Abstract
One of the strongest motivations for conceptualist readings of Kant is the belief that the Transcendental Deduction is incompatible with nonconceptualism. In this chapter, Golob argues that this belief is simply false: the Deduction and nonconceptualism are compatible at both an exegetical and a philosophical level. Placing particular emphasis on the case of non-human animals, Golob discusses in detail how and why his reading diverges from those of Ginsborg, Allais, Gomes and others. He suggests that ultimately it is only by embracing nonconceptualism that we can fully recognise the delicate calibration of the trap which the Critique sets for Hume.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
I do not think the solution here is as simple as emphasising the distinction between Wahrnehmung and Perception that is clouded by the English “perception”, although that is a good first step (see A225/B271, and compare Prol, 4:200 and A320/B376).
- 2.
I follow Allais in borrowing “particulars” from P.F. Strawson as a broader alternative to something like “material object”: “Material objects, people and their shadows are all particulars” (Strawson 1959:15).
- 3.
Infants can be naturally incorporated by treating their perceptions as similar to those of animals: at least up to a certain point, infants, like animals, lack any “online” faculty of understanding (Anth, 7:127).
- 4.
In this, my approach is in line with the existing debate; see, for example, Allais (2009:385).
- 5.
Whilst I disagree with her on these issues, I would like to stress that I am, like all writing on this topic, deeply indebted to Allais’s groundbreaking work.
- 6.
One might respond that the categories are necessary for empirical concepts because without category application we would be unable even to perceive spatiotemporal objects and so be unable to form or apply empirical concepts. Everything then hangs, of course, on what is meant by “objects”. I cannot treat this here, but I discuss it in detail in Golob (forthcoming b). For current purposes, we can simply note that, reframed in these terms, what is missing in Allais is an argument as to why empirical concept use should require objects in any sense which implies the categories: why cannot intuitions of what happens to be de facto a reasonably regular set of inputs plus the powers of abstraction and comparison suffice? One option, of course, would be to claim that without the categories we lack even the empirical intuitions from which we abstract empirical concepts—but this move is obviously unavailable to Allais as a nonconceptualist.
- 7.
I am not claiming that category application ensures we cannot be mistaken when drawing such a distinction. My claim is rather that Kant thinks that applying the category is a necessary condition on being able even to represent the relevant contrast.
- 8.
As the mention of simultaneity suggests, I think that all of the Principles ultimately closely interact: the ability to establish the type of mereological representation discussed in the Axioms goes hand in hand with the ability to represent objective simultaneity discussed in the Analogies.
- 9.
In order to avoid attributing such a weak argument to Kant, one might defend an alternative reading of this passage on which it concerns conditions only on some form of conceptual or discursive representation of the line. Textually this seems hard to sustain given the apparently unqualified scope of the passage (“I cannot represent to myself any line”). But were such a reading adopted, the passage would become immediately compatible with nonconceptualism—in accordance with the nonconceptualist strategy employed by both Allais and me, it would present categorial synthesis as a condition not on perception itself, but only on some more sophisticated achievement. So whilst I find this alternative reading questionable exegetically, its accuracy would only bolster the nonconceptualism I ultimately defend.
- 10.
This claim is compatible with the fact that there may be other transcendental arguments which do not play an anti-sceptical role (for example, the argument from geometry).
- 11.
One option open to these authors at this point would be to follow Ginsborg’s lead and emphasise the role of intentionality: perhaps the categories are a necessary condition for that. Given the wide variety of views on what constitutes intentionality, I cannot deal with that move here, unfortunately. I have addressed it in detail in Golob (forthcoming b). Another option would be to accept that, whilst the categories are not necessary for “perception” as we standardly use the term, they are necessary for some technical sense of “perception” which by definition involves apperception or other sophisticated capacities. This type of move is merely terminological and effectively concedes the case to nonconceptualism: exactly as the nonconceptualist claims, the mere intuition of spatiotemporal particulars itself, and thus perception in the usual sense, would be possible in the complete absence of conceptual abilities.
- 12.
For full discussion of the animal case, including the significance attached to the term “particular” and the distinction between the egocentric spatial awareness characteristic of animals and our own self-consciousness, see Golob (forthcoming b).
- 13.
I do not think this line of thought is enough to absolve Allais’s account from Gomes’s original worry since her premise for the categories is not even pre-theoretically an intuitive matter, but rather explicitly appeals to empirical concepts. In any case, even if Allais is able to escape that problem in this way, I think the other concerns raised regarding her account in Sect. 2.3 stand.
- 14.
The case of the Axioms is a little more complex in this regard. For details see Golob (forthcoming a).
- 15.
I would like to thank Lucy Allais, John Callanan, Anil Gomes, Robert Hanna, Dennis Schulting, Andrew Stephenson and Clinton Tolley for extremely helpful discussion of these issues. I am also very grateful to Dennis and to an anonymous referee for their comments on an earlier draft.
Bibliography
Allais, Lucy. 2009. Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47(3): 383–413.
Allison, H 1996. Idealism and Freedom. Essays on Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bowman, B. 2011. A Conceptualist Reply to Hanna’s Kantian Non-Conceptualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19(3): 417–446.
Burge, T. 2010. Origins of Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cassam, Q. 1987. Transcendental Arguments, Transcendental Synthesis and Transcendental Idealism. Philosophical Quarterly 37(149): 355–378.
Engstrom, S. 2006. Understanding and Sensibility. Inquiry 49(1): 2–25.
Falkenstein, L. 2006. Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic. In A Companion to Kant, ed. G. Bird, 140–153. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ginsborg, H 2006b. Kant and the Problem of Experience. Philosophical Topics 34(1): 56–106.
——— 2008. Was Kant a Nonconceptualist? Philosophical Studies 137(1): 65–77 [also published in D. Heidemann (2013), pp. 208–18.].
Golob, S 2015a. Kant as Both Conceptualist and Nonconceptualist. Kantian Review.
——— 2015b. What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism. In Kant and Animals, eds. L. Allais and J. Callanan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gomes, A 2014. Kant on Perception: Naive Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction. Philosophical Quarterly 64(2014): 1–19.
Griffith, A. 2012. Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. European Journal of Philosophy 20(2): 193–222.
Grüne, S 2011. Is There a Gap in Kant’s B Deduction? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19(3): 465–490.
Hanna, R 2011a. Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19(3): 323–398.
——— 2011b. Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and the Gap in the B Deduction. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19(3): 399–415.
——— 2013a. Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content. Hegel Bulletin 34(1): 1–32.
Heck, R. 2000. Nonconceptual Content and the “Space of Reasons”. Philosophical Review 109(4): 483–523.
Heidegger, M. 1997. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Hume, D. 1978. Treatise of Human Nature. ed. L. Selby-Bigge, second edition rev. P. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lear, J. 1984. The Disappearing “We”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58: 219–242.
McDowell, J 1994. Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Natorp, P. 1910. Die Logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften. Leipzig: Tübner.
Schulting, D 2015b. Probleme des “kantianischen” Nonkonzeptualismus im Hinblick auf die B-Deduktion. Kant-Studien 106(4): 561–580.
Speaks, J. 2005. Is There a Problem About Nonconceptual Content? Philosophical Review 114(3): 359–398.
Strawson, P.F. 1959. Individuals. London: Methuen.
Van Cleve, J. 1999. Problems from Kant. New York: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2016 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Golob, S. (2016). Why the Transcendental Deduction is Compatible with Nonconceptualism. In: Schulting, D. (eds) Kantian Nonconceptualism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53517-7_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53517-7_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-53516-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-53517-7
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)