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Handbook of New Institutional Economics pp 819–848Cite as

Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies

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A major problem in understanding institutions relates to the complexity and diversity of contemporary life and the resulting specialization that has occurred within the social sciences. The central aim of the social sciences is to explain human behavior. But what kind of human behavior? Within which kinds of institutional settings?

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Indiana University, USA

    Elinor Ostrom

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  1. Elinor Ostrom
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Université de Paris, 106 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75647, Paris, France

    Claude Ménard

  2. The Ronald Coase Institute, 5610 Wisconsin Ave, 20815, Chevy Chase, MD, USA

    Mary M. Shirley

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Ostrom, E. (2008). Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies. In: Ménard, C., Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69305-5_31

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