Afghanistan: Why Has Violence Replaced Political Power?

Ruiz-Gálvez, Encarnación Fernández

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-4020-4_4

Afghanistan: Why Has Violence Replaced Political Power?

Encarnación Fernández Ruiz-Gálvez⁴

Chapter
First Online: 01 January 2012

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Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 13))

Abstract

The hypothesis from which Chap. 4 stems, and which I will try to confirm through this article, is that in Afghanistan it has been the international factors (albeit interacting with internal dynamics) which have had a particular hand in intensifying the conflicts and the process of State decomposition. On top of the underlying and undeniable structural weakness and external vulnerability of the Afghan State (a matter addressed in sects 4.1 and 4.2), the international interventions from the Afghan-Soviet war to the 2001 invasion, the lack of interest shown by the international community in consolidating peace in Afghanistan during the 1990s, and especially the numerous errors made by the international community led by the EU in the past decade, and which began with the invasion at the end of 2001, have all contributed to the constant decline in the country conditions (a thesis developed in the central part of this work: sects 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6). Among other things, these factors have generated an environment ripe for the slow, progressive substitution of politics for violence which is one of the major obstacles today facing any attempts to reconstruct the country. In this sense, Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the distinction between political power and violence could serve as a basis for reflection about the possible (and doubtless difficult) ways out of the current situation in Afghanistan, through a recuperation of the political field, in the most noble sense of the term, as a way of overcoming violence through communication; a question which is addressed further in the final section of this work.

