Evaluation of the State of the Art

Abstract

This chapter serves two purposes. The first is to define the concept of coercive diplomacy and distinguish it from other threat-based and related strategies. This is necessary due to the terminological confusion which characterizes the writings on this topic. Even highly competent scholars confuse coercive diplomacy with deterrence. As Alexander L. George points out, many scholars describe the American strategy that preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 as deterrence.¹ Similarly, Janice Gross Stein and Richard Ned Lebow regard the American air strikes against Libya in 1986 as deterrence,² Stein views the American reflagging policy in the Gulf in 1987–8 as extended deterrence, ³ Hansjuergen Koschwitz argues that the threats of force issued to convince Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait constitute deterrence and Christoph Bertram refers to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs in February 1994 and its bombing campaign in the autumn of 1995 as deterrence.⁴ In all these examples, the strategies employed are coercive diplomacy.⁵