Abstract
We consider a problem in which a policy is chosen from a one-dimensional set over which voters have single-peaked preferences. While Moulin (Public Choice 35:437–455, 1980) and others subsequent works have focused on strategy-proof rules, Renault and Trannoy (Mimeo 2011) and Renault and Trannoy (J Pub Econ Theory 7:169–199, 2005) have shown that the average rule implements a generalized median rule in Nash equilibria and provide an interpretation of the parameters in Moulin’s rule. In this article, we first extend their result by showing that a wide range of voting rules which includes the average rule can implement Moulin’s rule in Nash equilibria. Moreover, we show additionally that within this class, generalized average rules are Cournot stable. That is, from any strategy profile, any best response path must converge to a Nash equilibrium.
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Yamamura, H., Kawasaki, R. Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules. Soc Choice Welf 40, 815–832 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0645-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0645-z