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Notes

1.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 7.
2.
PIRIS, Alberto, “Prólogo” a HEROLD, Marc W, Afganistán como un espacio vacío. El perfecto Estado neocolonial del S. XXI (Madrid: Foca, 2007), p. 9.
3.
HEROLD, Marc W, Afghanistan as an Empty Space: The Perfect Neo-Colonial State of the 21st Century, revised and updated April 2006, passim. Available at www.grassrootspeace.org/m_herold_afghanistan_0406.pdf
4.
The Abdalis were one of the two great rival groups of the Pashtun tribes- Ghilzais and Abdalis (later known as Durranis).
5.
“The disintegration of two mighty empires, the Saffavid in Iran and the Mughal in India, provided the opportunity for a great tribal confederation of Pashtuns in 1747” (HYMAN, Anthony, Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964-83 (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 4).
6.
MALEY, William, The Afghanistan Wars (Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), “The Afghan State”, pp. 11–3; RASANAYAGAM, Angelo, Afghanistan: A Modern History. Monarchy, Despotism or Democracy? The Problems of Governance in the Muslim Tradition, pp. 11–13 (London/New York; I.B. Tauris, 2010); and RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:…, cit., p. 12.
7.
MASON, A., “La crisis de seguridad en Colombia: causas y consecuencias internacionales de un Estado en vía de fracaso,” Revista Colombia Internacional, no. 49/50 (junio 2001).
8.
ROTBERG, Robert I., “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair,” in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. ROTBERG, Robert I., p. 5 (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004).
9.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “Afghanistan: The Patrimonial Trap and the Dream of Institution-Building,” in Persistent State Weakness in the Global Age, ed. KOSTOVICOVA, Denisa and BOJICIC-DZELILOVIC, Vesna, pp. 69–71 (Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2009).
10.
JAWAD, Nassim, Afghanistan. A Nation of Minorities, Minority Rights Group Report, London, 1992, pp. 7, 9 and 14.
11.
RASHID, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos. The World’s Most Unstable Region and the Threat to Global Security (London: Penguin Books, 2008), p. 8.
12.
RASANAYAGAM, Angelo, Afghanistan: A Modern History…, cit., p. 11.
13.
DOLLOT, René, L'Afghanistan: Histoire. Description. Moeurs et coutumes. Folklore. Fouille (Paris: Payot, 1937), p. 47.
14.
GHANI, Ashraf, “Impact of Foreign Aid on Relation Between State and Society,” Journal of Afghan Affairs (Peshawar, Pakistan) 5, no. 4 (1990).
15.
JAWAD, Nassim, Afghanistan. A Nation of Minorities, cit., p. 7.
16.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:…, cit., p. 11.
17.
RUBIN, Barnett R., “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 15, no. 2 (1996): 5; e ID., The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002 (2ª)), pp. 48–52.
Although formally Afghanistan was never a colony, the Treaty of Gandamack imposed important limitations on its sovereignty. The Treaty of Gandamack was signed during the war (May 26, 1879) by the regent Yakub Khan. The Treaty of Gandamack was an authentic protectorate treaty which granted England international representation of Afghanistan. For their part, England paid a subsidy for the maintenance of the army. Further, Yakub Khan was forced to cede vast areas to the west of the Indus (Kurram, Pishin and Sibi), and accept that the Khyber and Michi passes would remain under British control. This meant the virtual secession of the Peshawar Valley and of other Afghan territories to the west of the Indus, which permitted the British, less than 15 years later, to set out the Durand line (RASANAYAGAM, Angelo, Afghanistan: A Modern History…, cit., p. 8).
18.
RASANAYAGAM, Angelo, Afghanistan: A Modern History…, cit., p. 10.
19.
RUBIN, Barnett R., “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis”, cit., p. 5; e ID., The Fragmentation of Afghanistan:…, cit.
20.
ESPINOSA, Ángeles, “Las áreas tribales pakistaníes y la lucha contra el terrorismo,” Política exterior, no. 116 (marzo–abril 2007): 52–56.
21.
On the situation in tribal areas from Pakistan’s independence until today, ESPINOSA, Ángeles, “Las áreas tribales pakistaníes y la lucha contra el terrorismo”, cit., pp. 51–62 passim.
22.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “Afghanistan: The Patrimonial Trap and the Dream of Institution-Building”, cit., pp. 71–2.
23.
MALEY, William, The Afghanistan Wars, cit., p. 6.
24.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “Afghanistan: The Patrimonial Trap and the Dream of Institution-Building”, cit., pp. 73–4.
25.
RUBIN, Barnett R., The Fragmentation of Afghanistan:…, cit., p. 296.
26.
This income included both external aid and the sale of natural gas to the USSR, which began in 1968. (RUBIN, Barnett R., “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis”, cit., p. 7).
27.
Between 1956 and 1978, Afghanistan received some 533 million dollars in economic aid from the United States and about 2500 million from the Soviets in economic and military aid (RASHID, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos…, cit., p. 8).
28.
MALEY, William, The Afghanistan Wars, cit., “State and society” and “The decline of state legitimacy: 1964-78”, pp. 13–7. Quote from p. 15.
29.
MALEY, William, The Afghanistan Wars, cit., pp. 16–7.
30.
RUBIN, Barnett R., The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: …, cit., p. 119.
31.
For a detailed analysis of the social reforms undertaken (women’s empancipation, literacy campaigns and agrarian reform), of the results obtained as well as the difficulties in implementing them, particularly in rural areas, throughout the entire period of the PDPA regime, see GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan 1978-1992 (London: Hurst&Company, 2000), pp. 20–32.
32.
Pakistan began supporting the Afghan Islamists in 1975 in order to pressure Daud and as a response to the support he had given to the Pakistani Pashtun and the Marxist Baluchis. Among the Islamists were Gulbudin Hekmatyar, Burhanudin Rabani and Ahmad Shah Masud, who would later become important Mujahedin leaders in the war against the Soviets. During this period, a model of behaviour emerged which has persisted until today “with Pakistan using Islamic movements in Afghanistan to pressure the authorities in Kabul or as a means to try and install a more friendly government” (RUBIN, Barnett R., “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis”, cit., p. 11).
33.
RUBIN, Barnett R., “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis”, cit., pp. 6, 10 and 15. Quote from p. 10.
34.
PHILLIPS, Alan, “Preface” to JAWAD, Nassim, Afghanistan. A Nation of Minorities, cit., p. 5.
35.
ROTBERG, Robert I., “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: …”, cit., pp. 10 and notes.
36.
A broad discussion of the causes for the failure of states in FERNÁNDEZ RUIZ-GÁLVEZ, Encarnación, ¿Estados fallidos o Estados en crisis? (Granada: Comares, 2009), chapter III, pp. 98–120.
37.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:…, cit., p. 13. See also MALEY, William, The Afghanistan Wars, cit., “Popular mobilization in Afghanistan”, pp. 58–66.
38.
MALEY, William, The Afghanistan Wars, cit., “Islam as a basis of resistance”, pp. 58–60.
39.
MALEY, William, The Afghanistan Wars, cit., “Grassroots resistance and tribal warfare”, pp. 60–2.
In the same line, Rashid points out that in Kandahar “the struggle against the Soviets was a tribal jihad led by clan chiefs and ulema (senior religious scholars) rather than an ideological jihad led by Islamicists” (RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:…,, cit., p. 18).
40.
MALEY, William, The Afghanistan Wars, cit., “The role of Pakistan”, pp. 66–76.
41.
WEINBAUM, Marvin G., Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 32.
42.
A detailed explanation of same in RUBIN, Barnett R., “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis”, cit., pp. 17–9. Also in MALEY, William, The Afghanistan Wars, cit., pp. 63–4.
43.
RASHID, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos…, cit., p. 10.
44.
“The ISI – writes RASHID, op. cit., p. 10 – used the CIA cash and arms as bribes to keep the Mujahedin’s parties in line”.
45.
This was the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, led by Gailani, who was the most liberal and the closest to the old monarchy regime of the parties recognized by Pakistan; and the Afganistán National Liberation Front, lef by Sibgatullah Mujadedi. The latter was the party which Hamid Karzai joined. Sibgatullah Mujadedi was, in Rashid’s words, op. cit., p. 10, “[a] moderate man, he drew his support from tribal leaders who were Afghan nationalists rather than mullahs and militants, and became a fierce critic of the radical leaders who were favored by the ISI”. Rubin describes him as very well known but with no real power.
46.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:…, cit., p. 19.
47.
MANN, Carol, Femmes afghanes en guerre (Éditions du Croquant, 2010), pp. 145–9.
48.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:…, cit., Part 2, chapter 10, “Global Jihad: the Arab-Afghans and Osama Bin Laden”, pp. 128–140; y RASANAYAGAM, Angelo, Afghanistan: A Modern History…, cit., chapter 16, “Holy War, Unholy Terror”, pp. 213–249.
49.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, Empires of Mud. War and Warlords in Afghanistan (London: Hurst&Company, 2009): Within the Afghan context, the warlords emerged from the Jihadist movement (pp. 43–51) and also as a consequence of the evolution of militias recruited in order to confront the insurgency (pp. 53–68). Among the foremost was Ismail Khan, in the Herat region (ch. 14–21), while the most important warlord among the second group was Dostum in the north of the country (ch. 6–13). Giustozzi considers Masud not to have been a warlord per se, but rather a hybrid between warlordism and the guerrilla war (ch. 22).
50.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, Empires of Mud. War and Warlords in Afghanistan, cit., pp. 33–4.
51.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, Empires of Mud. War and Warlords in Afghanistan, cit., pp. 69–85.
52.
MALEY, William, The Afghanistan Wars, cit., pp. 154–5.
53.
MALEY, William, The Afghanistan Wars, cit., p. 153; “Effects of the war on Afghanistan”, pp. 154–9; y p. 167. See also, on cultural de-structuring JAWAD, Nassim, Afghanistan. A Nation of Minorities, cit., pp. 26–7.
54.
RASHID, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos…, cit., p. 11.
55.
KHANNA, Parag, The Second World…, cit., p. 69.
56.
MALEY, William, The Afghanistan Wars, cit., “US disengagement”, pp. 178–80.
57.
RUBIN, Barnett R., “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis”, cit., p. 29; e ID. The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), Part Two, “Negotiating the Geneva Accords”, pp. 31–91.
58.
RUBIN, Barnett R., The Search for Peace in Afghanistan:…, cit., p. 33.
59.
RUBIN, Barnett R., The Search for Peace in Afghanistan:…, cit., chapter 7, “Cooperation Between the Superpowers”, pp. 96–111.
60.
Joint declaration by the new Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State James Baker, Moscow, 13 September 1991.
61.
RUBIN, Barnett R., “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis”, cit., pp. 3, 6 and 15–22.
62.
RUBIN, Barnett R., “The Failure of an Internationally Sponsored Interim Government in Afghanistan,” in Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions, eds. SHAIN, Yossi and LINZ, Juan J. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 236.
63.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:…, cit., p. 21.
64.
RUBIN, Barnett R., “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis”, cit., pp. 22–4.
65.
RUBIN, Barnett R., “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis”, cit., p. 31.
66.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:…, cit, pp. 21–2; e ID., Descent into Chaos…, cit., pp. 12–3.
67.
RUBIN, Barnett R., “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis”, cit., pp. 3 and 6; and Amnesty International, Afghanistan: A Human Rights Disaster, 1995.
68.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:..., cit, p. 175--176; ID., Descent into chaos..., cit., p.11.
69.
The Mestiri mission was authorized by the United Nations General Assembly, “Emergency International Assistance for Peace, Normalcy and Reconstruction of War-Stricken Afghanistan”, A/RES/48/208, December 21, 1993.
70.
RUBIN, Barnett R., “Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis”, cit., pp. 31–5. Quote from p. 35.
71.
A more secure world: Our shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565, December 2, 2004), par. 86.
72.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:…, cit, pp. 1, 5, 22–5 y 87; ID., Descent into Chaos…, cit., p. 13.
73.
DAZ, Elías, Sociología y Filosofía del Derecho (Madrid: Taurus, 1980 (2ª); 1993 repr.), pp. 44–8.
74.
The Deobandists emerged in British India as a progressive movement who attempted to reform and unite Muslim society within the colonial context. The movement, which placed great importance on education, established madrasas all over India, the main one in Deoband. The Deobandi madrasas spread rapidly with the creation of Pakistan in 1947.
75.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:…, cit, Part 2, chapter 6, “Challenging Islam: the new-style fundamentalism of the taliban”, pp. 82–94. Quote from page 88.
76.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:…, cit, pp. 1 and 23.
77.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban:…, cit, Part 1, chapter 1 “Kandahar 1994: The Origins of the Taliban” in fine, pp. 26–30; and RASHID, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos…, cit., pp. 14.
78.
This theory was launched by Rashid in an article published in 1997 (RASHID, Ahmed, “The New Great Game. The Battle for Central Asia’s Oil”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 1997) and later developed in his work Taliban:…, cit., Part 3, “The New Great Game”, pp. 143–216. The analysis which follows is based on those in this last work, except for express references to the contributions of other authors.
79.
AMIRIAN, Nazanín and ZEIN, Martha, Irak, Afganistán e Irán. 40 respuestas al conflicto de Oriente Próximo (Madrid: Lengua de trapo, 2007), pp. 107–111.
80.
