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Theory and Applications of Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives pp 119–134Cite as

Dispositions and Response-Dependence Theories

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Abstract

This chapter offers a taste of some central issues concerning dispositions and response-dependence theories. The first part focuses on the conditional analysis of dispositions and the problem posed by finkish, masked and mimicking counterexamples. The second treats the relationship between dispositions and their bases, and summarises some of the central argument types relevant to the assessment of this issue. The third part provides an overview of response-dependence theories. It also contains a brief discussion of some questions that connect the three themes of the chapter. These concern conditional fallacy problems for response-dependence theses, the relationship between dispositional and subjunctive formulations of response-dependence theses, and the implications for (dispositional) response-dependence theses of which view one takes on dispositions in general.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This point is stressed by Fara (2005), p. 43. See also his excellent survey article, Fara (2006).

  2. 2.

    Most take dispositions to be intrinsic properties (e.g. Lewis 1997), but see McKitrick (2003a) for arguments that some dispositions are extrinsic properties.

  3. 3.

    This formulation is taken from Lewis (1997). It does not cover all dispositions; some adjustment would be needed to accommodate e.g. dispositions to elicit certain responses in other beings and things, or dispositions for which no particular stimulus is specifiable (e.g. radioactive decay). But it will do for current purposes.

  4. 4.

    Finkish counterexamples are often credited to Martin (1994), but are also discussed by Shope (1978) in a more general form. The term ‘finkish’ is, as far as I know, due to David Lewis. ‘Altering’ is a common alternative label.

  5. 5.

    Martin (1994), p. 3. In a bit more detail, the example is this: A wire has the dispositional property of being live iff it is the case that if the wire were touched by a conductor, electrical current would flow through it to the conductor. But Martin’s ‘electro-fink’ switches off the electricity whenever such contact is made.

  6. 6.

    The example is due to Johnston (1992). Johnston coined the term ‘masking’ and was the first to present masking cases as problems for the conditional analysis of dispositions.

  7. 7.

    Lewis (1997), p. 158.

  8. 8.

    Bird (1998), p. 231 and Gundersen (2002), p. 391.

  9. 9.

    Martin (1994), p. 6. It may be that some sort of ceteris paribus clause can solve the problems, but if so, more needs to be said. See e.g. Mumford (1996).

  10. 10.

    I am indebted to Crispin Wright for discussion and suggestions about these issues.

  11. 11.

    Lewis’s discussion of masking cases (1997, pp. 152–153) has been interpreted in many ways, none of which seem to solve the problem. See e.g. Choi (2003).

  12. 12.

    Armstrong (1968) and Mumford (1998).

  13. 13.

    For the causal exclusion argument for mental states, see e.g. Kim (1998). The statement of the argument given here is inspired by Crane (2001). For a causal exclusion argument regarding dispositions, see Prior et al. (1982), pp. 255–256.

  14. 14.

    Prior et al. (1982), p. 253.

  15. 15.

    For a statement of this argument (though for colours, not dispositions), see Johnston (1992), pp. 135–136.

  16. 16.

    Kripke (1972), pp. 144–155.

  17. 17.

    Again, based on Prior et al. (1982), pp. 253–254.

  18. 18.

    Johnston (1989), p. 146, fn. 8; Wright (1992), p. 109, fn. 16.

  19. 19.

    Johnston (1993), p. 103; see also Johnston (1989).

  20. 20.

    Wright (1992), appendix to Ch. 3, pp. 108–139.

  21. 21.

    See Pettit (2005), in which his most important papers on the topic are reprinted. Wittgenstein (1953) and Kripke (1982).

  22. 22.

    See Devitt (2006) for an argument – in my view, an unsuccessful one – that this claim is false.

  23. 23.

    Wright (1992), app. to Ch. 3.

  24. 24.

    I argue elsewhere (Gundersen 2006) that Pettit would do better without the biconditionals, and that they can’t be a priori for his version of response-dependence.

  25. 25.

    In the following, I rely on my own work on response-dependence, rather than summarising common ground from the literature. All points are elaborated in Gundersen (2006).

  26. 26.

    Finkish counterexamples pose a challenge to any theory based on theses of the form P ↔ (Q □→ R), where □→is a subjunctive conditional, and where Q’s becoming the case could make it the case that not P, so that R would not follow if Q occurred. For a general treatment of such ’conditional fallacy’ problems, see Shope (1978).

  27. 27.

    For another standard example, Johnston’s chameleon, see Johnston (1992), p. 231, and (1993), p. 119.

  28. 28.

    See Blackburn (1993) for an interesting alternative.

  29. 29.

    Wright (1992), pp. 117–120. Johnston (1992), p. 231.

  30. 30.

    For example the ‘univocity’ objection raised and discussed by Wright (1992), pp. 125–127.

  31. 31.

    What about maskers and mimickers? Such cases would not be ruled out by Wright’s move. However, masking and mimicking cases do not present specific problems for response-dependence theses, since they can presumably be avoided by appropriate specifications of the favourable conditions. Or, at any rate, maskers and mimickers are not harder to rule out than other perturbing factors that must be ruled out by the specifications of the favourable conditions. But this is an issue too large to be treated here.

  32. 32.

    Thanks to Lars Bo Gundersen and Crispin Wright for many inspiring discussions of the subjects treated in this paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Eline Busck Gundersen

  2. Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

    Eline Busck Gundersen

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  1. Dipto. Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale, Universita di Trento, Via Verdi 26, Trento, 38100, Italy

    Roberto Poli

  2. Dept. Philosophy, University of Aarhus, Jens Chr. Skousvej 7, Aarhus C, 8000, Denmark

    Johanna Seibt

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Gundersen, E.B. (2010). Dispositions and Response-Dependence Theories. In: Poli, R., Seibt, J. (eds) Theory and Applications of Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8845-1_6

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