it be to instantiate properties, except to stand in a relation (or non-relational tie) that follows this rule? Note, for example, that Sider himself seems to accept this consequence, moving freely between ‘thin particulars have properties. They really do!’ to ‘Thin particulars may be red, round, juicy...’ He moves freely, that is, between talk of x’s having property F to talk of x’s being F.

  17. Compare Paul (2002, pp. 592–593):

    …Does not my theory of logical objects imply that when we count the number of objects in the world, we will find far more objects than we ever dreamt we had? The easy answer to this question is yes—we have more objects than we common-sensically thought we had.

    But an increase in the number of objects we recognize as existing is a familiar consequence of accepting mereology. It is not that when we embrace mereology we discover many new entirely distinct (or, one might say, entirely different) objects; rather, we discover many new partly overlapping objects, i.e., we discover proper parts, which are objects in their own right.

  18. If Principle and the Constituent Thesis are supposed to be necessary truths, then we may run the above argument with weaker premises. We need only assume that possibly, some substance has a definite property. The contradiction would still follow.

References

  • Allaire, E. B. (1963). Bare particulars. Philosophical Studies, 14, 1–8.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allaire, E. B. (1965). Another look at bare particulars. Philosophical Studies, 16, 16–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alston, W. P. (1954). Particulars–bare and qualified. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15, 253–258.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anscombe, G. E. M. (1964). ‘Substance’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 38, reprinted in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind (vol. 2 of The Collected Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

  • Armstrong, D. M. (1989). Universals: An opinionated introduction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Baker, R. (1967). Particulars: Bare, naked, and nude. Noûs, 1, 211–212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benovsky, J. (2008). The bundle theory and the substratum theory: Deadly enemies or twin brothers? Philosophical Studies, 141, 175–190.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bergmann, G. (1947). Russell on particulars. Philosophical Review, 56, 59–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bergmann, G. (1964). Logic and reality. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergmann, G. (1967). Realism: A critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, K. (1990). Abstract particulars. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Casullo, A. (1982). Particulars, substrata, and the identity of indiscernibles. Philosophy of Science, 49, 591–603.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chappell, V. C. (1964). Particulars re-clothed. Philosophical Studies, 15, 60–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davis, R. B. (2003). Partially clad’ bare particulars exposed. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 534–548.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davis, R. B. (2004). The brave new bare particularism. The Modern Schoolman, 81, 267–273.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis, R. B., & Brown, D. S. (2008). A puzzle for bare particulars? Axiomathes, 18, 49–65.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hoffman, J., & Rosenkrantz, D. S. (1994). Substance and other categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Loux, M. (1978). Substance and attribute. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lowe, E. J. (2003). Individuation. In: M. J. Loux & D. W. Zimmerman (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Magalhaes, E. (2007). Time for Bergmann’s bare particulars’. In: C. Hochberg, R. Huntelmann, C. Kanzian, R. Schantz, & E. Tegtmeier (Eds.), Ontology and analysis: Essays and recollections about Gustav Bergmann. Paris/Piscataway, NJ: Ontos Verlag Transaction Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, C. B. (1980). Substance substantiated. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58, 3–10.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mertz, D. W. (2001). Individuation and instance ontology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79, 45–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mertz, D. W. (2003). Against bare particulars: A response to moreland and pickavance. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 14–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moreland, J. P. (1998). Theories of individuation: A reconsideration of bare particulars. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79, 251–263.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moreland, J. P. (2001). Universals. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moreland, J. P., & Pickavance, T. (2003). Bare particulars and individuation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 1–13.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morganti, M. (2009). Are the bundle theory and the substratum theory really twin brothers? Axiomathes, 19, 73–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oaklander, L. N., & Rothstein, A. (2000). Loux on particulars: Bare and concrete. The Modern Schoolman, 78, 97–102.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paul, L. A. (2002). Logical parts. Noûs, 36, 578–596.

  • Pickavance, T. (2009). In defense of ‘partially clad’ bare particulars. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87, 155–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quilter, J. (1985). What has properties? Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 10, 32–49.

  • Russell, B. (1948). An enquiry into meaning and truth. London: Allen and Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt, M. (2008). On spacetime, points, and bare particulars. Metaphysica: International Journal of Ontology and Metaphysics, 9, 69–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sellars, W. (1952). Particulars. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 13, 184–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sellars, W. (1963). Science, perception, and reality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sider, T. (2006). Bare particulars. Philosophical Perspectives, 20, 387–397.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sider, T. (2010). Against parthood. http://tedsider.org/papers/nihilism.pdf.

  • Simons, P. (1994). Particulars in particular clothing: Three trope theories of substance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 54, 553–575.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Inwagen, P. (2001). Ontology, indentity, and modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolterstorff, N. (1970). Bergmann’s constituent ontology. Noûs, 4, 109–134.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

Thanks to the van Plantingwagena reading platoon, an anonymous referee, audiences at Biola, Calvin, and Syracuse, and to Jeff Brower, Sam Grummons, James Lee, Mike Rea, and Ted Sider for helpful comments and conversation. Special thanks to Alex Skiles for convincing me to write this paper, and to Brad Rettler for good coffee and great conversation.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 100 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN, 46556, USA

    Andrew M. Bailey

Authors
  1. Andrew M. Bailey
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Andrew M. Bailey.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bailey, A.M. No bare particulars. Philos Stud 158, 31–41 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9665-2

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9665-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation