Outlines of a Theory of “Essentially Occasional Expressions”

Abstract

In describing the organization with which the perceptual world always presents itself to consciousness, whether thematically or marginally, we must use expressions such as “in front,” “behind,” “near,” “far,” etc. These terms imply a certain relativity to a referential system in the sense that an object to which one of these terms may be applied under certain circumstances, i.e. with respect to one orientation of the referential system, may no longer be designated by the same term when some change in the orientation of this system occurs. Sitting at my desk, I may designate a book which lies on my desk by saying “this is in front of me.” When I turn my back, the book can no longer be designated by the term “in front,” which now applies, say, to a picture hanging on the wall; but the picture was not “in front of me” before I turned my back on the book. As to the application of the terms in question to objects and the designation of the latter by the former, a certain equivocation appears insofar as the same term sometimes does and sometimes does not apply to the same object.

Published for the first time with the kind permission of Mrs. Aron Gurwitsch. The manuscript has been edited by Lester Embree to whom I am grateful — J. N. M.