Abstract
In this paper I argue that we can understand incommensurability in a naturalistic, psychological manner. Cognitive habits can be acquired and so differ between individuals. Drawing on psychological work concerning analogical thinking and thinking with schemata, I argue that incommensurability arises between individuals with different cognitive habits and between groups with different shared cognitive habits.
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Bird, A. (2008). Incommensurability Naturalized. In: Soler, L., Sankey, H., Hoyningen-Huene, P. (eds) Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 255. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6279-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6279-7_2
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