Abstract
There was a celebrated philosophical dispute. It was the very model of a philosophical dispute: protracted, much at cross purposes, confused, inconclusive. On one side, indisputably, was Karl Popper. The name he coined for his foes had even by the 1980s no entry in the Oxford English Dictionary, the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, or even that repository of words too unrespectable to make such august lexica, Partridge’s Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English. He called them “inductivists“.
An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the AAHPSSS conference in July 1997 at Auckland University, under the title ‘The Trojan Horse: or, How Popperism Took the Inductivist Citadel’.
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Fox, J.F. (2000). With Friends Like These ..., or What is Inductivism and Why is it Off the Agenda?. In: Nola, R., Sankey, H. (eds) After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3935-9_5
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