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The EU’s Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots

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Book cover International Investment Law and EU Law

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((Spec. Issue))

Abstract

The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has shed light on an area that has widely lacked public attention in recent years: the treatment of investment from non-EU Member State countries, i.e. third countries, under EU law. By explicitly expanding the EU’s external competence under the Common Commercial Policy to “foreign direct investment”, the Lisbon Treaty has posed two questions which, as we argue in this paper, warrant a holistic view, so far apparently not propagated in the literature.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The jurisprudence and writing in the area of free movement of capital offers valuable guidance on the interpretation of such notions as “direct investment” now also found in Art. 206 et seq. TFEU.

  2. 2.

    For an overview, see Hindelang, Gestufte Freiheitsverbürgung? – Art. 63 Abs. 1 AEUV (ex-Art. 56 Abs. 1 EG) im Drittstaatenkontext, IStR (2010), pp. 443 et seq.

  3. 3.

    Summarized and discussed in Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of Protection in EU Law, 2009.

  4. 4.

    Cf., e.g. ECJ, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation/Commissioners of Inland Revenue, C-446/04, [2006] ECR I, p. 11753.

  5. 5.

    Cf., in respect of an intra-EU context, for the first time in ECJ, C-367/98, Commission of the European Communities/Portuguese Republic, [2002] ECR I, p. 4731 (para. 45).

  6. 6.

    Ohler, Europäische Kapital- und Zahlungsverkehrsfreiheit, 2002, Art. 56 EC, mn. 120 et seq.; Somewhat more cautious: Tiedje and Troberg, in: von der Groeben/Schwarze (eds.), Art. 43 EC, mn 26 (2003); in respect of shareholdings: J. Lübke, Der Erwerb von Gesellschaftsanteilen zwischen Kapitalverkehrs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit, 2006, pp. 210 et seq.

  7. 7.

    Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of Protection in EU Law, 2009, pp. 82 et seq.

  8. 8.

    See Hindelang, The EC Treaty’s Freedom of Capital Movement as an Instrument of International Investment Law? in: Reinisch/Knahr (eds.), International Investment Law in Context, 2008, pp. 43 et seq. with further references.

  9. 9.

    ECJ, C-446/04, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation/Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [2006] ECR I, p. 11753 (paras. 36 et seq.).

  10. 10.

    ECJ, C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation/Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [2007] ECR I, p. 2107 (para. 27 et seq.); See also ECJ, Case C-492/04, Lasertec Gesellschaft für Stanzformen mbH/Finanzamt Emmendingen, [2007] ECR I, p. 3775 (paras. 19 et seq.).

  11. 11.

    ECJ, Case C-157/05, Winfried L. Holböck/Finanzamt Salzburg-Land, [2007] ECR I, p. 4051 (para. 23).

  12. 12.

    ECJ, C-182/08, Glaxo Wellcome GmbH & Co./Finanzamt München II, [2009] ECR I, n.y.p. (paras. 40, 47 et seq.).

  13. 13.

    ECJ, C-284/06, Finanzamt Hamburg-Am Tierpark/Burda GmbH, [2008] ECR I, p. 4571 (paras. 68–73).

  14. 14.

    ECJ, C-311/08, Société de Gestion Industrielle (SGI)/Belgian State, [2010] ECR I, n.y.p. (paras. 23–36).

  15. 15.

    ECJ, C-531/06, Commission of the European Communities/Italian Republic, [2009] ECR I, n.y.p. (paras. 40–42).

  16. 16.

    ECJ, Joined Cases C-439/07 and C-499/07, [2009] ECR I, n.y.p. (paras. 68–73).

  17. 17.

    See Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of Protection in EU Law, 2009, pp. 96 et seq.; Hindelang, Gestufte Freiheitsverbürgung? – Art. 63 Abs. 1 AEUV (ex-Art. 56 Abs. 1 EG) im Drittstaatenkontext, IStR (2010), pp. 443 et seq, with further references.

  18. 18.

    E.g. Schön, Europäische Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit und nationales Steuerrecht, in: Schön (ed.), Gedächtnisschrift für Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk, 1997, pp. 743 et seq. (750 et seq.).

  19. 19.

    E.g. Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of Protection in EU Law, 2009, pp. 81 et seq.

