Abstract
In Chap. 9, we saw that we imagine that we have ideas of objects that admit of perfect identity only after we have rejected vulgar perspective II. Hume repeats this claim in 1.4.6—at least in part. This occurs during his admittedly “labyrinth[ine]” (T App. 10; SBN 633) explanation of how we imagine the notion of the self, an explanation that he famously attacks just 2 years after the publication of the Treatise in the Appendix (T App. 10–22; SBN 633–6). Here, I show that it is very likely that this attack comprises Hume’s acknowledgement of the rift between the transcendental account of perfect identity and the philosopher’s account of perfect identity. In the Appendix, Hume suggests that the philosophical account of perfect identity is mistaken, while his account of transcendentally conceived of perfect identity is correct—at least in regard to the “self.” However, this is not a definitive solution to the conflict. In fact, this conflict is never resolved in the Treatise, nor elsewhere.
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- 1.
- 2.
ECHU II.xxvii. 9.
- 3.
Recall Chap. 8 for our discussion of a vulgar notion of perfect identity, which Hume does not refer to here. Instead, as explained above, he seems to be thinking of the notion of perfect identity given in Part I of 1.4.2’s system, i.e. the principle of individuation. Thus, in this part of 1.4.6, Hume seems to be confusing the vulgar notion of perfect identity with the principle of individuation. Why this is the case is a mystery, however, given the convoluted nature of 1.4.6, this should not come as a surprise.
- 4.
And, Hume adds here, invariable and variable, a contradiction that he does not focus on in 1.4.2.
- 5.
As noted in previous chapters, we will see in Chap. 12 that our ability to think in terms of natural causation does not necessarily presuppose our ability to imagine ideas of objects that admit of a perfect identity.
- 6.
Here, unlike what we saw earlier (i.e. T 1.4.6.6; SBN 253), Hume is careful enough to refer to what seems to be the vulgar conception of perfect identity, rather than the principle of individuation. Some might object that Hume does not have a vulgar conception of perfect identity in mind here, i.e. a situation where, thanks to “fix[ing] our thought” (T 1.4.2.33; SBN 203) we imagine that we are perceiving an uninterrupted and invariable object. Rather, the objection might continue, Hume is referring to a case where we actually have a “continu’d” or uninterrupted perception. However, if we read this passage in context, we see that this cannot be the case. As explained at length above, it is clear that Hume has vulgar perspective I in mind, where we do not have an uninterrupted perception, although, thanks to the imagination, we think we do. Moreover, as explained throughout this book (recall Part II), Hume explicitly claims that we never have continuous, i.e. uninterrupted perceptions, e.g. “We may, therefore, conclude with certainty, that the opinion of a continu’d and of a distinct existence never arises from the senses” (T 1.4.2.7; SBN 192).
- 7.
Because we ascribe a perfect identity to these “objects,” they could not already be imagined to have a perfect identity. Thus, Hume must be thinking of proto-objects here (recall Chap. 4).
- 8.
Not including vulgarly-conceived of perfect identity; recall that this notion has no alleged causal properties (see Chap. 8).
- 9.
Recall that generally speaking, an Aristotelian final cause is the purpose, or end of the thing at hand, while a formal cause is the plan or “essence” of the thing at hand.
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Rocknak, S. (2013). Personal Identity. In: Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 71. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2187-6_10
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