Abstract
The third class of facts that present themselves permanently to consciousness, at least in marginal form, pertains to the perceptual world. Whatever the theme of our mental activity, we cannot help being aware of a certain sector of the perceptual world, viz., our present perceptual environment, no matter how unconnected this sector may be, where relevancy is concerned, with that with which we are actually dealing. We may, for instance, remember a certain phase of our past and live in a “world of memory.” Absorbed as we may be in this remembered world of the past, the present perceptual world in which at the moment we happen to find ourselves does not vanish from consciousness altogether.
*Deceased
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Cf. Husserl, Erf u. Urt., p. 205.
- 2.
Cf. Husserl, Ideen, §28.
- 3.
Ibid., §§27, 45, and 47; cf. also Ludwig Landgrebe, “The World as a Phenomenological Problem,” trans. Dorion Cairns, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. I (1940), pp. 39 ff.
- 4.
Landgrebe, “The World as a Phenomenological Problem,” pp. 50 and 51.
- 5.
Ibid., p. 51.
- 6.
Husserl, Erf u. Urt., pp. 186 and 188 ff.
- 7.
Cf. FC, 343.
- 8.
The relationship between James’s concept of fringe and Husserl’s concept of horizon has been commented upon by Schutz in “William James’s Concept of the Stream of Thought Phenomenologically Interpreted,” pp. 448 ff.
- 9.
James, Principles, vol. II, p. 320.
- 10.
Husserl, Erf u. Urt., §36.
- 11.
Ibid., §38.
- 12.
Ibid., p. 191.
- 13.
Ibid., §§39 and 40.
- 14.
Ibid., §42a.
- 15.
Both relations of ideas and matters of fact are here understood according to Hume’s definitions in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
- 16.
Husserl, Erf. u. Urt., §43.
- 17.
FC, 431 ff.
- 18.
FC, 354 ff. and 348 ff.
- 19.
Husserl, Erf. u. Urt., pp. 28 f. As to the inner horizon [innenhorizont], cf. FC, 227 ff.
- 20.
Husserl, Erf. u. Urt., pp. 32 ff.
- 21.
Ibid., pp. 29 f. and 34 f.
- 22.
Cf. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §15: “… their [the particular realities] particularity is particularity within a unitary universe, which, even when we are directed to and grasping [erfassend, dans la perception] the particular, goes on appearing unitarily … . There is always co-awareness of it, in the unity of a consciousness that can itself become a grasping [erfassenden, perceptive] consciousness and often enough does. This consciousness is awareness of the world-whole in its particular form, that of spatiotemporal endlessness … . The one and only universe … remains as the existing background of our whole natural life.” [The author used the French translation of this text, where—at least on this occasion—Erfassung is rendered as perception in a way important for the author’s point, something interpolation of the German and French words has been made to clarify.—Ed.]
- 23.
Husserl, Erf. u. Urt., §7.
- 24.
For a more complete account of Husserl’s views and of the general development of them where the “world phenomenon” is concerned, we refer to the excellent article by Landgrebe already cited.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gurwitsch*, A. (2010). Awareness of the Perceptual World. In: Zaner, R. (eds) The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973). Phaenomenologica, vol 194. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3346-8_15
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3346-8_15
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-3345-1
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-3346-8
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)