  20. 20.

    Weber, Kapitalverkehr und Kapitalmärkte im Vertrag über die Europäische Union, EuZW (1992), pp. 561 et seq.

  21. 21.

    See also Hindelang, in: Reinisch/Knahr (eds.), International Investment Law in Context, 2008, pp. 43 et seq.

  22. 22.

    It would go beyond the scope and subject of this paper to set out the economic effects of liberalized capital movements and their benefits for the attainment of the treaty aims in detail. For an in depth discussion, see Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of Protection in EU Law, 2009, pp. 18 et seq.

  23. 23.

    Haferkamp, Die Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit im System der Grundfreiheiten des EG-Vertrages, 2003, pp. 196 et seq.

  24. 24.

    Case C-251/98 (Opinion of A.G. Alber), [2000] ECR I, p. 2787 (para. 50).

  25. 25.

    Rohde, Freier Kapitalverkehr in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 1999, p. 97; Müller, Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit in der Europäischen Union, 2000, p. 193; Haferkamp, Die Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit im System der Grundfreiheiten des EG-Vertrages, 2003, p. 195.

  26. 26.

    Annex I, Heading I of Directive 88/361/EEC.

  27. 27.

    Ibid., at Annex I (I); See also, e.g. Kiemel, in: von der Groeben/ Schwarze (eds.), EUV/EGV, 2003, Art. 56 EC mn. 21.

  28. 28.

    Ohler, Europäische Kapital- und Zahlungsverkehrsfreiheit, 2002, Art. 56 EC mn. 117; Weber, Kapitalverkehr und Kapitalmärkte im Vertrag über die Europäische Union, EuZW 3 (1992), pp. 561 et seq. (564); Case C-452/04 (Opinion of A.G. Stix-Hackl), [2006] ECR I, p. 9521 (para. 62).

  29. 29.

    See Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of Protection in EU Law, 2009, pp. 115 et seq.

  30. 30.

    ECJ, Joined Cases C-439/07 and C-499/07, [2009] ECR I, n.y.p. (para. 72).

  31. 31.

    E.g. Schön, Der Kapitalverkehr mit Drittstaaten und das internationale Steuerrecht, in: Gocke/et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Franz Wassermeyer, 2005, pp. 489 et seq.; Ståhl, Free movement of capital between Member States and third countries, EC Tax Review 13 (2004) 2, pp. 47 et seq.

  32. 32.

    Schön, Der Kapitalverkehr mit Drittstaaten und das internationale Steuerrecht, in: Gocke/et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Franz Wassermeyer, 2005, pp. 489 et seq. (502 et seq.); Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU, 1999, pp. 217 et seq.

  33. 33.

    Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of Protection in EU Law, 2009, pp. 173 et seq.

  34. 34.

    Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of Protection in EU Law, 2009, pp. 181 et seq.

  35. 35.

    lbid. 183 et seq.

  36. 36.

    Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of Protection in EU Law, 2009, pp. 216 et seq., 236 et seq.

  37. 37.

    Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of Protection in EU Law, 2009, pp. 242 et seq.; different view: ECJ, Case C-101/05, Skatteverket, [2007] ECR I, p. 11531, para. 63.

  38. 38.

    Hindelang, The EC Treaty’s Freedom of Capital Movement as an Instrument of International Investment Law?, in: Reinisch/Knahr (eds.), International Investment Law in Context, 2008, pp. 43 et seq. (255 et seq.).

  39. 39.

    Regulation (EC) No. 260/2009 of 26.02.2009, OJ L 84 of 31.3.2009, p. 1; Regulation (EC) No. 1061/2009 of 19.10.2009, OJ L 291 of 07.11.2009, p. 1.

  40. 40.

    Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94 of 22.12.1994, OJ L 349 of 31.12.1994, p. 71.

  41. 41.

    For an analysis of the EU’s competences before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, see Maydell, The European Community's Competence to Conclude International Agreements on Investment - Revealing the Inconvenient Truth, Vienna 2008, available at the Austrian National Library Vienna (Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek Wien) and the University Library of the Vienna University School of Law (Universitätsbibliothek der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät Wien).

  42. 42.

    For a discussion of the EU’s internal competences regarding foreign investment, see Hindelang/Maydell, Die Gemeinsame Europäische Investitionspolitik – Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen? in: Bungenberg/Griebel/Hindelang (eds.), Internationaler Investitionsschutz und Europarecht, 2010, pp. 11 et seq., pp 71 et seq.

  43. 43.

    Art. 207 (1) TFEU under Title II Common Commercial Policy reads: The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment , the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. Emphasis added. Art. 3 (1) (e) confers exclusivity on the EU’s investment competence: The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: (…) (e) common commercial policy. On views in the literature regarding the EU’s investment competence under Art. 207 TFEU, see, for instance, Tietje, Die Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 83, January 2009, p. 13; Eilmansberger, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, CMLR 46 (2009), pp. 383 et seq. (394).

  44. 44.

    Art. 2 (2) TFEU now defines the EU’s non-exclusive competence as “shared competence”: When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence. Emphasis added.

  45. 45.

    Whether this is politically desirable and/or feasible is not part of the legal assessment undertaken in this paper.

  46. 46.

    Schmalenbach, in: Calliess/Ruffert (eds.), EUV/EGV, (3. ed.) 2007, Art. 300, mn. 19.

  47. 47.

    With respect to the concept of the competence sweeping clause, see Winkler, in: Grabitz/Hilf (eds.), Kommentar zum EGV, (EL 34 January) 2008, Art. 308 EGV, para. 11. Art. 352 (1) TFEU reads: If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties , and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. Emphasis added. Ex-Art. 308 EC was limiting the competence sweeping clause to the EU’s internal sphere (compare emphasis): If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market , one of the objectives of the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.

  48. 48.

    ECJ, Opinion 2/92, OECD, [1995] ECR I, p. 521: (…) the Member States, whether acting individually or collectively, only lose their right to enter into obligations with non-member countries as and when there are common rules which could be affected by such obligations.

  49. 49.

    Gilsdorf, Die Außenkompetenzen der EG im Wandel, EuR (1996), p. 149.

  50. 50.

    Louis, La Cour et les Relations extérieures de la Communauté, CDE 42 (2006), pp. 285 et seq. (287).

  51. 51.

    ILO Opinion, mn. 25: While there is no contradiction between these provisions of the Convention and those of the directives mentioned, it must nevertheless be accepted that Part III of Convention No 170 is concerned with an area which is already covered to a large extent by Community rules progressively adopted since 1967 with a view to achieving an ever greater degree of harmonization (…).

  52. 52.

    ECJ, Opinion 1/94, WTO, [1994] ECR I, p. 5267, para. 95; and ECJ, Opinion 2/92, OECD, [1995] ECR I, p. 521, para. 33.

  53. 53.

    ECJ, Opinion 1/76,. [1977] ECR, p. 741, para. 4; ECJ, Opinion 1/94, WTO, [1994] ECR I, p. 5267, para. 87; Open Skies, paras. 56 et seq. For a summary, see ECJ, Opinion 2/92, OECD, [1995] ECR I, p. 521: It is true that, as the Court stated in Opinion 1/76, the external competence based on the Community's internal powers may be exercised, and thus become exclusive, without any internal legislation having first been adopted. However, this relates to a situation where the conclusion of an international agreement is necessary in order to achieve Treaty objectives which cannot be attained by the adoption of autonomous rules.

  54. 54.

    Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 2006, pp. 113 and 125. Since no internal legislation must have been released before, this competence category is the only quasi-parallel within implied exclusive competences. It is only quasi-parallel since the necessity test applies. See, for instance, Lenaerts/Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, 2005, p. 858.

  55. 55.

    For an extensive discussion on this competence category’s proof of existence, also in addition to the Lugano Opinion, and a related discussion in literature, see Maydell, The European Community’s Minimum Platform on Investment or the Trojan Horse of Investment Competence, in: Reinisch/Knahr (eds.), International Investment Law in Context, 2008, p. 84.

  56. 56.

    Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, [2006] ECR I, p. 1145, para. 134: The request for an opinion does not concern the actual existence of competence of the Community to conclude the agreement envisaged, but whether that competence is exclusive or shared.

  57. 57.

