Abstract
Whenever I hear the term ‘neuropragmatism,’ I am reminded of J. L. Austin’s opening words in his famous article ‘Performative Utterances,’ where he says, ‘You are more than entitled not to know what the word “performative” means. It is a new word and an ugly word, and perhaps it does not mean anything very much.’1 Likewise, you are more than entitled not to know what “neuropragmatism” means. It is, indeed, a new word, and it is perhaps an ugly word, but I daresay that it is not an inconsequential word. Therefore, the first question to ask is what the term might mean. The second and more important question is why we ought to care about neuropragmatism. I shall argue that, although we have good reasons for thinking that cognitive neuroscience has a great deal to offer toward a psychologically sophisticated view of mind, experience, thought, and language, our enthusiasm for cognitive neuroscience should always be tempered by a critical and more comprehensive perspective supplied by pragmatism. What pragmatist philosophy has to offer is the broader philosophical context necessary for understanding the grounding assumptions of cognitive neuroscience, its fundamental limitations, and its place in a more expansive pragmatist framework for approaching both philosophy and our basic life problems. In short, pragmatism without neuroscience is (partially) empty, but neuroscience without pragmatism is (partially) blind.
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Notes
John Austin, ‘Performative Utterances’ in Austin, Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 233.
Patricia Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 3.
Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999), p. 137.
Walter B. Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body (New York: W. W. Norton, 1932).
Jay Schulkin, Adaptation and Well-Being: Social Allostasis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 5.
M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003).
Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2003), p. 53.
John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry in The Later Works, vol. 12, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1938/1991), p. 72.
Don Tucker, Mind from Body: Experience from Neural Structure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 218.
Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999), p. 128.
William Bechtel, Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008), p. 21.
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© 2014 Mark Johnson
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Johnson, M. (2014). Keeping the Pragmatism in Neuropragmatism. In: Solymosi, T., Shook, J.R. (eds) Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy and Pragmatism. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137376077_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137376077_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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