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Networks, Topology and Dynamics pp 67–93Cite as

Games of Coalition and Network Formation: A Survey

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 613))

This paper presents some recent developments in the theory of coalition and network formation. For this purpose, a few major equilibrium concepts recently introduced to model the formation of coalition structures and networks among players are briefly reviewed and discussed. Some economic applications are also illustrated to give a flavour of the type of predictions such models are able to provide.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Urbino “Carlo Bo”, Urbino (Italy) & CREI, Universitá Roma Tre, Rome, Italy

    A. Marini Marco

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  1. A. Marini Marco
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Correspondence to A. Marini Marco .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipto. Economia Politica, Universià degli Studi di MilanoBicocca, Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1, Milano, 20126, Italy

    Ahmad K. Naimzada  & Silvana Stefani  & 

  2. Universià Cattolica del Sarcro Cuore, Largo A. Gemelli, 1, Milano, 20123, Italy

    Anna Torriero

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Marco, A.M. (2009). Games of Coalition and Network Formation: A Survey. In: Naimzada, A.K., Stefani, S., Torriero, A. (eds) Networks, Topology and Dynamics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 613. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68409-1_3

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