Abstract
The idea that theories are intimately involved with models has been a commonplace in the philosophy of science for generations, though there have been logicist challenges from time to time. But the application of the idea of modelling to the understanding of experimental apparatus and its role in science is relatively new.
Acknowledgements: (1) Some of the material in this paper is drawn from J. Aronson, R. Harré and E.C. Way, Realism Rescued, London, Duckworth, 1996. (2) Some other material is drawn from R. Harré, ‘Recovering the Experiment’, Philosophy, LXXIII (1998), pp. 353-377.
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Notes
J. Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science, New York, Penguin, 1987, pp. 78–79.
R. Harré, Varieties of Realism, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986, p. 130.
R. Ackermann, Data, Instruments and Theory, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1985.
W. A. Wallace, The Scientific Methodology of Theodoric of Freibourg, Fribourg, 1959.
P. Thagard, “Scientific Change: the Discovery and Acceptance of the Bacterial Theory of Ulcers.” Address to The British Society for the Philosophy of Science, London, 10 March, 1997.
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Harré, R., Aronson, J.L., Way, E.C. (2000). Apparatus as Models of Nature. In: Hallyn, F. (eds) Metaphor and Analogy in the Sciences. Origins, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9442-4_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9442-4_1
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