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Unsustainable sovereign debt—is the Euro crisis only the tip of the iceberg?

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Abstract

As a direct effect of the financial crisis in 2008, public debt began to accumulate rapidly, eventually leading to the European sovereign debt crisis. However, the dramatic increase in government debt is not only happening in European countries. All major G7 countries are experiencing similar developments. What are the implications of this kind of massive deficit and debt policy for the long term stability of these economies? Are there limits in debt-ratios that qualitatively change policy options? While theory can easily illustrate these limits, where are these limits in real economies? This paper examines the relationship between sovereign debt dynamics and capital formation, and accounts for the effects of the 2008 financial crisis on debt sustainability for the four largest advanced economies. We contribute to the literature on fiscal sustainability by framing the problem in an OLG model with government debt, physical capital, endogenous interest rates, and exogenous growth. For the calibration exercise we extract data from the OECD for Germany as a stabilization anchor in Europe, the US, the UK, and Japan for almost two decades before the 2008 crisis. Except for intertemporal preferences, all parameters are drawn or directly derived from the OECD database, or endogenously determined within the model. The results of the calibration exercise are alarming for all four countries under consideration. We identify debt ceilings that indicate a sustainable and unsustainable regime. For 2011 all four economies are either close to, or have already passed the ceiling. The results call for a dramatic readjustment in budget policies for a consolidation period and long-term fiscal rules that make it possible to sustain sufficient capital intensity so that these economies can maintain their high income levels. Current conditions are already starting to restrict policy choices. However, the results also make it very clear that none of these economies would survive a second financial crisis such as the one in 2008.

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Notes

  1. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) find that financial crises often percede or accompany debt crises. Causality may run in both directions. See also Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012).

  2. Patillo et al. (2011), among others, show that there is a non-linear relationship between GDP growth and external debt. In particular, they find a threshold beyond which more debt affects growth negatively. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) argue that this relatioship is weak for low debt to GDP ratios.

  3. This result contrasts with the pioniring results of the theoretical and older study of Sargent and Wallace (1981), where a constant increasing debt/GDP ratio is proven to be unsustainable with a limit on the demand for government debt.

  4. Reinhart et al. (2012) identify a 90 % debt/ GDP threshold, above which there is a negative causal relationship between high debt and growth. Although their study takes a different approach, their long-term robust results confirm; (1) the crowding-out mechanism behind the present paper’s theoretical model, and (2) the existence of a maximum debt ratio.

  5. See for e.g., Masson (1985) for a related OLG model under uncertainty.

  6. We prefer writting intensity ratios in terms of income due to the obvious advantages linked with the calibration exercise. For identical arguments see Chalk (2000, p.304).

  7. This assumption implicitly takes care of liquidity properties of the two assets. Capital will be more likely to be bequeathed and debt will be more likely to be partly consumed and partly bequeathed by the old.

  8. At this point we also differ from related modeling like Farmer and Zotti (2010). While they implement a constant tax burden on ‘labor in efficiency units’ we tax labor income proportionally. The implication is straightforward. In Farmer and Zotti (2010) a constant tax rule on “labor efficient units” will leave the tax payments unchanged even if wage income increases with a higher capital intensity. That is, the tax burden increases per income unit. Hence, their rule implicitly establishes a mechanism of changing taxes per wage income when capital intensity changes, which has clear implications for the reported results. In order not to rely on this specific effect we establish a fixed tax ratio per income unit. In this case higher income (for whatever reason) would be taxed with the same ratio, and the tax burden per income is fixed.

  9. See the difference to Rankin and Roffia (2003), p. 222.

  10. Chalk (2000) includes a risk premium to examine possible bias. He concludes that the inclusion of a risk premium would not change qualitative results, so we will not consider this aspect further.

  11. The unsustainability of such a scenario was first discussed by Sargent and Wallace (1981).

  12. For identical arguments see e.g., Diamond (1965, p. 1137), De la Croix and Michel (2002, pp. 216–226), and Farmer and Zotti (2010, p. 294).

  13. Note that this could have been written in terms of a government spending rule for a given tax revenue.

  14. In this simplifying model we only include the flow component of international assets. Including international stocks would provide more interesting information about the international component of total assets and the steady state shares. However, this would not change the fact that stationary flows reveal whether international resources add to the current budget constraint, or whether a resource outflow reduces domestically available resources.

