Justification and Proper Basing

Abstract

Some thirty or so years ago, Keith Lehrer attacked the idea that causation has much to do with knowledge or justification with the case of the gypsy lawyer, and has more recently endorsed the same kind of attack with the case of the racist scientist.’ These cases threaten not only causal theories of knowledge but also theories of knowledge or justification which require that one’s evidence be at least a partial cause of one’s belief. They threaten, that is, the view that causation is at the heart of the distinction between propositional justification, the justification one has for thecontentof one’s belief, and doxastic justification, the justification which attaches to the believing itself. When justification attaches to the believing itself rather than merely to the content of what is believed, it is because one holds the belief in questionon the basis ofthe evidence. When justification only attaches to propositional contents, there is a failure of such basing, e.g., one may have the evidence but believe for different reasons.

This essay is written in honor of Lehrer’s luminary career in philosophy, out of deep respect for his intellectual achievements and gratitude for his acquaintance and gracious assistance throughout my career. It is a privilege to know him, and I dedicate this essay to a splendid human being and brilliant philosopher.