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International Workshop on Mathematical Methods, Models, and Architectures for Computer Network Security

MMM-ACNS 2003: Computer Network Security pp 122–134Cite as

Symbolic Partial Model Checking for Security Analysis

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2776))

Abstract

In this paper, we present a symbolic version of the Hennessy-Milner logic for expressing security properties. The models of the logic are CryptoCCS processes with their symbolic semantics. We study the model checking problem and partial model checking techniques for the logic.

Work partially supported by Microsoft Research Europe (Cambridge); by MIUR project “MEFISTO”; by MIUR project “ Tecniche e strumenti software per l’analisi della sicurezza delle comunicazioni in applicazioni telematiche di interesse economico e sociale”; by CNR project “Strumenti, ambienti ed applicazioni innovative per la società dell’informazione” and finally by CSP with the project “SeTAPS”.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Istituto di Informatica e Telematica – C.N.R., Area della ricerca di Pisa, Via G. Moruzzi 1, Pisa, Italy

    Fabio Martinelli

Authors
  1. Fabio Martinelli
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. St. Petersburg Intitute for Informaticsand Automation, 39, 14-th Liniya, 199178, St. Petersburg, Russia

    Vladimir Gorodetsky

  2. AFRL/IF, 525 Brooks Rd., 13441-4505, Rome, NY, USA

    Leonard Popyack

  3. US Air Force, Binghamton University (SUNYI), 13902, Binghamton, NY, USA

    Victor Skormin

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Martinelli, F. (2003). Symbolic Partial Model Checking for Security Analysis . In: Gorodetsky, V., Popyack, L., Skormin, V. (eds) Computer Network Security. MMM-ACNS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2776. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45215-7_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45215-7_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40797-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45215-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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