  15. To keep it as simple as possible, for the formal model we do not consider potential reevaluation of assets. In recent years we have observed that real assets, in particular real estate prices, developed differently from the GDP deflator. This relative price change in real assets may under certain conditions affect the budget constraint. However, for the calibration we include the change in relative prices and provide a formal modelling in Appendix 1.

  16. Using Eqs. 6 and 9.

  17. For a proof see Appendix 1.

  18. For similar OLG calibration exercises see e.g., Chalk (2000), Moraga and Vidal (2004), and Voyvoda and Yeldan (2005).

  19. Chalk (2000) selects a period for the baseline scenario which avoids periods of high deficits in order to calibrate the model for a balanced budget.

  20. Since data availability and the identification of a baseline period depends on the capital concept, this interaction needs to be briefly discussed. We want to identify real capital in the production process. The longest time period is available for a capital concept that the OECD economic outlook calls ‘productive capital’. Hence, this variable is our first choice for ‘capital’ to identify a stationary capital output ratio for 1991–2007. However, we know that ‘productive capital’ is only a fraction of total capital input in the aggregate production process. In particular, housing capital is an important additional element of fixed capital and capital accumulation. Therefore, if housing is excluded from the calibration data we do not have consistent budget constraints and might run into the problem of generating biased results in terms of a larger gross return on capital. E.g., for the UK the ‘tangible fixed capital ratio’ including dwellings is more than 2.5 times higher than a capital measure excluding dwellings. Hence, using a measure of capital that excludes dwelling will lead to an inconsistent budget constraint and overestimate the gross return on capital. As the variables are directly computed from the model, we are forced to address this problem by using the capital concept ‘tangible fixed assets’ from the national accounts of the OECD. Finding stationarity for ‘productive capital’ for the period 1991–2007 (for the UK 1988–2007) and being restricted to the period 1995–2007 for ‘tanglible fixed assets’ we regard this sub-period, too, as stationary, even if we cannot apply respective tests and provide statistical support due to shortage of data.

  21. ADF and PP tests show stationarity for the US, UK, and Germany. For the UK we obtain this result for 1988–2007.

  22. This statement is not precise with respect to the relative prices of dwellings in the UK. In the UK there was a significant and ongoing relative price increase in dwellings particular after 2000 that affected tangible assets. This is also true for the United States.

  23. According to statistical stationarity tests productive capital and η were stationary for 1991–2007.

  24. Another legitimate reason why we abstract from choosing 1988–1992 as a potential stationary real economy period, despite the fact that data for Japansese ‘tangible capital assets’ is available from 2001, is the drastic development in the structure of the Japanese economy since 1992, which would make a reflection of a stationary real economy dubious at best.

  25. As opposed to Creel and Saraceno (2008), but following Chalk (2000).

  26. See HPI for UK: http://www.nationwide.co.uk/hpi/datadownload/data_download.htm (Last accessed on September 25th 2012); for US: http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=87 (Last accessed on September 25th 2012); for Germany: http://www.hypoport.de/hpx-hedonic.html (Last accessed on September 25th 2012); and Japan http://www.reinet.or.jp/en/index.html (Last accessed on September 25th 2012).

  27. Under certain conditions relative price changes in favor of real capital (here, housing) can lead to an increase in both asset ratios, k and b, without additional savings or external resources. For the time of the relative price change this effect appears almost as a kind of temporary relaxation in the resource constraints. For the theoretic argument see Appendix 1. For a discussion of the accounting priciples see SNA (2008).

  28. In line with Barro (1979), Reinhart et al. (2012) confirm in their long-run study that the predominance of low interest rates during periods of high debt-ratios in the advanced economies means that the latter alone cannot be a debt stabilization instrument. Public spending and tax adjustments have to keep debt below a given threshold at all times.

  29. We are fully aware that the US has no general federal sales tax like the VAT in other countries. However, we use sales tax to achieve comparability with the systems of other countries consisdered.