On the error of this policy, Rubin wrote “Whatever the merits of the isolation policy towards Iran in the fight against terrorism, they incapacitate the US in Afghanistan” (RUBIN, Barnett, “US Policy in Afghanistan”, Muslim Politics Report (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1997)).
81.
RASHID, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos…, cit., p. XLV and pp. 15–21.
82.
Along these lines, UN Special Mission to Afghanistan, Civil Affairs Unit, Report on Administrative and Judicial Structures of Afghanistan: A First Inquiry, Islamabad, 2000.
83.
In this sense, DUFFIELD, Mark, Development, Security and Unending War. Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007), pp. 154–5.
84.
UN, Strategic Framework for Afghanistan: Towards a Principled Approach to Peace and Reconstruction, New York, 1998.
85.
DUFFIELD, Mark, Development, Security and Unending War…, cit., pp. 142–150. Citations from pp. 146 and 150, respectively.
86.
A detailed analysis of this theory and of the objections which could be made about it in FERNÁNDEZ RUIZ-GÁLVEZ, Encarnación, ¿Estados fallidos o Estados en crisis?, cit., “Estados frágiles: ¿amenaza para la paz y seguridad internacionales?”, pp. 83–9.
87.
RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban…, cit., “New Foreword Post-Terrorist Attacks, September 2001”, pp. ix–xv.
88.
RASANAYAGAM, Angelo, Afghanistan: A Modern History…, cit., p. 242.
89.
This terminology is used in the Report on The Responsibility to Protect. Nonetheless, the military intervention in 2001 in Afghanistan had nothing to do with this sort of intervention which the Report on The Responsibility to Protect deal with. The invasion of Afghanistan was not one with “the purpose of human protection”; instead, as we will see, its purposes were of another sort. Although the “responsibility to prevent”, like the “responsibility to reconstruct” may be applied as analogy to these interventions which are different to those in the Report on The Responsibility to Protect, and with the same character of conditions of legitimacy of any hypothetical intervention.
90.
About these events, CARDONA LLORENS, J., “La Resolución 1386 (2001) del Consejo de Seguridad autorizando la fuerza internacional de asistencia para la seguridad de Afganistán: ¿Un paso más en el debilitamiento de las Naciones Unidas?”, Revista española de Derecho Internacional LIII, no. 1 and 2 (2001): 227–8.
91.
This is one way of understanding two Security Council resolutions written immediately after September 11th (1368, from 12 September 2001, and 1373, from 22 September 2001), though they are ambiguous and contradictory.
92.
SANJOSÉ GIL, A., “Algunas reflexiones sobre el Informe del Grupo de Alto Nivel creado por el Secretario General y el futuro del sistema de seguridad colectiva de las Naciones Unidas”, Anuario de la Asociación para las Naciones Unidas en España, no. 7 (2005): 313–317.
93.
RASHID, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos…, cit., p. XLIII.
94.
RASHID, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos…, cit., passim.
95.
CARDONA LLORENS, Jorge, “La Resolución 1386 (2001) del Consejo de Seguridad autorizando la Fuerza Internacional de Asistencia para la Seguridad de Afganistán:…”, cit., pp. 227–45.
96.
Initially called the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), it was later known as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).
97.
MASADYKOV, Talatbek, GIUSTOZZI, Antonio and PAGE, James Michael, “Negotiating with the Taliban: Toward a solution for the Afghan conflict”, Crisis States Research Centre working papers series 2, 66 (London: Crisis States Research Centre/London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010), pp. 1–6.
98.
ORTZ, Antonio, “La OTAN tras la cumbre Estrasburgo-Kehl,” Política exterior, no. 129 (mayo–junio 2009): 62–66.
99.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “Afghanistan: getting worse before getting better?”, Writenet, Geneva, Switzerland, 2009, pp. 4–7 y 15–9. Available at www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4a9797572.pdf
100.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “Afghanistan: Political Parties or militia Fronts?”, en ZEEUW, Jeroen de (ed.), From Soldiers to Politicians. Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War, Lynne Rienner, Boulder/London, 2008, pp. 179--204 passim.
101.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “Afghanistan: Political Parties or militia Fronts?”, cit., p. 186.
102.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, Empires of Mud. War and Warlords in Afghanistan, cit., p. 304.
103.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “War and Peace Economies of Afghanistan’s Strongmen,” International Peacekeeping 14, no.1 (2007): 75–89.
104.
BARANYI, S., ¿Estabilización o paz sostenible? ¿Qué clase de paz es posible después del 11-S? (Madrid: CIP-FUHEM, 2006), pp. 18–9.
