In general terms, competent adults are deemed to have the right to reproduce. This right is generally understood as a negative right – a right of non-interference – derived from broader notions of autonomy and liberty. To say that someone has a right to reproduce is to say that, other things being equal, the person has the freedom to decide whether to reproduce or not, and other persons have correlative duties not to interfere. In this regard, the right to reproduce is akin to other negative rights, for example, the right to choose one’s own religion, partner, or the method by which to educate one’s children. Framed as a negative right, the right to reproduce serves to recognize and protect individual values and personal liberty against the interests of others or social utility. As we are familiar, this negative right is not universally respected, and some countries have enacted policies that permit such restrictions. Furthermore, we may believe, or come to believe in the future, that such restrictions are morally defensible.
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Buller, T. (2009). Reproduction, Responsibility and Rationality. In: Simonstein, F. (eds) Reprogen-ethics and the future of gender. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2475-6_12
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