Skip to main content

Mind and Brain: Toward an Understanding of Dualism

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

Part of the book series: History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences ((HPTL,volume 6))

Abstract

A post-Newtonian understanding of matter includes immaterial forces; thus, the concept of ‘physical’ has lost what usefulness it previously had and consequently Cartesian dualism has ceased to support a divide between the mental and the physical. A scientific understanding of mind that goes back at least as far as Priestley (eighteenth century) not only includes immaterial components but identifies brain parts in which these components correlate with neural activity. What are we left with? The challenge is not so much to figure out how a physical brain interacts with a nonphysical mind, but to try to unify theories of mind and theories of brain that to date do not share a single property. The challenge is enormous, but at least we can be quite clear about its nature, as there is no reason to be distracted by the idea of two distinct substances. In the present volume, several historical perspectives on the mind-body problem are discussed; we follow major currents of thought regarding the mind-body problem so that it can be seen how we arrived at our conception that it makes sense only to talk about theory unification.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Thales, as reported by Aristotle (De anima, 411a7); in Kirk and Raven 1971, 94.

  2. 2.

    Frankfort and Frankfort 1949, 14: ‘primitive man simply does not know an inanimate world.... The world appears to primitive man neither inanimate nor empty but redundant with life…’.

  3. 3.

    See, for example (Apostle 1969), Metaphysics A, wherein Aristotle critically surveys the views of his immediate predecessors.

  4. 4.

    It is worth noting that while the spirit (so to speak) of the Pythagorean view in some ways parallels the spirit of the Cartesian view, there are important differences in both the physics and metaphysics that inform the views.

  5. 5.

    Some scholars maintain that the accompanying creation doctrine is what Plato presents in his dialogue Timaeus. Others, Duerlinger (2005) e.g., think that Plato himself adopted a view very similar to this Pythagorean view.

  6. 6.

    There is one notable exception to this general rule: God. According to Aristotle, the divine being is form itself, without matter. See, Metaphysics Γ, Ζ, Η and Λ.

  7. 7.

    For a defense of the view that Aristotle did not consider the body and soul separate in any sense, see Matson 1966.

  8. 8.

    Al-Haytham’s Optics was published about 1025 CE; see Sabra (1983, 2002).

  9. 9.

    White 1963. White gives a number of reasons for the development of labour-saving technologies in medieval Europe, not least ‘the spiritual repugnance of subjecting anyone to drudgery’ (p. 291).

  10. 10.

    Vesalius 1998–2009, Book VII, Chapter 1, p. 624.

  11. 11.

    See, for example, Letter to Meyssonnier, 29 January, 1640; to Mersenne, 1 April, 1640; and to Mersenne, 30 July, 1640.

  12. 12.

    There are a number of theoretical debates continuing in the philosophy of mind. Dating back to J.J.C. Smart’s important (1959) paper “Sensations and Brain Processes,” there is the view that seeks a theoretical reduction of paradigmatic mental states to brain states, just as we are able to reduce lightning to electrical discharges. More recently, Kari Theurer and John Bickle (2013) have revived something of a mechanistic approach to the reduction of the mental to the physical. Lockwood (1989) suggests that the existence of what we refer to as consciousness presents yet another challenge to the common-sense view of matter, just as does quantum theory.

References

  • Apostle H (1966) Aristotle’s metaphysics, translated with commentaries. The Peripatetic Press, Grinnell

    Google Scholar 

  • Apostle H (1969) Aristotle’s physics, translated with commentaries. The Peripatetic Press, Grinnell

    Google Scholar 

  • Apostle H, Gerson L (1991) Aristotle: selected works, 3rd edn. Peripatetic Press, Grinnell

    Google Scholar 

  • Atherton M (1994) Women philosophers of the early modern period. Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Beretta A (2014) Joseph Priestley: an instructive 18th century perspective on the mind-body problem. In: Smith C, Whitaker H (eds) Brain and mind: essays in the history of neuroscience, Springer series in history, philosophy and theory of the life sciences. Springer, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Bright T (1586) A treatise of melancholie, containing the canvases therof, and reasons of the strange effects it worketh in our minds and bodies: with the phisicke cure, and spirituall consolation for such as haue thereto adioyned an afflicted conscience. Thomas Vautrollier, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers D (1995) Facing up to the problem of consciousness. J Conscious Stud 2(3):200–219