  30. The UK has been forecasted to have a lower interest-growth differential relative to the US and Japan (source: the IMF Fiscal Monitor (2011), September edition, p. 9)

  31. OECD (2011), table 3.8.

  32. Or alternatively increase spending by 30 bill Euro yearly.

  33. For another illustrative analysis see e.g. the IMF’s fiscal adjustment strategy in the 2011 Fiscal Monitor edition. It gives the adjustment required to bring back debt to the target ratios of the IMF by 2030.

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Appendices

Appendix

This is an extended appendix for the working paper version:

1.1 Notation

α :

share of physical capital

1 − β :

the future discount factor

γ :

bequest share of sovereign debt

A :

exogenous scale parameter reflecting technological level

n :

population growth rate

ε t :

labor efficiency growth

η :

total growth factor

\(c_{t}^{1}\) :

individual’s consumption per capita of the young generation at time t

\(c_{t+i}^{2}\) :

individual’s consumption per capita of the old generation in period t + i of life

B t :

stock of government net financial liabilities at the start of period t

D t :

principal of debt issued at the start of period t

b t :

government net financial liabilities as a share of GDP at the start of period t

k t :

capital efficiency-labour ratio at the start of period t

g t :

government expenditure as a share of GDP at time t

τ t :

tax revenues as share of wage income at the time t

d t :

primary balance as share of GDP at time t

i t :

real interest rate on public debt

r t :

net real physical rate of return on physical capital at time t

δ t :

depreciation rate for real capital stock

1.2 Appendix 1: Solving the model

1.2.1 Production per labor in efficiency units

The output of a firm is defined by the Cobb-Douglas production function

$$ Y_{t}=A\left( K_{t}\right) ^{\alpha }\left( H_{t}\right) ^{1-\alpha }. $$

In order to determine the production in efficiency units we have to compute the ratio each efficiency-weighted labour input provides. Hence, we obtain

$$ \tilde{y}:=\frac{Y_{t}}{H_{t}}=A^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha }}k_{t}^{\frac{\alpha }{ 1-\alpha }}\textrm{with} \,k_{t}:=K_{t}/Y_{t}. \label{y_schlange} $$
(12)

1.2.2 Profit maximization of firms

In order to determine the input factor prices we consider the profit function

$$ \Pi =A(K_{t})^{\alpha }(H_{t})^{1-\alpha }-\left( r_{t}+\delta \right) (K_{t})-\tilde{w}_{t}(H_{t}). $$

Maximizing leads to the first order conditions

$$ \tilde{w}_{t}=\left( 1-\alpha \right) A^{\frac{\alpha }{1-\alpha }}k_{t}^{ \frac{\alpha }{1-\alpha }}\textrm{and}\,r_{t}=\alpha k_{t}^{-1}-\delta . $$

1.2.3 Lifetime consumption maximization

Using the Langrangeian function for the consumer’s maximization problem

$$ L=\left( \beta \left( \tilde{c}_{t}^{1}\right) ^{-\rho }+(1-\beta )\left( \tilde{c}_{t+1}^{2}\right) ^{-\rho }\right) ^{\frac{-1}{\rho }}+\lambda _{1}\left( \tilde{w}_{t}\left( 1-\tau _{t}\right) -\left( \tilde{c}_{t}^{1}+ \frac{1}{1+i_{t}}\tilde{c}_{t+1}^{2}\right) \right) $$

we obtain the condition

$$ 1+i_{t}=\frac{\beta }{1-\beta }\left( \frac{\tilde{c}_{t+1}^{2}}{\tilde{c} _{t}^{1}}\right) ^{\rho +1}. \label{con_opt} $$
(13)

Using the derivative with respect to λ 1 and plugging in we obtain the household’s savings rule in efficiency units

$$ \tilde{s}_{t}=\frac{\tilde{w}_{t}\left( 1-\tau _{t}\right) \left( \frac{ 1-\beta }{\beta }\right) ^{\varphi }}{\left[ \left( \frac{1-\beta }{\beta } \right) ^{\varphi }+(1+i_{t})^{1-\varphi }\right] }\textrm{with}\,\varphi = \frac{1}{\rho +1}. $$

