Abstract
I have already touched on the contrast between psychology and transcendental phenomenology — as well as the relationship between them — a number of times. In this chapter I will deal with this relationship in a more systematic way. In the process we must bear in mind the fundamental difference between empirical psychology and descriptive psychology, a difference we already encountered in Husserl’s early work. Thus the question of the relationship between psychology and transcendental phenomenology becomes two questions. First, what is the relationship of transcendental phenomenology to descriptive psychology? Second, what is its relationship to empirical psychology? I will take up these two questions separately.
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References
Among the passages on the a priority of transcendental phenomenology, see 5, 33, 153.
Nachwort 146, 159; PP 247, 264, 267, 269, 295. See also below 477.
Krisis 205 (E 202); PP 292.
Husserliana III 65, 183; Krisis 238 (E 235); PP 241, 243.
Fink, ‘Die phän. Phil. E. Husserls in der gegenw. Kritik,’ 379f.
Fink, op.cit. 332, 338, 340.
Fink, op.cit. 345, see also 334ff.
Fink, op.cit. 376.
See P. Koestenbaum, The Paris Lectures XLV, LXXXII; Ricoeur note 1 to 105 Idées directrices.
LU II (ed. 2) 354 note 1, 357 note 1, 361 note 1, 363 note 1. In the foreword to LU I, XVI, Husserl writes that the new edition retains the original passages because of Natorp’s interesting polemic in his Allgemeine Psychologie of 1913, 280, 290.
Entwurf 337/8. Husserl says here that he discovered the important difference between transcendental phenomenology and rational psychology around 1908.
Id IV 42, 43; see above 418f.
PSW 295; Id I 44, 45.
PSW 304, 320; on Lipps see also Id I 151.
Id II 92, 133, 138.
PSW 313f, 308.
PSW 303–320.
According to Husserl in Krisis 48 (E 48); see above 424.
PSW 318. See also Id III 39f, 48. The a priori structure says nothing about contingent truths.
PSW 299; Id I 118.
LU II (ed. 2) 22; PSW 299.
PSW 314f; see also 302, 294, 336, Id I 38.
PSW 298f; see also Krisis 208 (E 204).
Compare LU (ed. 2) 336, 338 to Id I 77, 93, 184. See above 229.
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© 1978 Martinus Nijoff Publishers bv, The Hague
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De Boer, T. (1978). Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology. In: The Development of Husserl’s Thought. Phaenomenologica, vol 76. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9691-5_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9691-5_18
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