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers D (1996) The conscious mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N (1995) Language and nature. Mind 104:1–61

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Churchland PS (2002) Brain-wise: studies in neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Cottingham J, Stoothoff R, Murdoch D (1984) The philosophical writings of Descartes vols I, II. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cottingham J, Stoothoff R, Murdoch D, Kenny A (1991) The philosophical writings of Descartes, vol 3. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Letter to Meyssonnier: (CSMK, p. 143); Letter to Mersenne: (CSMK, p. 145); Letter to Regius (CSMK, p. 181)

    Google Scholar 

  • De la Mettrie JO (1748/1996) Machine man. In: Thomson A (ed) La Mettrie: machine man and other writings. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1–39

    Google Scholar 

  • Duerlinger J (2005) Plato’s Sophist: a translation with a detailed account of its theses and arguments. Peter Lang Publishing, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankfort H, Frankfort HA (1949) The intellectual adventure of ancient man: an essay on speculative thought in the ancient near East. Penguin, Baltimore

    Google Scholar 

  • Green CD, Groff PR (2003) Early psychological thought: ancient accounts of mind and soul. Praeger, Westport

    Google Scholar 

  • Hamilton E, Cairns H (1961) The collected dialogues of Plato including the letters. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Jaynes J (1990) The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind. Houghton Mifflin, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirk GS, Raven JE (1971) The pre-socratic philosophers: a critical history with a selection of texts. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Kline M (1985) Mathematics and the search for knowledge. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis CS (1964) The discarded image: an introduction to medieval and renaissance literature. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Locke J (1690/1975) Nidditch PH (ed) An essay concerning human understanding. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Lockwood M (1989) Mind, brain and the quantum: the compound “I”. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Margoliash D, Nusbaum HC (2009) Language: the perspective from organismal biology. Trends Cogn Sci 13:505–510

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Matson W (1966) Why isn’t the mind-body problem ancient? In: Feyerabend P, Maxwell G (eds) Mind, matter and method: essays in philosophy and science in honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel T (1974) What is it like to be a bat? Philos Rev 83:435–450

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pulvermüller F (2002) The neuroscience of language: on brain circuits of words and serial order. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Russo J, Simon B (1968) Homeric psychology and the oral epic tradition. J Hist Ideas 29(4):483–498

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ryle G (2002) The concept of mind. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Sabra AI (ed) (1983) The optics of Ibn al-Haytham, books I–II–III: on direct vision. The Arabic text, edited and with introduction, Arabic-Latin glossaries and concordance tables. National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters, Kuwait

    Google Scholar 

  • Sabra AI (ed) (2002) The optics of Ibn al-Haytham. Edition of the Arabic text of books IV–V: on reflection and images seen by reflection. 2 vols. The National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters, Kuwait

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandywell B (1996) The beginnings of European theorizing: logological investigations. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Smart JJC (1959) Sensations and brain processes. Philos Rev 68:141–156

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Theurer KL, Bickle J (2013) What’s old is new again: Kemeny-Oppenheim reduction in current molecular neuroscience. Philos Sci 17(2):89–113

    Google Scholar 

  • Vesalius A (1998–2009) On the fabric of the human body (trans: Richardson WF, Carman JB), 5 vols. Norman Publishing, San Francisco/Novato

    Google Scholar 

  • Whitaker HA (2007) Was medieval cell doctrine more modern than we thought? In: Cohen H, Stemmer B (eds) Consciousness and cognition: fragments of the mind and brain. Elsevier Science, London, pp 45–51

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • White H (1963) An anatomy of kinship. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kristopher G. Phillips .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Phillips, K.G., Beretta, A., Whitaker, H.A. (2014). Mind and Brain: Toward an Understanding of Dualism. In: Smith, C., Whitaker, H. (eds) Brain, Mind and Consciousness in the History of Neuroscience. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8774-1_18

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics