Abstract
There is a natural confusion between existence and designation, but these are really orthogonal issues. Terms designate; objects exist. For instance the phrase “the first President of the United States” designates George Washington, though thinking temporally, the person being designated is no longer with us—the person designated does not exist, though he once did. The nonexistent George Washington is designated by the phrase now. On the other hand the phrase, “the present King of France,” does not designate anybody now, living or dead, though at certain past instances it did designate.
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Fitting, M., Mendelsohn, R.L. (1998). Designation. In: First-Order Modal Logic. Synthese Library, vol 277. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5292-1_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5292-1_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-5335-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-5292-1
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