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Antitrust in Software Markets

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Abstract

The computer and software sector is a tremendously important and visible part of the economy. It is also a sector in which there have long been concerns about monopolization. In the past, these concerns centered on monopolization by IBM. Today, the concerns are with Microsoft, but in many ways they are the same. IBM was accused of attempting to sabotage industry standards in Fortran; Microsoft is accused of sabotaging JAVA. IBM was accused of predatory product pre-announcements; Microsoft has been accused of employing “vaporware” — the tactic of announcing products before they are ready in order to preempt the market — to undercut its competitors. IBM was accused of bundling functionality into its CPUs to reduce the value of peripheral equipment; Microsoft is battling government lawyers over the bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows 95. IBM was accused of manipulating interfaces and refusing to reveal them to competitors; Microsoft is accused of refusing to reveal interfaces to competitors. Both companies entered into consent decrees with the Department of Justice to settle antitrust charges.

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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Katz, M.L., Shapiro, C. (1999). Antitrust in Software Markets. In: Eisenach, J.A., Lenard, T.M. (eds) Competition, Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4407-0_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4407-0_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5894-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-4407-0

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