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Secure In-Vehicle Communication

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Summary

This work presents a study of state of the art bus systems with respect to their security against various malicious attacks. After a brief description of the most well-known and established vehicular communication systems, we present feasible attacks and potential exposures for these automotive networks. We also provide an approach for secured automotive communication based on modern cryptographic mechanisms that provide secrecy, manipulation prevention and authentication to solve most of the vehicular bus security issues.

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Wolf, M., Weimerskirch, A., Paar, C. (2006). Secure In-Vehicle Communication. In: Lemke, K., Paar, C., Wolf, M. (eds) Embedded Security in Cars. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28428-1_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28428-1_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28384-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-28428-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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