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Concept Formation and Commensurability

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Incommensurability and Related Matters

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 216))

Abstract

The paper addresses the issue of how the processes of concept formation and change in science can be brought to bear on the problem of incommensurability. It argues that the problem arises out of a methodological approach that identifies the conceptual structure of a science with a language and transfers what is thought to be known about languages to science. Employing a cognitive-historical method that shifts the focus to the representational and reasoning practices of scientists in constructing new concepts provides a way of uncovering the nature of the commensurability relations between successive representations of a domain.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Georgia Institute of Technology, USA

    Nancy J. Nersessian

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  1. Nancy J. Nersessian
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Hannover, Germany

    Paul Hoyningen-Huene

  2. University of Melbourne, Australia

    Howard Sankey

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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Nersessian, N.J. (2001). Concept Formation and Commensurability. In: Hoyningen-Huene, P., Sankey, H. (eds) Incommensurability and Related Matters. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 216. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9680-0_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9680-0_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5709-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9680-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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