Abstract
I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character just is for it to have a certain representational content (perhaps represented in the right sort of way), encounters two problems: the dual looks problem and the duplication problem. The dual looks problem is this: strong representationalism predicts that how things phenomenally look to the subject reflects the content of the experience. But some objects phenomenally look to both have and not have certain properties, for example, my bracelet may phenomenally look to be circular-shaped and oval-shaped (and hence non-circular-shaped). So, if strong representationalism is true, then the content of my experience ought to represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. Yet, intuitively, the content of my experience does not represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. The duplication problem is this. On a standard conception of content, spatio-temporally distinct experiences and experiences had by distinct subjects may differ in content despite the fact that they are phenomenally indistinguishable. But this undermines the thesis that phenomenal character determines content. I argue that the two problems can be solved by applying a version of an idea from David Chalmers, which is to recognize the existence of genuinely centered properties in the content of perceptual experience.
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Notes
Thompson (2006), Schroeder and Caplan (2007) and Tye (2007, 2008) discuss versions of this problem for strong representationalism. Schroeder and Caplan conclude that strong representationalism is not consistent with a Russellian conception of content. Thompson and Tye argue that the problems give us reasons for rejecting strong representationalism. Tye (2007, 2008) furthermore argues that the correct view of content is the singular (when filled) thesis. He admits that this view cannot account for the representationalist intuition that veridical experiences and hallucinations can have a common content. As he puts it, ‘what remains is the singular (when filled) thesis … it concedes that the content of visual experience in hallucinatory cases is different from the content of visual experience in veridical cases. At the level of content itself, there is indeed no common factor. For each experience, there is only a single admissible content, but this content is different in veridical and in hallucinatory cases’ (2008, p. 22). Thompson argues that two objects may differ in surface-spectral reflectance properties and yet have the same phenomenal character. However, this is not an objection to the view defended in this paper, as I do not equate phenomenal-representational color properties with surface-spectral reflectance properties. Nor do I hold that there must be a distinct phenomenal-representational color property for every surface-spectral reflectance property. The view central to this paper is simply that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character just is for it to have a certain representational content.
As an anonymous referee points out, the problem raised is not a problem with centered worlds but a problem with a certain centered-worlds approach. If the content of my experience is that there is a blue ball two feet away, to my right, then the relevant centered worlds are those in which there is a blue ball two feet away from the center’s right. The marked features of centered worlds need not be individuals or times.
Of course, as an anonymous referee points out, ‘looks’ reports might not even be conveying beliefs derived from one’s visual experience. For example, upon being told that the theorem has been proven, one might say ‘it looks like Fermat was right, then’.
For variations on these examples, see e.g. Peacocke (1983, p. 12) and Sainsbury (2007). Sainsbury considers the case of a shirt that is partially lit by bright sunshine. The shirt veridically looks to be orange all over and bi-colored. However, unless the perceiver is casting the shade, shades don’t move as the perceiver moves (they move only when the object that’s creating the shade moves). So, it seems that this case is better accounted for by taking the shadedness of the shirt to be an ordered pair of orangeness and illumination. For discussion of the color constancy cases and strong representationalism, see e.g. Thompson (2006).
This is not to say that F is, say, a surface-spectral reflectance property but only that it is true to say that the thing has F. For example, in color conversion cases, an object with the surface spectral reflectance property green may perhaps be truly said to be red. In such cases phenomenal red represents the surface-spectral reflectance property green. Whether it represents correctly will depend on the application conditions for ‘phenomenal red’. For discussion see Tye (2000) and Chalmers (2006).
Some authors (e.g. Lycan 1995, p. 129) would insist that a circular-shaped bracelet cannot veridically look to be oval-shaped. This reply is consistent with denying that P-‘looks’ reports reflect the representational content of experience. If P-‘looks’ reports do not reflect the representational content of experience, then a circular-shaped bracelet can look oval-shaped and one’s experience can be veridical.
See e.g. Tye (1996, p. 121, 2000, p. 159).
The terminology is from Tye (1996).
Schellenberg maintains that the content of an experience need not represent situation-dependent properties as relational. However, if this is so, then the situation-dependent properties that constitute the content of experiences cannot have extensions relative to possible worlds (otherwise, the problem of contradictory contents will re-emerge). Rather, they must be construed as centered properties of the sort I consider below.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for offering this response.
My centered properties are at least superficially similar to the constituents of Chalmers’ centered contents and Egan’s centering features. On Chalmers’ view, perceptual content contains centered properties such as being the object that caused this experience and being the property that normally gives rise to phenomenally red experiences in me. Chalmers does not explicitly recognize centered properties such as being to the right, red, being further away than, and so on. But, as we will see, his approach can easily be extended in this direction. Egan’s centering features are dispositions in things to cause certain color appearances in perceivers. Egan argues that the strong representationalist who aims to avoid the problem of the inverted spectrum should take the content of perceptual experience to contain centering features. Chalmers and Egan prefer to reserve the term ‘property’ for those features which are (or represent) functions from worlds to extensions. However, as I see it, this is merely a terminological difference.
Of course, some of these properties might have an extension only relative to a centered world which contains cultural standards.
An exception is ‘hurts’. ‘My legs hurts’ is not typically treated as short for ‘my leg hurts me’. But if my leg hurts, then of course it hurts me not you (for discussion see Crane 2007).
Of course, the content is more detailed than that. This is a simplification.
Thanks to an anonymous referee here.
As an anonymous referee points out, it could be argued that on the current view, the apparent ovalness of a bracelet seen obliquely does not phenomenally look like the ovalness of a true oval also seen obliquely. The first will look to be centered-oval but not uncentered-oval. The second will look uncentered-oval but not centered-oval. So they have nothing in common, phenomenologically. One could, as the referee suggests, avoid this problem by talking instead about seeing things as having oval cross-sections. That keeps the same property (ovalness) in both the phenomenology of the bracelet and of the obliquely seen oval. Alternatively, I suppose one can hypothesize (as I do) that uncentered ovalness and centered ovalness are phenomenally indistinguishable even though the former has an extension relative to a world whereas the latter has an extension only relative to a centered world.
It may be objected that smoothness is an intrinsic property, and so one that doesn’t vary with respect to the sight of an observer. However, it is not clear to me what it is for a piece of paper to be smooth simpliciter. It seems to me that, relative to the world as a whole, the paper is smooth at a scale perceivable by some particular perceiver or a type of perceiver. But we can then say that, relative to a centered world containing that perceiver or type of perceiver, the paper instantiates centered smoothness.
The paper has benefited from comments provided by an anonymous referee, J. C. Bjerring, David Bourget, David Chalmers, Patrick Greenough, Fiona Macpherson, Susanna Schellenberg, Daniel Stoljar and Declan Smithies.
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Brogaard, B. Strong representationalism and centered content. Philos Stud 151, 373–392 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9437-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9437-z