Abstract
Received conceptions of the meanings of scientific terms assign to meanings an essentially benign methodological role: the meaning of a term consists of principles or inference rules which are, always or for the most part, (approximately) true or reliable. In fact, many scientific terms have meanings which are malignant: which are mainly false or misleading and which detract from, rather than contribute to, scientific progress. Kuhn’s conception of incommensurability can be fruitfully extended to take account of malignant meanings. Malignant meanings are especially implicated in cases, like that of human sociobiology, in which the influence of social ideology on scientific practice is especially profound.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Alexander, R. (1979). Darwinism and Human Affairs. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Alexander, R. (1987). The Biology of Moral Systems. New York: Aldyne de Gruyter.
Barash, D. (1979). The Whisperings Within. New York: Harper and Row.
Betzig, L., ed. (1997). Human Nature: A Critical Reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
Block, N. and G. Dworkin, eds. (1976). The IQ Controversy. New York: Pantheon.
Boyd, R. (1983). “On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism.” Erkenntnis 19: 45–90.
Boyd, R. (1985a). “Lex Orendi est Lex Credendi.” In P.Churchland and Hooker, eds., Images of Science: Scientific Realism Versus Constructive Empiricism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Boyd, R. (1985b). “Observations, Explanatory Power, and Simplicity.” In P. Achinstein and O. Hannaway, eds., Observation, Experiment, and Hypothesis In Modern Physical Science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Boyd, R. (1988). “How to be a Moral Realist.” In G. McCord, ed., Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Boyd, R. (1989). “What Realism Implies and What It Does Not.” Dialectica 43: 5–29.
Boyd, R. (1990a). “Realism, Approximate Truth and Philosophical Method.” In W. Savage, ed., Scientific Theories, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Volume 14. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Boyd, R. (1990b). “Realism, Conventionality, and ‘Realism About’.” In G. Boolos, ed., Meaning and Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boyd, R. (1991). “Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds.” Philosophical Studies 61: 127–148.
Boyd, R. (1992). “Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method.” In J. Earman, ed., Inference, Explanation and Other Philosophical Frustrations. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Boyd, R. (1993). “Metaphor and Theory Change.” (second version) In A. Ortony, ed., Metaphor and Thought. 2nd edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Boyd, R. (1995). “Postscript” to “How to be a Moral Realist.” In P. Moser and J. Trout, eds., Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. New York: Routledge.
Boyd, R. (1999). “Kinds as the ‘Workmanship of Men’: Realism, Constructivism, and Natural Kinds.” Proceedings of the Third International Congress, Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Buss, D. (1989). “Sex Differences in Human Mate Preferences: Evolutionary Hypotheses Tested in 37 Cultures.” Behavior and Brain Sciences 12: 1–14, as reprinted in Betzig 1997.
Carnap, R. (1950). “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology.” Revue internationale de philosophie, 4th year.
Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby. (1987). “From Evolution to Behavior: Evolutionary Psychology as the Missing Link.” In J. Dupre, ed., The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality, pp. 277–306, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Daly, M. and M. Wilson. (1997). “Child Abuse and Other Risks of not Living with Both Parents.” In L. Betzig, ed., Human Nature: A Critical Reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
Feigl, H. (1956). “Some Major Issues and Developments in the Philosophy of Science of Logical Empiricism.” In H. Feigl and M. Scriven, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 1. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Field, H. (1973). “Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference.” Journal of Philosophy 70:462–481.
Gilbert, A. (1981). “Historical Theory and the Structure of Moral Argument in Marx.” Political Theory 9: 173–205.
Gilbert, A. (1982). “An Ambiguity in Marx’s and Engel’s Account of Justice and Equality.” American Political Science Review 76: 328–346.
Gilbert, A. (1984). “Marx’s Moral Realism: Eudaimonism and Moral Progress.” In J. Farr and T. Ball, eds., After Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goodman, N. (1973). Fact, Fiction and Forecast. 3rd edition. Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill.
Gould, S. and R. Lewontin (1979). “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Program.” Proc. Roy. Soc. Lon. (B) 205: 581–598.
Hanson, N. (1958). Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1993). Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science, trans. A. Levine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kitcher, P. (1985). Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Kripke, S. (1971). “Identity and Necessity.” In M. Munitz, ed., Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press.
Kripke, S. (1972). “Naming and Necessity.” In D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., The Semantics of Natural Language. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Kuhn, T. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
LeVay, S. (1991). “A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men.” Science 253: 1034–1037.
LeVay, S. (1993). Untitled Short Editorial Piece, The Nation, July 5, 1993.
Lewontin, R. (1976). “Sociobiology — a Caricature of Darwinism.” In PSA 1976 Volume 2, pp. 22–31.
Lumsden, C. and E. Wilson. (1981). Genes Mind and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Miller, R. (1985). “Ways of Moral Learning.” Philosophical Review 94: 507–556.
Pinker, S. (1996). How the Mind Works. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Putnam, H. (1962). “The Analytic and the Synthetic.” In H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume3. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Putnam, H. (1972). “Explanation and Reference.” In G. Pearce and P. Maynard, eds., Dordrecht: Reidel.
Putnam, H. (1975a). Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sherman, P. and H. Reeve. (1997). “Forward and Backward: Alternative Approaches to Studying Human Social Evolution.” In L. Betzig, ed., Human Nature: A Critical Reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sturgeon, N. (1984). “Moral Explanations.” In D. Copp and D. Zimmerman, eds., Morality, Reason and Truth. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld.
Sturr, C. (1998). Ideology., Discursive Norms and Rationality. Ph.D. Dissertation, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University.
Thornhill, R. and N. Thornhill. (1990). “An Evolutionary Analysis of Psychological Pain Following Rape: I. The Effects of Victim’s and Marital Status.” Ethology and Sociobiology 11: 155–176.
Trivers, R. (1971). “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.” Quarterly Review of Biology 46: 35–39, 45–47.
Williams, G. (1975). Sex and Evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wilson, E. (1975). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Wilson, E. (1978). On Human Nature. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Wood, A. (1972). “The Marxian Critique of Justice.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 244–282.
Wood, A. (1979). “Marx on Right and Justice: A Reply to Husami.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 8: 267–295.
Wood, A. (1984). “A Marxian Approach ‘to the Problem of Justice.’” Philosophica 33: 9–32.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Boyd, R.N. (2001). Reference, (In)Commensurability and Meanings. In: Hoyningen-Huene, P., Sankey, H. (eds) Incommensurability and Related Matters. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 216. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9680-0_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9680-0_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5709-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9680-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive