Abstract
In this chapter, a simple model of tax cooperation is developed. The basic model is not meant to capture all the relevant characteristics of international tax policy; instead, the intention is to develop first predictions about countries’ strategic concerns in international tax policy. I first discuss why single taxation is the collectively optimal choice. Then I consider to what extent it is also individually rational for a government to pursue a policy of single taxation. Achieving single taxation involves the avoidance of both over- and under-taxation of international income. I first derive the strategic structure for avoiding over-taxation and then turn to under-taxation. As will be shown, both issues involve different kinds of collective action problems. From the close analysis of the strategic structures, I derive hypotheses on the institutional design that may help to overcome the respective problems of collective action. Finally, I consider the issue of institutional development over time and derive hypotheses on the expected institutional trajectory of the tax regime.
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© 2008 Thomas Rixen
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Rixen, T. (2008). A Baseline Model of Tax Cooperation. In: The Political Economy of International Tax Governance. Transformations of the State. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230582651_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230582651_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-35359-0
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-58265-1
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)