Discussion Special Contribution to the Debate

Abstract

I shall concentrate on a central point in the phenomenological enterprise, namely the function of the life-world (LW) concept in constitutional analyses. The merit of Professor Mohanty’s distinction between LW₁ and LW₂ is that it commits us ultimately to reject any kind of pure foundations interpretation of Husserl’s work. It should be clear that neither LW₁ nor LW₂ can provide the justificatory ground of incorrigible statements from which, say, particular scientific statements are derived (or to which they can be reduced). But if an appeal to the life-world does not serve this function, what purpose does it serve ? Professor Mohanty’s answer is that the “vague typicalities” of LW₂ “are the a priori conditions of the possibility of an entity, or world, whatsoever.” It is to this rather Kantian answer that I shall direct my following remarks.

Research for this paper was supported by a summer grant from the SUNYA Committee on Institutional Funds.