Hence, for the savings rule in terms of the savings rate (savings per income) it holds

$$ s_{t}:=\frac{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \left( 1-\tau _{t}\right) \left( \frac{ 1-\beta }{\beta }\right) ^{\varphi }}{\left[ \left( 1+i_{t}\right) ^{1-\varphi }+\left( \frac{1-\beta }{\beta }\right) ^{\varphi }\right] }. $$

We can show that the derivative of s t according to i t is increasing

$$ \frac{\partial s_{t}}{\partial i_{t}}=-\frac{\left( 1-\varphi \right) \left( 1-\alpha \right) \left( 1-\tau _{t}\right) \left( \frac{1-\beta }{\beta } \right) ^{\varphi }}{\left[ \left( 1+i_{t}\right) +\left( 1+i_{t}\right) ^{\varphi }\left( \frac{1-\beta }{\beta }\right) ^{\varphi }\right] ^{2}}>0 \textrm{for}\, \varphi >1 $$

1.2.4 The public sector

Each period debt changes by

$$ \begin{array}{lll} B_{t+1}-B_{t} &=&D_{t}+i_{t}B_{t}=G_{t}-T_{t}+i_{t}B_{t}. \\[4pt] &\Leftrightarrow &\frac{B_{t+1}\eta _{t}}{Y_{t}\eta _{t}}=\frac{D_{t}}{Y_{t}} +\left( 1+i_{t}\right) \frac{B_{t}}{Y_{t}}=\frac{G_{t}}{Y_{t}}-\frac{T_{t}}{ Y_{t}}+\left( 1+i_{t}\right) \frac{B_{t}}{Y_{t}}. \end{array} $$

In order to obtain the total debt accumulation in ‘debt ratio’ b t  = :B t /Y t substitute \(d_{t}=\frac{D_{t}}{Y_{t}},g_{t}=\frac{G_{t}}{ Y_{t}}\) and \(\tau _{t}=\frac{T_{t}}{Y_{t}}.\) Hence, we obtain

$$ \eta _{t}b_{t+1}=d_{t}+(1+i_{t})b_{t}=g_{t}-\tau _{t}+(1+i_{t})b_{t} $$

with η t denoting the growth factor of output which in a potential steady state becomes equal to the product of the population growth factor (1 + n t ) and the growth factor of labor productivity \(\left( 1+\varepsilon _{t}\right) \), such that \(\eta _{t}=\left( 1+\varepsilon _{t}\right) (1+n_{t})\).

1.2.5 Equilibrium and stationarity conditions

Pure transmission of capital and bonds from generation to generation:

We assume that the old generation bequeaths the total capital K t and bonds B t with the share γ if the restriction is fulfilled that total bequest does not restrict full capital transfer. Therefore the income and expenditure equation becomes:

$$ \begin{array}{lll} wH&+&K_{t}+\gamma B_{t}-T-C^{y}+K_{t}r_{t}+B_{t}r_{t}+\left( 1-\gamma \right) B_{t}\\ &=&C^{o}+K_{t+1}+B_{t+1}-F\\ &\Rightarrow &s_{t}+f_{t}+k_{t}+\gamma b_{t}=\eta _{t}k_{t+1}+\eta _{t}b_{t+1} \end{array} $$

General stationarity curve:

For the general stationarity curve we use that b t + 1 = b t and k t + 1 = k t :

$$ \Rightarrow b_{t}^{s}=:b_{t}=\frac{s_{t}}{\left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) }+ \frac{f_{t}}{\left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) }+\frac{\left( 1-\eta _{t}\right) }{\left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) }k_{t} $$

Properties of the general stationarity curve:

$$ \begin{array}{cc} \text{Case} & \underset{k\rightarrow 0}{\lim }b_{t}^{s}(k_{t}) \\ \varphi >1: & \frac{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \left( 1-\tau _{t}\right) }{ \left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) }+\frac{f_{t}}{\left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) } \\ \varphi =1: & \frac{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \left( 1-\tau _{t}\right) }{ \left[ \left( \frac{1-\beta }{\beta }\right) ^{-1}+1\right] \left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) }+\frac{f_{t}}{\left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) } \\ \varphi <1: & \frac{f_{t}}{\left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) } \end{array} $$

