Abstract
In this paper I argue for the thesis that Alfred Tarski’s original defmition of truth, together with its later elaboration in model theory, is an explicate of the classical correspondence theory of truth. In defending Tarski against some of his critics (see also Niiniluoto, 1994), I wish to show how this account of truth can be formulated, understood, and further developed in a philosophically satisfactory way. My overall aim is to employ the non-epistemic correspondence account of truth as a basis of the concept of truthlikeness (verisimilitude), which in turn is an indispensable ingredient of the philosophical programme of critical scientific realism (see Niiniluoto, 1984, 1987, forthcoming).
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Niiniluoto, I. (1999). Tarskian Truth as Correspondence — Replies to Some Objections. In: Peregrin, J. (eds) Truth and Its Nature (if Any). Synthese Library, vol 284. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9233-8_7
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