Most people find it difficult to believe that they do not know what they mean by some of the words and phrases they use. Even philosophers find it difficult, notwithstanding the fact that it is a phenomenon with which we are all too familiar, and one for which— at least in many cases—we have an account. It shows up in the following way. In a certain context, I may assert something confidently, convinced of its truth—for example, ‘Every human being has human dignity, just because they are human.’ But in another context I may say, or find myself agreeing with someone who says, that some human beings lack it or have forfeited it, and thinking that this is true too. Well, on the face of it, they cannot both be true, and yet, in some way, I may think they both are. So what do I mean by each of these conflicting assertions, such that they do not really conflict? It is not easy to say, even though they are my own thoughts in my own words.
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Hursthouse, R. (2007). Human Dignity and Charity. In: Malpas, J., Lickiss, N. (eds) Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6281-0_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6281-0_6
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