105.
RASHID, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos…, cit., chapter seven, “The One-Billion-Dollar Warlords”, pp. 125–44.
106.
RASHID, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos…, cit., p. 133.
107.
HEROLD, Marc W, Afghanistan as an Empty Space…, cit., p. 2 (where the quote is taken from) and passim.
108.
An expression which paraphrases economic jargón. It is used by Giustozzi, following among others, COHEN, Youssef et al., “The Paradoxical Nature of State-Making: The Violent Creation of Order,” The American Political Science Review 75, no. 4 (December 1981): 901–10, and TILLY, Charles, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1990). It corresponds, in part at least, with what Weber called the establishment of the monopoly of violence. Giustozzi further considers that what would be involved in the phase of ‘primitive accumulation of power’ would be the monopoly of violence on a large scale. To the contrary, the control over violence on a small scale would be the concern of a mature State.
(GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, Empires of Mud. War and Warlords in Afghanistan, cit., p. 10).
109.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, Empires of Mud. War and Warlords in Afghanistan, cit., “Conclusion”, pp. 297–305 passim.
110.
HEROLD, Marc W, Afghanistan as an Empty Space…, cit., Section 2, pp. 27–38.
111.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “Afghanistan: getting worse before getting better?”, cit., pp. 1–3.
112.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “Afghanistan: The Patrimonial Trap and the Dream of Institution-Building”, cit., p. 79, and on the lack of economic modernization in the past, pp. 72–5.
113.
GHANI, Ashraf and LOCKHART, Clare, Fixing Failed States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 100.
114.
DUFFIELD, Mark, Development, Security and Unending War…, cit., p. 183.
115.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 11–79.
116.
MASADYKOV, Talatbek, GIUSTOZZI, Antonio and PAGE, James Michael, “Negotiating with the Taliban: …”, cit., passim. Quote from p. 8. In the same line, SUHRKE, Astri, “Afganistán: ¿negociar con los talibanes?”, Política Exterior, no. 129 (mayo–junio 2009): 45–70.
117.
GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “Afghanistan: Political Parties or militia Fronts?”, cit., p. 197.
118.
CORTINA, Adela, Ciudadanos del mundo. Hacia una teoría de la ciudadanía, 2ª ed. (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2005, 4ª reimpresión), pp. 44–5.
119.
ARENDT, Hannah, Crises of the Republic (San Diego/New York: HBJ, 1972), pp. 134–155.
120.
HABERMAS, Jürgen, The Divided West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).
121.
RASHID, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos…, cit., pp. 202 y 209–11.
122.
TADJBAKHSH, Shahrbanou, “South Asia and Afghanistan: The Robust India-Pakistan Rivalry” (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2001), p. V y passim.
123.
Rashid mentions the need for a new “Marshall Plan” for the region of Central Asia and the South (RASHID, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos…, cit., p. XLIV).
124.
Internacional Crisis Group, Pakistan’s tribal areas: appeasing the militants, 11 December 2006.
125.
ESPINOSA, Ángeles, “Las áreas tribales pakistaníes y la lucha contra el terrorismo”, cit., pp. 61–2.
126.
Afghan Member of the Parliament who faced the warlords at the Constitutional Loya Jirga and since that moment has been persecuted.
127.
CORTINA, Adela, Ciudadanos del mundo…, cit., pp. 36–7 y capítulo V, “Ciudadanía civil. Universalizar la aristocracia”, pp. 133–75.
128.
MANN, Carol, Femmes afghanes en guerre, cit., pp. 131ss.
129.
PHILLIPS, Alan, “Preface”, a JAWAD, Nassim, Afghanistan. A Nation of Minorities, cit., p. 5.

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Philosophy of Law, Department of Law, Moral and Political Philosophy, Master Human Rights, Peace and Sustainable Development, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain
Encarnación Fernández Ruiz-Gálvez

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Campus Tarongers, Philosophy of Law, University of Valencia, Avda. de Los Naranjos S/N, Valencia, 46022, Valencia, Spain
Jesús Ballesteros
, Philosophy of Law, University of Valencia, Philosophy of Law S/N, Valencia, 46022, Valencia, Spain
Encarnación Fernández Ruiz-Gálvez
, Philosophy of Law, University of Valencia, Valencia, 46022, Valencia, Spain
Pedro Talavera

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Ruiz-Gálvez, E.F. (2012). Afghanistan: Why Has Violence Replaced Political Power?. In: Ballesteros, J., Fernández Ruiz-Gálvez, E., Talavera, P. (eds) Globalization and Human Rights. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4020-4_4

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