    Opinion 1/94, WTO, [1994] ECR I, p. 5267, para. 1, and Case C-467/98, Commission/Denmark (Open Skies), [2002] ECR I, p. 9519, para. 1.

  58. 58.

    Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, [2006] ECR I, p. 1145, paras. 114 and 115. Emphasis added.

  59. 59.

    This has also been noted by Cremona, External Relations of the EU and the Member States: Competence, Mixed Agreements, International Responsibility and Effects of International Law, 2006, p. 2, and not mentioned by Lavranos, Annotation to Opinion 1/03, CML Rev. 43 (2006), pp. 1087 et seq.

  60. 60.

    See Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, [2006] ECR I, p. 1145, para. 173. The ambiguity observed regarding the Opinions 1/94 and 2/91 as to the result (mixity) proclaimed by the ECJ mentioned above, therefore, did not arise here.

  61. 61.

    Without elaboration, see Tridimas, The WTO and OECD Opinions, in: Dashwood/Hillion (eds), The General Law of EC External Relations, 2000, pp. 48–60 at p. 57; Schmalenbach, in: Callies/Ruffert (eds), EUV/EGV, 2007, (3rd edn) Art. 300 para. 15. This also seems to be the opinion of Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, 2004, pp. 90–91, who has submitted that Opinion 1/76 did not establish exclusive external competence, but simply confirmed general parallelism between internal and external powers and that it is only the exercise of competence which creates its exclusive character. See also Heliskoski, Mixed Agreements as Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European Community and its Member States, 2001, p. 44, and the joined opinion by A.G.Tizzano in the Open Skies Cases, [2002] ECR I, p. 9427, paras 49 et seq. cf. also the account of the diverging doctrine by Holdgaard, The European Community’s Implied External Competence after the Open Skies Cases, 2003, pp. 372–373.

  62. 62.

    Opinion 1/94, WTO, [1994] ECR I, p. 5267, para. 85: It is understandable, therefore, that external powers may be exercised, and thus become exclusive, without any internal legislation having first been adopted. See also Opinion 2/92, ILO, [1993] ECR I, p. 1061, para. 4.

  63. 63.

    In somewhat reluctant agreement, see Cremona, External Relations of the EU and the Member States: Competence, Mixed Agreements, International Responsibility and Effects of International Law, 2006, p. 3.

  64. 64.

    Dashwood, The Attribution of External Relations Competence, in: Dashwood/Hillion (eds), The General Law of EC External Relations, 2000, pp. 127–136.

  65. 65.

    See Dashwood and Heliskoski, The Classic Authorities Revisited, in: Dashwood/Hillion (eds), The General Law of EC External Relations, 2000, pp. 3–19 at pp. 16–18. They, however, seem to read the (early) case law only as providing for the “lower” standard of necessity to establish an implied shared competence. See, in contrast, Dashwood, The Attribution of External Relations Competence, in: The General Law of EC External Relations, 2000, pp. 132–134: implied external competence arises, where this will help ensure the optimal exercise of the expressly conferred internal competence.

  66. 66.

    Griller and Gamharter, External Trade: Is There a Path Through the Maze of Competences?, in: Griller/Weidel (eds), External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in the European Union, 2002, pp. 79–80.

  67. 67.

    But see Schütze, Parallel External Powers in the European Community: From “Cubist” Perspectives Towards “Naturalist” Constitutional Principles? 2004, p. 239.

  68. 68.

    Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, 2005, pp. 109–115.

  69. 69.

    Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, 2005, p. 111.

  70. 70.

    See Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 2006, p. 124. But see A.G. Tizzano, Open Skies Cases, [2002] ECR I, p. 9427, para. 51.

  71. 71.

    Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, 2004, pp. 89 and 97. See also Dörr, Die Entwicklungen der ungeschriebenen Außenkompetenzen der EG, 1996, p. 41.

  72. 72.

    But see Cremona, External Relations of the EU and the Member States: Competence, Mixed Agreements, International Responsibility and Effects of International Law, 2006, p. 3, who suggests that in Opinion 1/03 this test has been relaxed again by the ECJ.

  73. 73.

    Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, 2005, p. 858.

  74. 74.

    Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, 2004, p. 99; Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 2006, p. 113.

  75. 75.

    Louis, Editorial: La Cour et les Relations extérieures des la Communauté, CDE (2007), pp. 285 et seq. (289).

