Abstract
Dynamic clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However, clock auctions require congregating bidders for a fixed time interval, which has limited field applicability and introduces inefficiencies of its own given the time cost of congregating bidders. In this experiment we explore the effects of removing these inefficiencies through survival auctions—a multi-round sealed-bid auction which is theoretically isomorphic to the dynamic clock auction with drop-out information.
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Kagel’s research was partially supported by National Science Foundation Grants No. 0136925 and 0136928. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. We thank the associate editor, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at Purdue University, especially Tim Cason, participants at International Industrial Organization April 2004 Conference, the ESA June 2003 meetings, and our discussant, Tim Salmon, for valuable comments. Kirill Chernomaz provided valuable research assistance. The usual caveat applies.
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Kagel, J.H., Pevnitskaya, S. & Ye, L. Survival auctions. Economic Theory 33, 103–119 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0156-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0156-9