The Psychological Concept of Subjective Probability: A MeasurementTheoretic View
 Thomas S. Wallsten
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Abstract
A point of view is presented concerning the psychological concept of subjective probability, both to study its relation to the corresponding mathematical and philosophical concepts and to provide a framework for the rigorous investigation of problems unique to psychology. In order to do this the empirical implications of axiom systems for measurement are discussed first, relying primarily on Krantz’s work, with special emphasis, however, on some similarities and differences between psychological and physical variables. The psychological variable of uncertainty is then examined in this light, and it is concluded that few, if any, current theories of subjective probability are satisfactory when viewed from this perspective, including those deriving from the mathematical work in the axiomatic foundations of probability. This might appear to pose difficulties for applications to real problems of normative decision theory when those applications require numerical probability judgments from individuals. Two possible solutions are discussed briefly
 Title
 The Psychological Concept of Subjective Probability: A MeasurementTheoretic View
 Book Title
 The Concept of Probability in Psychological Experiments
 Pages
 pp 4972
 Copyright
 1974
 DOI
 10.1007/9789401022880_4
 Print ISBN
 9789401022903
 Online ISBN
 9789401022880
 Series Title
 Theory and Decision Library
 Series Volume
 8
 Series Subtitle
 An International Series in the Philosophy and Methodology of the Social and Behavioral Sciences
 Publisher
 Springer Netherlands
 Copyright Holder
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
 Additional Links
 Topics
 eBook Packages
 Editors
 Editor Affiliations

 3. Stanford Research Institute
 Authors

 Thomas S. Wallsten ^{(4)}
 Author Affiliations

 4. L. L. Thurstone Psychometric Laboratory, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina, USA
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