  76. 76.

    Kovar, Les compétences implicites: jurisprudence de la Cour et pratique communautaire, in: Demaret (ed), Relations extérieures de la Communauté européenne et marché intérieur: aspects juridiques et fonctionnels, 1986, pp. 15 et seq. (20–21).

  77. 77.

    Note that the facilitation test is considerably easier to fulfill than the encessity test of Art. 216 (1) TFEU. The necessity standard represents a legal and factual condition sine qua non. while the facilitation standard is already met when the exercise of internal EU competence is being facilitated through external EU treaty making. Therefrom also follows the significantly increased attractiveness of implied external competences as compared to Art. 216 (1) TFEU, in particular for inclusion of portfolio investment in future EU treaties. Judging the inclusion of portfolio investment merely on the basis of Art. 216 (1) TFEU would not allow the EU to include this type of investment in an international treaty, as the EU could simply conclude a mixed agreement together with Member States in order to cover protfolio investment. Such a possiblity frustrates the necessity requirement, as EU external action is not necessary, i.e., the only alternative, to achieve one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties.

  78. 78.

    For a continued existence of implied shared competences apparently Herrmann, Die Zukunft der mitgliedstaatlichen Investitionspolitik nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, EuZW (2010) 6, p. 210. Arg.: Investitionen, die diese Schwelle nicht erreichen, sind als Portfolioinvestitionen zu bezeichnen und sind von den ausschließlichen Kompetenzen nach Art. 206 und Art. 207 I AEUV nicht abgedeckt. Damit soll die Union nach ganz überwiegender Auffassung im Schrifttum nicht über eine ausschließliche Kompetenz zur Regelung von Portfolioinvestitionen verfügen. Eine solche Kompetenz könne sich allenfalls als geteilte Zuständigkeit aus den Bestimmungen über die Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit ergeben. Herrmann does not make any reference whatsoever to Art. 216 (1) TFEU.

  79. 79.

    To the knowledge of the authors, no publication has discussed the foundations and impact of implied shared competences after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU’s competences in the field of international investment law in detail. Herrmann, without providing a dogmatic explanation, seems to argue that the EU’s external competence also covers portfolio investment, which would eventually even be covered by exclusive EU competence: Herrmann, Die Zukunft der mitgliedstaatlichen Investitionspolitik nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, EuZW (2010) 6, p. 210. With respect to explicit competences, see Eilmansberger, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, CMLRev (2009), pp. 394 et seq.; Bungenberg, Außenbeziehungen und Außenhandelspolitik, Beiheft EuR 1/2009, pp. 207 et seq. For a comparative analysis between explicit and implied external EU competences with respect to international investment law, see Hindelang/Maydell, Die Gemeinsame Europäische Investitionspolitik – Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen?, in: Bungenberg/Griebel/Hindelang (eds.), Internationaler Investitionsschutz und Europarecht, 2010, pp. 11 et seq.

  80. 80.

    With a comprehensive overview on relevant literature following this view, see Tietje, Die Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 83, January 2009, pp. 13 et seq.

  81. 81.

    Partial award of 27 March 2007, Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, SCC No. 088/2004, para. 156; for a detailed analysis, see: Eilmansberger, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, CMLR 46 (2009), pp. 383 et seq. (388 et seq.).

  82. 82.

    Eilmansberger, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, CMLR 46 (2009), pp. 383 et seq. (398 et seq.).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Walter Hallstein Institute of European Constitutional Law, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany

    Steffen Hindelang (Chair of Public, International and European Law)

  2. Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Brussels, Belgium

    Niklas Maydell

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  1. , Business Economics and Business Law, University of Siegen, Hölderlinstr. 3, Siegen, 57068, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg

  2. , International Investment Law Centre Colo, University of Cologne, Albertus Magnus Platz, Köln, 50935, Germany

    Joern Griebel

  3. , Juristische Fakultät, WHI, Humboldt-University of Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, Berlin, 10099, Germany

    Steffen Hindelang

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Hindelang, S., Maydell, N. (2011). The EU’s Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots. In: Bungenberg, M., Griebel, J., Hindelang, S. (eds) International Investment Law and EU Law. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14855-2_1

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