Abstract
Crispin Wright’s discussion of my paper on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem has the great merit of linking the principal topic of that with the more celebrated thesis of Lucas, recently endorsed by Penrose. In my paper I did not refer to Lucas’s work, unsurprisingly since his original paper on the subject was published in the same year as mine; but I came close to endorsing his view, saying:
it may be the case that no formal system can ever succeed in embodying all the principles of proof that we should intuitively accept; and this is precisely what is shown to be the case in regard to number theory by Gödel’s theorem.1
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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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McGuinness, B., Oliveri, G. (1994). Reply to Wright. In: McGuinness, B., Oliveri, G. (eds) The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Synthese Library, vol 239. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8336-7_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8336-7_21
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