Abstract
Though the following problem is not explicitly raised by her, it seems sufficiently similar to an issue of pertinence to Akins’s “Black and White and Color” (Akins 2014) to merit the moniker, Akins’s Problem: Can there be a visual experience devoid of both color phenomenology and black-and-white phenomenology?
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But not “Akins’ Problem.” Regarding the rule followed here on apostrophes for proper nouns ending in “s,” see p. 354 of The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th Edition, Chicago University Press, 2010.
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Acknowledgements
Most of what I know about the neurophilosophy of color I learned while under the influence of Kathleen Akins and Martin Hahn, and I am grateful for conversations with them about this stuff over the years. Thanks are due as well for conversations on related matters with Richard Brown, Jacob Berger, and David Rosenthal.
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Mandik, P. (2014). What Is Visual and Phenomenal but Concerns Neither Hue Nor Shade?. In: Brown, R. (eds) Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_17
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