Framing and Solving Problems

Abstract

In this Part III, I take a closer look at learning science in an open-inquiry laboratory environment. I particularly focus on various aspects of students’ framing of problems and solution finding. That is, we follow students who were faced not with preframed problems, but who were in a situation where they had to construct their own problems as well as their own solutions.¹ I begin with a brief review of the literature on problem-solving from three different perspectives: the traditional cognitive science view with its laboratory-bound (‘indoors’) research methods of investigating well-defined problems and puzzles; the research on problem-solving and decision making in groups and organizations which focuses on messy problems in real organizations (‘outdoors’, ‘garbage cans’); and finally, the research on problem-solving in everyday out-of-school settings (‘outdoors’) by ordinary people (JPFs) and by designated scientists in their laboratories. Following this overview, I present my findings on problem framing and solving in the Grade 8 general science and grade 11/12 physics classes. I continue with a discussion of traditional, well-defined versus not-so-traditional, ill-defined problems in science classrooms. My central finding is that problem-solving in open-inquiry environments is distinctly different from doing word problems posed by the teacher or textbook. Based on the data from both the Grade 8 ecology unit and the grade 11 and 12 physics investigations, I claim that this problem-solving is more akin to everyday out-of-school problem-solving by JPFs and scientists than that which students had to do in traditional classrooms. In both the open-inquiry and out-of-school, problems and solutions emerged from complex interactions between individuals and their setting. As a consequence, take legitimate ownership of the problem, and this contributes to the students’ motivation and sense of responsibility for their own learning. Finally, I provide data for the claim that concrete modes of thought, the analysis of situation with concrete models, and narratives are not inferior to the abstract modes of thought which are valued in rationalistic science. I provide arguments for my claims that concrete and abstract thought are expressions of the relationship between individual and problem rather than properties of individuals.