For k→ ∞ we obtain

$$ \underset{k\rightarrow \infty }{\lim }b_{t}^{s}(k_{t})=-\infty . $$

For the derivative we obtain

$$ \begin{array}{lll} \frac{\partial b_{t}^{s}(k_{t})}{\partial k_{t}} &=&\frac{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \left( 1-\tau _{t}\right) }{\left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) }\\ &&\times\left[ \frac{\alpha \left( \frac{1-\beta }{\beta }\right) ^{-\varphi }}{ k_{t}^{2}\left( 1+\alpha k_{t}^{-1}-\delta \right) ^{\varphi }\left[ \left( 1+\alpha k_{t}^{-1}-\delta \right) ^{1-\varphi }\left( \frac{1-\beta }{\beta }\right) ^{-\varphi }+1\right] ^{2}}\right] \\ &&+\frac{(1-\eta )}{\left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) } \end{array} $$
$$ \underset{k\rightarrow 0}{\lim }\frac{\partial b_{t}^{s}(k_{t})}{\partial k_{t}}=\infty . $$
$$ \underset{k\rightarrow \infty }{\lim }\frac{\partial b_{t}^{s}(k_{t})}{ \partial k_{t}}=\frac{(1-\eta )}{\left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) }<0. $$

Since we have parts where the derivative of the \(b_{t}^{s}-\)curve is positive and parts where it is negative we can state that with the intermediate value theorem there is at least one point where the derivative is 0, hence a maximum.

Non-stationary dynamics:

From Eqs. 10 and 11 it is apparent that below the \(b_{t}^{s}-curve\) capital intensity will increase and above the \(b_{t}^{s}-curve\) capital intensity will decrease.

$$ k_{t+1}\geq k_{t}\textrm{if}\,b_{t}\leq b_{t}^{s}\qquad \textrm{and}\, \qquad k_{t+1}\leq k_{t}\textrm{if}\,b_{t}\geq b_{t}^{s} $$

1.2.6 Relative price changes of real assets:

In order to include the relative price change of real assets into the budget constraint we assume the price change to be

$$ p_{t+1}^{K}=\underset{:=\pi _{t}^{K}}{\underbrace{\left( \frac{ (p_{t+1}^{K}-p_{t}^{K})}{p_{t}^{K}}+1\right) }}p_{t}^{K}=\pi _{t}^{K}p_{t}^{K}. $$

Then the income and expenditure equation becomes

$$\begin{array}{lll} wH&+&p_{t}K_{t}+\gamma B_{t}-T-C^{y}+K_{t}r_{t}+B_{t}r_{t}+\left( 1-\gamma \right) B_{t}\\ &=&C^{o}+p_{t+1}K_{t+1}+B_{t+1}-F\\ &\Rightarrow & s_{t}+f_{t}+p_{t}k_{t}+\gamma b_{t}=\eta _{t}\pi _{t}^{K}p_{t}^{K}k_{t+1}+\eta _{t}b_{t+1} \end{array} $$

With the same procedure we obtain for the general stationarity curve:

$$\begin{array}{lll} b_{t}^{s}&:=&b_{t}=\frac{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \left( 1-\tau _{t}\right) }{ \left[ \left( 1+\alpha p_{t}k_{t}^{-1}-\delta \right) ^{1-\varphi }\left( \frac{1-\beta }{\beta }\right) ^{-\varphi }+1\right] \left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) }\\[4pt] &&+\,\frac{f_{t}}{\left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) }+\frac{(1-\eta \pi _{t}^{K}p_{t}^{K})}{\left( \eta _{t}-\gamma \right) }k_{t}\end{array} $$

Note that the price change could also be implemented before deriving the savings rule. However, since the total capital stock is bequeathed an implementation would not change the interpretation.

Appendix 2: A calibration exercise

Definition of extracted input-data

Table 6 All extracted variables are taken as a simple averages for the respective country and base line period
Table 7 All extracted variables are taken as a simple averages for the respective country and base line period

Results stationarity tests

Table 8 Stationarity tests

Determining values for the baseline scenario from the model

Table 9 Determining values for baseline scenario from the model

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Bilkic, N., Carreras Painter, B. & Gries, T. Unsustainable sovereign debt—is the Euro crisis only the tip of the iceberg?. Int Econ Econ Policy 10, 1–45 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-013-0230-2

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